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ABSTRACT
ENSURING APPLICATION SPECIFIC SECURITY, PRIVACY AND
PERFORMANCE GOALS IN RFID SYSTEMS

Farzana Rahman
Marquette University, 2013

Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is an automatic identification technology that
uses radio frequency to identify objects. Securing RFID systems and providing privacy in RFID
applications has been the focus of much academic work lately. To ensure universal acceptance of
RFID technology, security and privacy issued must be addressed into the design of any RFID
application. Due to the constraints on memory, power, storage capacity, and amount of logic on
RFID devices, traditional public key based strong security mechanisms are unsuitable for them.
Usually, low cost general authentication protocols are used to secure RFID systems. However, the
generic authentication protocols provide relatively low performance for different types of RFID
applications. We identified that each RFID application has unique research challenges and
different performance bottlenecks based on the characteristics of the system. One strategy is to
devise security protocols such that application specific goals are met and system specific
performance requirements are maximized.
This dissertation aims to address the problem of devising application specific security
protocols for current and next generation RFID systems so that in each application area maximum
performance can be achieved and system specific goals are met. In this dissertation, we propose
four different authentication techniques for RFID technologies, providing solutions to the
following research issues: 1) detecting counterfeit as well as ensuring low response time in large
scale RFID systems, 2) preserving privacy and maintaining scalability in RFID based healthcare
systems, 3) ensuring security and survivability of Computational RFID (CRFID) networks, and 4)
detecting missing WISP tags efficiently to ensure reliability of CRFID based system’s decision.
The techniques presented in this dissertation achieve good levels of privacy, provide security,
scale to large systems, and can be implemented on resource-constrained RFID devices.
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Chapter 1:

Introduction

Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is an automatic identification technology that
uses radio waves to identify objects such as products, animals or persons. Each RFID system has
three main components: tag, reader, and database. An RFID reader and an RFID tag communicate
via a wireless radio communication channel. The basic idea of RFID technology is an automatic
identification technique, which relies on storing and remotely retrieving data about objects we
want to manage using RFID tags. Some popular applications of RFID technology are product
tracking in a supply chain [Li07], toll payments [Mayes09], military applications and access
control [Juels05a], patient recognition in hospitals [Juels05a], automatic vehicle identification
[Juels05a], point of sale applications [Juels05a], library book administration [Juels05a], and epassports [Juels05b].
Near field communication (NFC) [NFC] is a similar technology like RFID with much
less capability. NFC is a subset of RFID that limits the range of communication to within 10
centimeters or 4 inches. However, one advantage of NFC is that some mobile phones are being
equipped with NFC now-a-days. But this advantage of NFC is overshadowed by its limitations,
like: NFC has a very limited range and it cannot be programmed like active RFID tags. Therefore,
it cannot be used in applications where the reading range has to be in meters. It cannot be used in
many sophisticated applications where the active tag has to be programmed for special purpose.
Specially, in most of the healthcare applications (like: pharmaceutical drug tracking, patient
specific meal dispatch and such sophisticated application) longer range and tag programming
capability is required. Since RFID tags can be read in longer range and it can be programmed for
special purpose, it has become popular over the last decade in many real life application areas.
We envision that low-cost RFID tags will be attached to every object in our daily lives,
from clothes, books, and pens, to very small objects, such as pins and buttons. Annotating objects
around us with tags gives us an enormous advantage in connecting the physical world with the
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cyber-world so that people can easily obtain information about the environment and physical
objects. We believe that more powerful tags and readers in the future promise many more
applications based on how we may use those tags.
Unit cost per tag is a major consideration for RFID tags because some applications need
low cost tags. Cost may be a secondary consideration in passports or credit cards because security
is paramount and these devices may pass that cost on to the consumer without much concern. In
an application like product tagging, cost is paramount, and the cost per tag needs to be low;
otherwise, the benefits of RFID are outweighed by the cost.
However, simply integrating RFID technology into the above mentioned applications will
not ensure that the needed services are provided adequately, because RFID systems operate
untrusted environments, for which adversaries motivated by different purposes may attack the
system. Some will block readers from hearing tags. Further, attackers may attempt to hide within
a group of authorized users in an attempt to eavesdrop private information. Moreover, privacy is
an issue that could hinder the wider use of RFID. Furthermore, privacy will become an even more
important issue as RFID technology is pervasively applied. To ensure a wider use of RFID
technology, security must be included into any design of applications. In some systems one must
make sure the communication between tags and readers is confidential and authenticated, in other
systems the information provided by the tags needs to be authenticated and in other systems the
access to the RFID systems, including tags, readers and other related equipment should be
classified against unauthorized parties.
Securing RFID systems and providing privacy in RFID consumer applications has been
the focus of much academic work lately. Due to the constraints on memory, power, computation
capacity, and limitations of logic on RFID devices, standard cryptographic primitives are often
unsuitable for them. Therefore, researchers focused on developing general authentication
protocols based on lightweight cryptographic tools to ensure the security and privacy of RFID
systems. However, these generic authentication protocols provide relatively low performance for
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different types of RFID applications. There was no validated explanation as to why achieving a
generalized security solution with maximum system performance is not possible for all RFID
systems. With deeper investigation of existing RFID applications and analysis of authentication
protocols, we identified that each RFID application has different underlying research challenges
and a different set of performance bottlenecks based on the unique characteristics of the system.
One strategy is to devise security protocols such that application specific goals are met and
system specific performance requirements are maximized. For example:
1) The main challenge in an RFID based supply chain is to detect counterfeit products at
the same time ensure low system response time.
2) Systems like, RFID-based healthcare, e-passports, and office personnel monitoring are
more focused on ensuring privacy and maintaining scalability.
3) More sophisticated applications like RFID-installed military networks are more
focused on maintaining system survivability without sacrificing system’s performance.
All these applications of RFID technology have a different set of research challenges in
meeting their system specific goals.
The aim of this dissertation is to make several contributions to address the problem of
devising application specific security protocols for the current and next generation of RFID
systems so that in each application area maximum performance can be achieved and other system
specific goals are met. Since ensuring security is the common goal in almost any RFID system,
our major focus has been to develop and implement authentication protocols to solve the
identified research issues using lightweight operations like hash functions, XOR operations or
pseudorandom number generation.
1.1. Dissertation Focus
In this dissertation, we focus on understanding different research challenges
corresponding to four different applications of current and next generation RFID systems, so that
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in each application area maximum performance can be achieved and other system specific goals
are met. Though there can be numbers of different RFID applications, most of them fall under the
umbrella of the four RFID application areas that are mentioned in this dissertation. Therefore, the
contribution of this dissertation makes an effort to address the security, privacy and performance
goals of many common RFID applications, as well as providing solution to the following research
issues of four major specific RFID application areas:
1) Detecting counterfeits in large-scale RFID systems
2) Preserving privacy in RFID based healthcare systems
3) Ensuring survivability of Computational RFID (CRFID) systems
4) Ensuring reliability of system’s decision in CRFID based critical systems
1.2. Major Contributions
In this section, we briefly summarize the contributions of this dissertation. In this
dissertation, first, we describe the properties of a typical RFID and Computational RFID system
in Chapter 2. Next, in Chapter 3, we summarize all the possible attacks that can be launched
against RFID systems and how our proposed approaches can defend against those problems.
Then, in Chapter 4, we point out the security, privacy and performance goals that should be
guaranteed by RFID protocols to defend against various attacks. Throughout the dissertation, we
use four different RFID applications as a motivating example of RFID systems with a strong
demand for various goals mentioned in Chapter 4. In this same chapter, we also present how these
goals are achieved by our proposed four RFID protocols. Then, in Chapter 6, 7, 8 and 9, we
present our approaches that propose defense mechanisms against various attacks as well as ensure
application specific goals mentioned in chapter 4. Our proposed approaches to ensure security,
privacy and system specific goals in four different RFID application areas are as follows:
•

Detecting counterfeits in large-scale RFID systems: In Chapter 6 we have introduced

the concept of batch authentication for detecting counterfeits efficiently. In large-scale RFID
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applications (such as supply chain, pharmaceutical industry, etc.), general authentication is used
to detect counterfeit products. However, general authentication protocols are mainly per-tag
based where the reader needs to authenticate tags sequentially and one at a time. This increases
the protocol execution time due to a large volume of authentication data. To solve this issue, we
proposed to detect counterfeit tags by verifying the objects in batches. We present a batch
authentication protocol named FTest to meet the requirements of prompt and reliable counterfeit
tag detection. The novel discovery of this work is that the batch authentication can reduce the
system response time while performing significantly better than existing counterfeit detection
approaches.
•

Preserving privacy in RFID based healthcare systems: In Chapter 7, we have

identified the two major types of privacy preservation techniques that are required in RFID-based
healthcare: 1) a privacy preserving authentication protocol is required while sensing RFID tags
for different identification and monitoring purposes and 2) a privacy preserving access control
mechanism is required to restrict unauthorized access of private information while providing
healthcare services using the tag ID. We designed and developed a “two component based
framework” that makes an effort to address the above mentioned two privacy issues. One
component of the framework is a privacy preserving authentication protocol that provides more
privacy than the existing approaches when RFID tags are sensed by a nearby legitimate reader.
The other component of the framework allows authenticated user access in the information
system. This system consists of both the ID of the RFID tag and its corresponding usage history.
To the best of our knowledge, it is the first framework to provide increased privacy in RFIDbased healthcare systems, using RFID authentication along with access control techniques.
•

Ensuring survivability of Computational RFID (CRFID) systems: In Chapter 8, we

propose a robust authentication protocol to defend against the DoS attack in CRFID systems. Due
to the sensing capability of CRFID tags, recently they have been used in many sophisticated
applications like physiological signal monitoring in home healthcare systems, enemy move

6

detection in military battlefield, activity inference, etc. In these types of CRFID applications, an
adversary may launch DoS attack by de-synchronizing the tags with the reader. This may
jeopardize the survivability of the system. In an effort to address the survivability issues of
CRFID systems, we propose DRAP protocol. DRAP allows both tag and reader to communicate
successfully with each other and provide service even if the adversary launches Desynchronization or DoS attack.
•

Ensuring reliability of system’s decision in CRFID based critical systems: In Chapter

9 we have studied the problem of monitoring a large set of WISP tags and identifying the missing
tags in CRFID-based critical systems. Recently, CRFID tags have been used in many critical
applications like monitoring indoor activity, vital signs, sleep quality, and health status remotely.
These types of systems make critical decisions based on the data collected from each individual
tag in the system and perform collective information analysis. Hence, the absence of any tag data
may eventually introduce serious error into the decision making process of the system. To address
this, we propose two tag monitoring protocols for WISP based critical systems based on
probabilistic methods. Our approach proposes a secure protocol to monitor for missing tags and
for collecting sensor values from existing tags only, to reduce system response time of CRFID
based critical systems.
•

In chapter 6, 7, 8, and 9 we propose four different protocols for four example RFID

application areas. Though we have used specific application scenario as a motivating example,
most of the RFID systems fall within the category of one of these application types. Figure 1.1
presents a summary of what security, privacy and performance goals are achieved by our
proposed protocols.
We emphasize that we do not consider in our work low-level criteria such as gate count
or power consumption of tags because, although important, these depend on the implementation
of the building blocks. Instead, we focus on the protocols, their efficiency, and the security and
privacy level they achieve. The techniques presented in this dissertation achieve good levels of
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privacy, provide security, scale to large systems, and can be implemented on resource-constrained
RFID devices. From now on we refer to Computational RFID systems as CRFID systems.
Table 1.1 Security, Privacy and Performance goals addressed by our proposed protocols
Privacy Access
DoS/DeSpoofi Track Eavesdro
Scalability
Violation of data Synchronization ng
ing
pping
Ftest Protocol
(Chapter 6)
PriSens
Protocol
(Chapter 7)
DRAP
Protocol
(Chapter 8)
MTD
Protocol
(Chapter 9)

Low response
time

X

X

+A

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

+A

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

+A

X

X

X

X

X

Assumptions in our Proposed Approaches: For the rest of the dissertation, we consider
typical RFID tags that are capable of generating Pseudo Random Number (PRNG), performing
simple hash function and XOR operation. From this point on and in the rest of the dissertation,
we use Computational RFID and CRFID interchangeably. Like majority of the literature on RFID
security, in all of our approaches, we assume that the channel between server and reader is secure.
We also assume the physical security of the devices involved, like an intruder not being able to
have physical access to the contents of the truck.
1.3. Dissertation Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:
•

In Chapter 2, we present a brief description of RFID technology. We first discuss the
historical perspective of RFID technology. Next in this section, we discuss different
components of RFID systems and their constraints. Next, we introduce Computational RFID
(CRFID) technology.
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•

In Chapter 3, we start by pointing out the attack objectives and goals of an RFID system
attacker. Then we briefly discuss the security requirements of RFID systems and RFID
protocols. Next we define different types of adversary. This is followed by a detailed
discussion of different types of attacks in RFID systems and attack intentions of an adversary.

•

In Chapter 4, we briefly describe the security, privacy and performance goals that should be
guaranteed by most RFID applications. We also point out some system specific goals that
should be guaranteed by authentication protocols to ensure maximum system functionality.
At the end of this section we present a summary of which goals are satisfied by our proposed
RFID authentication protocols.

•

In Chapter 5, we discuss some classic and some recently proposed RFID protocols that use
symmetric cryptography to ensure the identified privacy, security and performance
requirements.

•

In Chapter 6, we present our motivation for addressing the issue of batch authentication in
large scale supply chain. The rest of the chapter presents the details of our proposed protocols
(GTest and FTest), analysis, and evaluation results.

•

In Chapter 7, we introduce the notion of the two-fold privacy preservation issue in RFID
based healthcare systems. The rest of the chapter presents the details of our proposed privacy
preserving framework (PriSens-HSAC), security analysis, and evaluation results.

•

In Chapter 8, we introduce the issue of survivability in CRFID networks. The rest of the
chapter briefly presents the details of our proposed protocol (DRAP), security analysis, and
evaluation results.

•

In Chapter 9, we introduce the notion of missing tag monitoring in CRFID based home
healthcare systems. The rest of the chapter briefly presents the details of our proposed
missing tag detection protocol (MTD), security analysis, and evaluation results.
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•

In Chapter 10, we summarize the contributions of this dissertation, and identify future
research directions.

1.4. Publications
In this section, we list out the publications that forms the basis this dissertation.
1.4.1. Publication based on the contributions of the dissertation
• The contribution of chapter 4, i.e. the literature survey on attacks on RFID systems forms the
base of a paper that we have submitted in Journal of ACM Computing Surveys.

• The proposed methodologies of Chapter 6 have been published and they are as follows:
Published [Rahman12a]: Farzana Rahman and Sheikh Iqbal Ahamed, “Looking for
needles in a haystack: Detecting Counterfeits in Large Scale RFID Systems using Batch
Authentication Protocol”, In Proc. of IEEE PerCom Workshop on Pervasive Wireless #etworking
(PW#12). Switzerland. 2012. pp. 811 - 816. [Acceptance rate: 20%]
In Press [Rahman12c]: Farzana Rahman and Sheikh Iqbal Ahamed, “Efficient Detection
of Counterfeit Products in Large Scale RFID Systems with Batch Authentication Protocols”,
Accepted to be published in Journal of Personal and Ubiquitous Computing, Springer-Verlag.
2012.

• The proposed methodologies of Chapter 7 have been published and they are as follows:
Published [Rahman12b]: Farzana Rahman and Sheikh Iqbal Ahamed, “I am not a
goldfish in a bowl: A Privacy Preserving Framework for RFID based Healthcare Systems”, In
Proc. of IEEE 14th International Conference on e-Health #etworking, Applications and Services
(IEEE Healthcom 2012). China. 2012. [Best paper winner]
Published [Hoque11]: Md. Endadul Hoque, Farzana Rahman, and Sheikh I. Ahamed,
"AnonPri: An Efficient Anonymous Private Authentication Protocol", In Proc. of IEEE
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International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom 2011), WA,
USA. 2011. pp.102-110. [Acceptance rate: 11%]
Under Review: Farzana Rahman and Sheikh Iqbal Ahamed, “A Privacy Preserving
Framework for RFID based Healthcare Systems”, In a journal.

• The proposed methodologies of Chapter 8 have been published and they are as follows:
Published [Rahman12d]: Farzana Rahman and Sheikh Iqbal Ahamed, “DRAP: A
Robust Authentication Protocol to Ensure Survivability of Computational RFID Networks”, In
Proc. of ACM Symposium on Applied Computing (SAC 2012). Italy. 2012. pp. 498-503.
In Preparation: Farzana Rahman and Sheikh Iqbal Ahamed, “Designing Survivable
Computational RFID Systems with Robust Authentication Protocol”.

• The proposed methodologies of Chapter 9 have been published and they are as follows:
Published [Rahman12e]: Farzana Rahman and Sheikh Iqbal Ahamed, “MonAC:
Detecting Missing Tags for Improved Accuracy in Computational RFID based Assisted
Environments”, In Proc. of the ACM Symposium on Research in Applied Computation (ACM
RACS 2012). USA. 2012.
Under Review: Farzana Rahman and Sheikh Iqbal Ahamed, “Towards Improving
Security and Reliability of Computational RFID based Assisted Environments”, In a journal.
1.4.2. Other related publications
Notable publications related to this dissertation are as follows: [Ahamed08a, Ahamed08b,
Ahamed08c, Ahamed08d, Ahamed08e, Hoque09a, Hoque10a, and Rahman 11].
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Chapter 2:

Overview of RFID and Computational RFID Technology

The goal of this chapter is to discuss some basics of RFID technology. It starts by
highlighting the historical perspective of RFID. Then the technical background of RFID readers
and tags are discussed. We also give a description of Computational RFID (CRFID) technology
at the end of this chapter.
2.1. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Technology
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) (Figure 2.1) is the classic pervasive computing
technology. At the very beginning, RFID was plugged as the replacement for traditional barcodes
and its’ wireless identification capabilities promise to revolutionize our industrial, commercial,
and medical experiences. What makes RFID unique is that it facilitates information gathering
about physical objects easy. Information about RFID tagged objects can be read through physical
barriers and from a distance. In line with Mark Weiser's concept of ubiquitous computing
[Weiser93, Pervasive1, and Pervasive2], RFID tags could turn our interactions with computing
infrastructure into something more ubiquitous than ever before.

Figure 2.1 Different types of RFID tags (Source: [WikiTag])

Unit cost per tag is a major consideration for RFID tags because some applications need
low cost tags. Cost may be a secondary consideration in passports or credit cards because security
is paramount and these devices may pass that cost on to the consumer without much concern. In
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an application like product tagging, cost is paramount, and the cost per tag needs to be low;
otherwise, the benefits of RFID are outweighed by the cost. Securing RFID tags and providing
privacy in consumer applications, while limiting cost per tag, has been the focus of much
academic work. Due to the constraints on memory, power consumption, and amount of logic on
RFID devices, standard cryptographic primitives are often unsuitable.
In recent years, numbers of papers have been published providing solutions to RFID
security and privacy challenges. One approach to addressing such privacy and security threats is
to use a tag authentication scheme in which a tag is both identified and verified in a manner that
does not reveal the tag identity to an attacker. However, RFID tags have limited computation
power and storage because of the tag cost requirements.
2.2. History and RFID Technology
RFID is an acronym for Radio Frequency IDentification. It designates a large family of
technologies and devices all having in common the aim to identify objects or persons with RFID
tags. Even if RFID is often thought of as a very new domain, actually it dates back to World War
II. British technology IFF (Identify Friend or Foe) was developed in the late 1930s to help the
Royal Air Force to distinguish between friendly and hostile aircrafts, and it is the ancestor of
RFID technology. Basically, the IFF of WWII and Soviet era systems used coded radar signals to
automatically trigger the aircraft transponder in an aircraft identified by the radar. An aircraft
responding to an IFF request was then considered a friend, one not responding a foe. This
technique was intended to reduce friendly fire. Since then RFID has seen new forms and
applications.
Starting in the late 1980s battery powered active RFID devices have been used for
automatic toll collecting on motorway (e.g. Telepass in Italy). Nevertheless the big revolution,
bringing RFID to the attention of common people and media, has certainly been due to the
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progresses in miniaturization, which led to very small and cheap tags, well suited to be applied on
single packages of products.
2.3. A Typical RFID System Architecture
RFID systems are made up of three main components: RFID tag, RFID reader, and the
back-end database. Figure 2.2 illustrates a typical RFID system. In the following subsections, we
explain the details of different components of an RFID system.

Figure 2.2 Architecture of a simple RFID system

2.3.1. RFID tags or transponder
In an RFID system, each object will be labeled with a tag. Each tag contains a microchip
with some computation and storage capabilities and an antenna coil for communication. Tags can
be classified according to three main criteria:
A) Memory Type: The memory element serves as writable and non-writable data storage. Tags
can be programmed to be read-only, write-once read-many, or fully rewritable. Depending on the
kind of tag, tag programming can take place at the manufacturing level or at the application level.
B) Power Source: A tag can obtain power from the signal received from the reader, or it can have
its own internal source of power. The way the tag gets its power generally defines the category of
the tag.
• Passive RFID tags. Passive tags do not have an internal source of power. They harvest
their power from the reader that sends out electromagnetic waves. They are restricted in
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their read/write range as they rely on RF energy from the reader for both power and
communication.
• Semi-passive RFID tags. Semi-passive tags use a battery to run the microchip’s circuitry
but communicate by harvesting power from the reader signal.
• Active RFID tags. Active tags possess a power source that is used to run the microchip’s
circuitry and to broadcast a signal to the reader.
C) Computational capability: Based on the computational capacity of RFID tags, there are
mainly two types [Song09]: dumb and smart.
• Dumb tags: A dumb tag has very low computation capacity, and it has a unique identifier
that is of a fixed unique length (usually 10 or 16 hexadecimal digits long) value. The
memory capacity of a dumb tag is likely to be fairly small (i.e. hundred bytes to 2kBytes).
• Smart tags: Smart tags have a small processor built within them that has the capability do
some cryptographic operation [Laurie07]. They usually have a larger memory capacity
(32kBytes or more) compared to dumb tags. Smart tags can perform authentication before
allowing access to the stored data. Such a tag can encrypt communications to avoid some
major attacks [Laurie07].
2.3.2. RFID Readers or Transceiver
RFID readers are generally composed of an RF module, a control unit, and an antenna
element to interrogate electronic tags via RF communication. Readers may have better internal
storage and processing capabilities than the tags they interrogate, and they frequently have a
connection to backend databases. Complex computations, such as all kinds of cryptographic
operations, may be carried out by RFID readers. Figure 2.3 shows an RFID reader.
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Figure 2.3 A simple RFID reader (Source: [Reader])

2.3.3. Back-end server
The information provided by tags is usually an index to a back-end server (pointers,
randomized ids, etc.). This limits the information stored in tags to only a few bits, which is a
sensible choice due to severe tag limitations in processing and storing. It is generally assumed
that the connection between readers and back-end server is secure, since processing and storing
constraints are not so tight in readers.
2.3.4. Constraints on the RFID System
The constraints on the two main components of an RFID system are as follows:
A) Constraints on the tags:
1) Tag is passive: It has no batteries. It can operate just when interrogated by a reader and
only for a short time after each interrogation.
2) Tag has limited memory: Each tag has on board only a few kilobits of memory to
store its id and its secrets. At present the majority of the tags can just save a fixed 96-bit id.
Nevertheless, we consider more sophisticated tags where some more memory is available
otherwise there would be no space for any cryptographic data.
3) Tag has limited computational abilities: Each tag can perform only basic calculations,
hash calculations, PRNG, AES 2. Public-key cryptography is quite expensive.
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4) Tag provides no physical security: Each tag can be physically opened, thus revealing
the complete contents of its memory.
5) Tag communicates up to a fixed distance: The tag-to-reader communication is limited
to a few meters, but the reader-to-tag communication could be eavesdropped at a greater distance.
B) Constraints on the reader:
While having constraints on the tag seems quite obvious, it might appear that there is no
constraints on the reader side. However, the constraints of the readers are mainly associated with
the complexity of the reader-side algorithms. Many RFID systems consist of millions of tags. The
main concern on the reader is the number of cryptographic operations needed to identify tags.
These identification costs increase if computation intensive cryptographic functions are used.
Therefore, to keep the reader’s response time moderate, efficient and scalable protocols need to
be designed and deployed that take these constraints into account.
2.3.5. Assumptions in Typical RFID Systems
Usually the following assumptions are made about the availability of cryptographic
functions in RFID tags.
•

There are sufficiently secure hash functions, which are suitable for a low-cost tag.

•

There is a sufficiently secure pseudo-random number generator for a low-cost tag.

2.3.6. RFID Standards
As with any technology, lack of standards leads to inefficiencies because customers have
to rely on a single equipment provider. Even the well-known EPC standard is not yet fully
standardized. Another problem is that frequency regulations are not internationally standardized.
EPC Global standardizes different categories of devices, in relation with the technical
characteristics and functionalities provided by the tag. Each class includes all the properties of the
previous and adds some new. The summary of EPC class is showed in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1 EPC class types

Class type

Specification

Class 0

Read only tags

Class 1

Write once, read many tags

Class 1 Gen 2

Write once, read many tags, UHF Gen 2 protocol

Class 2

Rewritable tags

Class 3

Semi-passive tags

Class 4

Active tags

Class 0: Class 0 tags are the simplest type of tags, where the data, which are usually a
simple id number (EPC), are written into the tag only once during manufacture. No further
updates are possible. These tags announce their presence when passing through an antenna field.
Class 1: Class 1 tags are manufactured with no data written into the memory. Data can
either be written by the tag manufacturer or by the user, but only once. After this no further
update is possible and the tag can only be read.
Class 2: Class 2 tags allow users to both read and write data into the tag’s memory. They
are typically used as data loggers and therefore contain more memory space than tags that carry
only simple ID numbers.
Class 3: Class 3 tags are just like class 2 tags except that they contain on-board sensors
for recording parameters like temperature and pressure into the tag’s memory. As sensor readings
must be loaded into memory in the absence of the reader, the tags are either semi-passive or
active, thus requiring an on-board power source.
Class 4: Class 4 tags are equipped with integrated transmitters. These tags are similar to
radio devices, which can communicate with other tags and devices in the absence of a reader.
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Presently deployed Gen 1 RFID systems are based on a number of competing protocols,
most notably Matric’s Class 0 and Alien Technology’s Class 1. There is a problem that these
protocols are proprietary. Beyond that, they lack the features, reliability and power to adequately
serve the growing number of applications, particularly when taking worldwide operability into
account. MIT’s Auto-ID Center recognized these problems and created a single open standard
that would firstly create an environment of interoperability and international regulatory
compliance and secondly raise the bar on RFID system performance in a significant way. These
two values formed the backbone of the EPC Gen 2 UHF standard. With a single worldwide
specification in place, UHF RFID-based systems are expected to become faster, easier to use, less
costly to deploy and more robust.
2.4. Introduction to Computational RFID (CRFID) Technology
Table 2.2 Comparison of different technologies [RFID_Journal]

CPU Sensing Size (inches)

Range

Power

Lifetime
< 3 yrs

WS+ (Mote)

Yes

Yes

3.0 x 1.3 x .82 (2.16 in3)

Any

Battery

RFID tag

No

No

6.1 x 0.7 x .02 (.08 in3)

30 ft

Harvested Indefinite

CRFID (WISP)

Yes

Yes

5.5 x 0.5 x .10 (.60 in3)

10 ft

Harvested Indefinite

Despite many successes of RFID technology and various applications of wireless sensor
networks, none of them has led to an approximation of sensing embedded in the fabric of
everyday life, where walls, clothes, products, and personal items are all equipped with networked
sensors. For this type of deployment, truly unobtrusive sensing devices are necessary. The size
and finite lifetime of motes make them unsuitable for these applications. One recent extension of
RFID, Computational RFID (CRFID) [Buettner08b, Sample08], which has some exciting sensing
capabilities, presents numerous possibilities for many future pervasive computing applications.
CRFID combines the advantages of RFID with those of sensor networks. As discussed, two
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technologies, wireless sensor networks and RFID, have been widely used to realize real-world
applications. But CRFID presents the combination of both of these networks. The comparison of
these three technologies is presented in Table 2.2.

Figure 2.4 Wireless Identification and Sensing Platform (WISP) tag’s size (Source: [RFID_Journal])

The Wireless Identification and Sensing Platform (WISP) from Intel Research Seattle
[Buettner08, Sample08] is an example of Computational RFID tags. WISPs combine passive
UHF RFID technology with traditional sensors. A current WISP is shown in Figure 2.4. WISPs
are assembled from discrete components costing at most $25. However, they are intended to be
mass manufactured like RFID tags at price points closer to $1 [Buettner09]. WISP is the only
RFID sensor node with computational capabilities and that operates in the long range UHF band.
In the rest of the chapter, we will use tag or WISP tag interchangeably to refer to a WISP tag.
WISPs combine passive UHF RFID technology with traditional sensors. A current WISP
is shown alongside a commercial UHF RFID tag and a common wireless sensor node (mote) in
Figure 2.4. WISPs have the capabilities of RFID tags but also support sensing and computation.
Like any passive RFID tag, WISP is powered and read by a standard off-the-shelf EPC “Gen 2”
RFID reader, harvesting the power it uses from the reader's emitted radio signals.
To an RFID reader, a WISP is just a normal EPC class-1 or gen-2 tag. However, Inside
WISP, it has a 16-bit Microcontroller that features an 8 MHz clock rate, 8 kilobytes of memory,
and 512 bytes of RAM. The microcontroller also has an analog-to-digital converter within itself.
It can perform a variety of computing tasks, including sampling sensors and reporting sensor data
back to the RFID reader. WISPs are the first programmable, passive RFID devices. They have
used in different types of studies, from energy harvesting experiments [Jiang05] to monitoring
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animal behavior [Holleman08, Segawa09]. The main advantage of WISP tags is that they allow
us to implement novel security solutions on a live, passive RFID device. One disadvantage of
using WISP tags is that they need to be placed within 1-2 meters of the reader.
WISP uses an integrated 802.15.4 radio for communication with readers. WISPs can
sense parameters such as light, temperature, acceleration, strain, and liquid level. The WISP
harvests energy from a reader and stores this energy in a capacitor. When enough energy is
harvested, the WISP powers up and can begin sensing and communicating. However, sensing and
communication drain power from the WISP. Though the feasibility of WISPs has been discussed
in some research literature, how to harness many such devices to create a WISP sensor network is
until now an open question. In near future, sensor networks will consist of multiple WISP tags,
RFID tags and one or more readers. Consequently, realizing such a secure full-scale network will
require research on both the WISP tag’s end and the reader’s end.
2.5. Security Challenges and Goals In CRFID +etworks
As WISP tag is a combination of RFID and sensor, the security challenges of WISP
networks is a combination of those found in RFID networks and traditional sensor networks. To
develop useful security mechanisms while borrowing the ideas from the current security
techniques, it is necessary to understand these constraints and challenges first. Some of the most
important challenges of WISP networks are discussed next.
C1. Communication Medium: Since WISP tags are wireless in nature, a network
consisting of WISP tags involves broadcast communication which makes eavesdropping and
jamming easier.
C2. Data Conflict: In WISP networks data conflicts may happen even when the channel
is reliable. Since the communication may still be unreliable. This is due to the nature of the WISP
networks. If many tags reply at the same time, conflicts will occur and the transfer itself will fail.

21

C3. Constraint Power: WISP tags do not have their own battery or power. This can result
in the WISPs losing power in the middle of an operation. WISPs may also need to cooperate with
readers for power management.
C4. Data Sensitiveness: In order to decrease the collision rate while replying to reader
queries, only the WISP tags with new sensor data need to reply. Therefore, estimating an
aggregate property of the data without collecting the data is also a challenge.
C5: Mobility: Establishing secure association in the presence of mobility is challenging.
Moreover, if a WISP tag is associated with a human user, tracking the device reveals the user
location and mobility pattern which is a severe privacy violation.
C6. Close Proximity: Currently WISP tags can communicate at most up to 4.5 meters of
distance. But much future application will demand longer distant communication. Designing
security protocols for such applications will be more challenging as it will incur more
communication cost. Moreover, such protocols need to ensure the reliability of the collected
WISP data.
C7. Asymmetric Identification and Sensing Protocol: RFID tags and WISPs are highly
asymmetric in terms of their communication abilities. With RFID and WISPs, readers are able to
transmit messages to all tags and tags can send messages to the reader. But, tags can do so only
when the reader initiates communication, and tags cannot communicate directly with each other.
This makes it difficult to develop efficient protocols for gathering sensor data that changes over
time.
C8. Accessibility: Though some WISP tags in the networks may be managed by the
owner some of them can be placed in remote and/or hostile locations for the application’s
purpose. This greatly increases their vulnerability to physical attacks.
C9. 9on-Collaborative: Though in most of the WSNs sensors can collaborate among
themselves, this feature is totally unavailable in WISP networks. WISP tags can only
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communicate with the reader that makes the design of security protocols even harder. This is one
of the key reasons for which WSN security protocol cannot be applied in WISP networks.
C10. Various Attacks: The unreliable communication channel makes the security of
WISP networks defenses even harder. WISP networks are particularly vulnerable to several types
of attacks. Attacks can be performed in a variety of ways, most notably as denial of service
attacks, but also tracking, cloning, eavesdropping, Replay attack, privacy violation, physical
attacks, and so on.
Usually, in CRFID networks the security goals are classified as primary and secondary
[Buettner08a]. The primary goals are known as standard security goals such as Confidentiality,
Integrity, Authentication and Availability. However, the secondary goals are identified as Privacy
Preservation, Resistance against Tracking, Cloning, Replay attack, Eavesdropping and DoS
attack. Figure 2.2 illustrates the relation among the primary and secondary goals of WISP
networks. Here the inner nodes correspond to primary security goals and outer nodes correspond
to secondary security goals. We establish the relationship among security goals in such a way so
that if we want to satisfy a primary security goal (identified by an inner node), we need to satisfy
all the secondary security goals (identified by the outer node) belonging to the primary goal.

Figure 2.5 Primary and secondary security goals of WISP +etworks
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2.6. Summary
In this chapter, we discuss the properties and capabilities of different categories of RFID
tags. This is followed by the discussion of constraints of tags, readers, and back-end server. We
also discuss RFID standards and the details of different types of EPC classes. Finally at the end of
the chapter, we discuss the properties of Computational RFID tags and their capabilities.
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Chapter 3:

Attacks in RFID Systems

Security and privacy concerns are the two major drawback of RFID technology. Security
problems in RFID systems can be divided in two categories. The first concerns those attacks
which aim to wipe out the functioning of the system. The second category is related to privacy
where the problem is information leakage and also traceability.
Apart from the two above mentioned security problems, a great variety of attacks can be
identified in RFID systems. Attacks in RFID systems opened the door for the development of
both classical and modern security techniques, ranging from signal jamming to challengeresponse based authentication. And it is just as likely that RFID will continue to inspire progress
in security and privacy research in the future, as it has done for decades. The major goal of this
chapter is to discuss the existing weaknesses of RFID systems so that a better understanding of
RFID attacks can be achieved.
3.1. Attack Objectives
The objective of each attack in an RFID system can be very different. It is important to
identify the potential targets in order to understand all the possible attacks. The target can be the
complete system or only a part of the entire system. Most of the literatures focus on protecting the
transmitted data. However, while designing the RFID system, additional objectives such as
tracking or data manipulation should be addressed. Let us imagine the following example in a
department store: an attacker modifies the data of a tag of an item by reducing its price from 200
to 20 ¤. This leads to a huge loss for the store. In this scenario, the data is transmitted in a secure
form and the database is not manipulated. However, attack is carried out because part of the
system has been modified. Therefore, in order to make a system secure, all of its components
should be considered. Neglecting one component could compromise the security of the whole
system. As shown in the above example, the attack may be carried out to steal or reduce the price
of a single item, while other attacks could aim to prevent all sales at a store.
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3.2. Adversary Types
The adversary can be categorized into the following classes:
•

Weak adversary: This type of adversary cannot corrupt any tags.

•

Strong adversary: This type of adversary has no limitations on corrupting tags, and can

do anything at its wish.
•

Forward adversary: This type of adversary can corrupt tags under the limitation that

once the adversary corrupts a tag, it can do nothing subsequently except for corrupting more tags.
•

Destructive adversary: This type of adversary can do anything after corrupting a tag.

However, this statement is true under the limitation that the adversary cannot reuse a tag after
corrupting it. Specifically, once a tag is corrupted it will be virtually destroyed. In particular, a
destructive adversary cannot observe or interact with a corrupted tag nor can the adversary
impersonate a corrupted tag to the reader.
3.3. Classification of Different Attacks
The following section discusses the major classes of attacks that are usually launched in
RFID systems.
Modification of data:
This type of attack deals with the alteration of data saved within the memory of the tags.
By unauthorized write access, the data stored on the tag can be modified. This attack is only
effective if the identifier and security information such as keys remain unchanged. Otherwise this
attack leads to denial-of-service. The attack is only possible if additional data along with the
identifier are stored at a physical device (e.g. tags or database).
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Deactivation of tags:
In this type of attack, the tag is made inoperative by executing a dedicated command or
by physical intervention. Depending on the degree of deactivation the identity or the presence of
the tag can no longer be determined.
Active jamming:
Although passive interference is usually unintentional, an attacker can take advantage of
the fact that an RFID tag listens indiscriminately to all radio signals in its range. Thus, an
adversary may cause electromagnetic jamming by creating a signal in the same range as the
reader in order to prevent tags from communicating with readers.
Sniffing or tracking:
RFID tags are designed to be readable by any compliant reader. Unfortunately, this
allows unauthorized readers to scan tagged items, oftentimes from great distances. This type is
attack is called sniffing or tracking and this is one of the major attacks launched in most of the
RFID systems. This type of attack can also be launched by eavesdropping on the wireless channel
between the tag and the reader. Tracking of RFID tags allows monitoring of individuals'
whereabouts and actions. RFID readers placed in strategic locations (like doorways) can record
RFID tags' unique responses, which can then be persistently associated with a person’s identity.
RFID tags without unique identifiers can also facilitate tracking by forming collections which are
recurring groups of tags that are associated with an individual. In such cases, RFID technology
also enables the monitoring of entire groups of people. Moreover, tracking attack will also lead to
unrestricted access to tag data or tagged object’s information. Unrestricted access to tag data can
have serious implications and collected tag data might reveal information like medical history
which could cause denial of insurance coverage or employment for an individual.
Spoofing or cloning:
In this type of attack, the attackers can create authentic RFID tags by writing
appropriately formatted data on blank RFID tags. For example, thieves could retag items in a
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supermarket identifying them as similar, but cheaper, products. Tag cloning is another kind of
spoofing attack, which produces unauthorized copies of legitimate RFID tags.
Replay attack:
Replay devices are capable of intercepting and retransmitting RFID queries, which could
be used to abuse a variety of RFID applications. These types of attacks usually occur in situations
where RFID components use a challenge response based protocol. RFID tags and readers usually
share a secret and use a challenge response protocol to authenticate their identities. Nevertheless,
very often this approach is subject to replay attacks. In a replay attack, an adversary broadcasts a
tag’s response recorded from a past transaction in order to impersonate the tag to a reader.
Typical example of this attack is the unauthorized access to restricted areas by broadcasting an
exact replay of the radio signal sent from a legitimate tag to the reader that grants access.
Relay attack:
In a relay attack an adversary acts as a man-in-the-middle. An adversarial device is
placed surreptitiously between a legitimate RFID tag and reader. This device is able to intercept
and modify the radio signal between the legitimate tag and reader. Subsequently, a momentary
connection is relayed from the legitimate tag/reader through the adversarial device to the
legitimate reader/tag. The legitimate tag and reader are fooled into thinking that they are
communicating directly with each other. To make this type of attack even more sophisticated,
separate devices could be used, one for the communication with the reader and one for the
communication with the RFID tag. This sort of attack dismisses the assumption that readers and
tags should be very close for communication. Additionally, even if communications are
encrypted, the attack is feasible because messages are only relayed through a fast communication
channel, without requiring knowledge of their contents.
Denial-of-Service (DoS):
This is a type of attack in which an attacker causes RFID tags to reach to such a state
from which they can no longer function properly. This results in the tags becoming either
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temporarily or permanently out of operation. More precisely, in this attack a tag is attacked with
queries from an illegitimate reader. As a result, that tag is not able to respond to a further query
from the legitimate reader. In other words, a genuine reader cannot communicate with its
legitimate tags. A similar attack is also possible on the reader, but since the tag is much more
resource constrained than the reader, they are more susceptible to such attacks than the readers.
Such attacks are often intensified by the mobile nature of the tags, allowing them to be
manipulated at a distance by covert readers. This type of attack can be a serious threat to the
integrity of automated inventory and shipping applications.
Eavesdropping attack
As RFID technology operates through radio channel, so communication can be covertly
overheard. In eavesdropping an unauthorized individual uses an antenna in order to record
communications between legitimate RFID tags and readers. In this type of attack, the
communication between tag and reader over the air interface is intercepted, decoded and
interpreted. A passive adversary can eavesdrop on messages between a reader and a tag and can
keep records of the messages. The information recorded can be used to perform more
sophisticated attacks later. The feasibility of this attack depends on many factors, such as the
distance of the attacker from the legitimate RFID devices.
There are two possible distances at which an attacker can listen to the messages
exchanged between a tag and a reader. They are:
Forward Channel Eavesdropping Range: In the reader-to-tag channel (forward
channel) the reader broadcasts a strong signal, allowing its monitoring from a long distance.
Backward Channel Eavesdropping Range: The signal transmitted in the tag-to-reader
(backward channel) is relatively weak, and may only be monitored in close proximity to the tag.
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3.4. Attack Intentions
Table 3.1 summarizes various intentions that an adversary might have while attacking an
RFID system. An attacker may want to access sensitive information or exploit an RFID system by
spoofing an RFID tag. An attacker’s intention might be to make an RFID system unavailable.
Table 3.1 Intentions behind attacks in RFID systems

Privacy Violation

Access of data

DoS

Spoofing

Modification of data
Tag Spoofing
Deactivation of tags
Removal of tags
Eavesdropping
Jamming
Reader Spoofing
3.5. Attack Addressed by our Proposed Protocols
Table 3.2 Attack intentions addressed by our proposed protocols

Privacy Violation

Access of data

DoS

Spoofing

Ftest Protocol (Chapter 6)

X

X

X

PriSens Protocol (Chapter 7)

X

X

X

DRAP Protocol (Chapter 8)

X

X

MTD Protocol (Chapter 9)

X

X

X

X
X

In this dissertation, we propose four protocols suitable for four different example
application areas. These four protocols are also suitable for other application areas that have the
same core functionality like our example applications. In Table 3.2 we summarize what attacks
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intentions are addressed by our proposed protocols. By addressing the attack intentions, our
protocols basically address various attacks mentioned in this chapter.
3.6. Summary
In this chapter, we present the security issues that arise with RFID technology. Firstly a
discussion of the attack objectives of an adversary in an RFID system is given. After that, major
attacks in RFID systems are identified and discussed. Then, attack intentions of an RFID system
attacker are identified. Finally we present what attacks are addressed by our system.
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Chapter 4:

Security, Privacy and Performance Goals in RFID Systems

In our previous chapter, we have described various attacks that can be launched in an
RFID system by an adversary. In this chapter, our aim is to identify the key fact that can ensure
the security of an RFID system. Moreover, to ensure widespread deployment of RFID systems,
there are three main goals that need to be addressed by the RFID researchers. We have identified,
that these three goals are related to security, privacy and performance of RFID system. Usually,
most RFID protocols need to guarantee the security goals. For some RFID systems preserving
privacy is the major goal and for some other systems ensuring survivability or ensuring low
response time is the major goal. Nonetheless, no matter what the major goal is for any RFID
systems, providing basic security is a common requirement for every RFID protocol. Next we
describe these goals briefly.
4.1. Security Goals in RFID Systems
Security and privacy of data (and of consumers) is one of the major concerns that have
hindered the adoption of RFID technology for many applications. The absence of protocols for
privacy and security introduce concerns such as scanning and tracking, cloning, eavesdropping,
and replay attacks. However, a major problem of designing cryptographically secure RFID
protocols is the lack of computational resources on RFID tags. This prohibits the use of common
cryptographic operations to enhance privacy and security in RFID infrastructures. Therefore
RFID protocol designers need to keep in mind all the challenges to find some new lightweight
alternatives. RFID technology may bring spontaneous risks because of the proliferation of RFID
tags. We try to point out the security goals that should be guaranteed by a protocol:
•

Privacy protection: A tag cannot be distinguished by an adversary without tampering it

and realizing the data stored in the tag.
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•

Anti-tracking: It is tough for an adversary to track a tag if the adversary does not have

any information about the tag. But the attacker can track a tag, if the tag replies with a
constant response each time it is queried. So protocols should be designed such that a tag
neither reveals its  nor replies with constant response.
•

Anti-cloning: In order to clone a tag, an adversary needs to know the secret key shared

between a tag and the authorized reader. So, to be secured against cloning attack, protocols
should never reveal the shared secret key.
•

Synchronization: Attacker should not able to update the key used by the tag or the reader

to secure the communication.
•

DoS resiliency: Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack means an authorized entity is prevented

from accessing its authorized entities. In order to ensure successful communication between a
reader and its authorized tags, it should be guaranteed that an adversary cannot desynchronize
them.
•

Susceptible to replay attack: Security must be ensured against replay attacks so that an

adversary cannot impersonate a legitimate tag by replaying an eavesdropped message.
•

Forward secrecy: An adversary compromising a tag will not be able to identify the

previous outputs of the tag.
•

Backward secrecy: An adversary compromising a tag will be unable to track future

transactions even if it has access to the tag’s present internal state.
4.2. Privacy Goals in RFID Systems
While RFID has existed for several decades, it is its recent widespread usage that made
privacy a major concern for everyone. One of the main concerns of users of RFID systems is user
privacy. Since the communication between a tag and reader is unprotected, it can disclose
sensitive information about a tag or its bearer, including its location. Two major privacy problems
in RFID systems are as follows:
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Information Leakage: In a typical RFID system, when a reader queries a tag, the tag
responds with its identifier. If unauthorized parties can also obtain a tag ID, then they may be able
to request and obtain the private information related to the tag held in the database. For example,
if the information associated with a tag attached to person’s medical record could be obtained
from a server, then the damage would be very serious.
Tag Tracking: If the responses of a tag are linkable to each other or distinguishable from
those of other tags, then the location of a tag could be tracked by multiple collaborating
unauthorized entities. For example, if the response of a tag to a reader query is a static ID code,
then the movements of the tag can be monitored, and the social interactions of an individual
carrying a tag may be available to third parties without him or her being aware.
Therefore, RFID protocols should meet the following privacy requirements in order to
mitigate the two threats described above.
Tag Information Privacy: RFID systems should be able to resist tag information leakage.
To protect against such a attack, RFID systems need to be controlled so that only authorized
entities are able to access the information associated with a tag.
Tag reply unlinkability: RFID systems should be able to resist tag tracking attacks. If
messages from tags are anonymous, then the problem of tag tracking by unauthorized entities can
be avoided.
Though adding privacy protection to RFID tags leads to higher per-tag costs and
increased computational cost in the backend system, for some RFID applications (i.e. RFID based
healthcare), ensuring privacy is very important. In these types of systems, the cost is outweighed
by the need for privacy. Therefore, protocols designed for these types of data sensitive RFID
applications needs to ensure privacy and the cost of extra computational complexity.
4.3. Performance Goals
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RFID protocols cannot use computationally intensive cryptographic algorithms to
provide privacy and security because the low cost of the tags put severe limits on tag side
resources. RFID protocols should address the following performance issues [Avoine05, and
Weis03].
Scalability:
A protocol is said to be scalable if the number of nodes can be significantly increased
without imposing an unacceptable workload on any entity in the network. The interpretation of
scalability will vary depending on the context (and the size of the network). Any security protocol
deployed in an RFID network should not significantly affect its scalability. In the context of
secure RFID systems, we would typically require that the workload on the server, to complete a
single transaction, should not be a linear function of the number of deployed RFID tags.
Survivability:
Survivability refers to a system’s ability to withstand malicious attacks and support the
systems mission even when parts of the system have been damaged. With effective fault tolerance
and damage recovery mechanisms in place, a system may still be trustworthy in fulfilling its
functions and supporting the system mission. In case of RFID systems, most of the authentication
protocols are request-response based where the tags and the reader maintain synchronization
between them during the protocol execution. Therefore, if any attacker launches DoS attack by
de-synchronizing the tags and reader, the system is not able to provide any service. However, in
case of some critical RFID applications (i.e. enemy move detection in military battlefield using
CRFID technology), it is very important that the system provides minimal service even under
attack. Therefore, to ensure system survivability, we need to ensure that the protocols designed
for critical RFID systems need to provide service even when it is under attack.
Low System Response Time:
Some of the most famous RFID applications are: asset tracking, supply chain, product
identification in warehouse, etc. In all of these applications, products attached with RFID tags
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need to be identified in a very quick manner. An identification protocol or authentication protocol
may need very small time to identify one particular tag. However, in case of the applications
mentioned above, there are usually millions of products in the system that needs to be
authenticated on an everyday basis. Therefore, if the protocol is not efficient enough, it might
take several hours or days to authenticate all tags in the system which might not be acceptable for
the industry owner. So, to increase the popularity of RFID technology and to make RFID systems
more efficient, we need to ensure that the designed RFID security protocol can guarantee low
system response time
Storage Capacity:
The volume of data stored in a tag should be minimized because of tight tag cost
requirements. Therefore, we need to ensure that the designed protocols use very lightweight
operations like: hash functions or XOR operations.
Communication:
Since message communication between tags and reader consume much energy and makes
an RFID system more vulnerable to various attacks, the number and size of messages exchanged
between a tag and a reader should be minimized as much as possible.
Reliability:
Every RFID protocol should guarantee the reliability of the system’s decision. Yet,
ensuring reliability or decision accuracy of an RFID system has been understudied so far.
However, there are some recent RFID applications (i.e. behavior inference using CRFID or
physiological status inference using CRFID), where ensuring reliability of system’s decision is
very important and critical. In these types of applications, the final decision at any state of the
system is taken based on the data collected from all the tags. These types of RFID systems
depend on all tags’ data for collective information analysis and decision making. Therefore,
protocols designed for such RFID applications need to ensure that the system will take accurate
decision by ensuring system’s reliability.
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4.4. Goals Achieved by our Proposed Protocols
In this dissertation, we propose four different protocols for four example RFID
application areas. Though we have used specific application scenario as a motivating example,
most of the RFID systems fall within the category of one of these application types. Figure 4.1
presents a summary of what goals are achieved by our proposed protocols:
Table 4.1 Summary of goals achieved by our protocols

Application Area

Goals achieved by our approach
1. Ensuring security requirements

Supply Chain, Asset Tracking and such
2.Counterfeit detection (tag spoof identification)
applications
3. Ensuring low response time
1. Ensuring security requirements
RFID based healthcare or such applications

2. Efficient privacy preservation (tag information

where user privacy is important

privacy and tag reply unlinkability)
3. Ensuring scalability

\

Sophisticated critical CRFID applications

1. Ensuring security requirements

where system survivability is important

2. Ensuring survivability

(enemy move detection)

3. Reducing system response time

Critical RFID applications where decision

1. Ensuring security requirements

accuracy is important (physiological status

2. Ensuring decision reliability

inference using CRFID)

3. Reducing system response time
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Chapter 5:

Related Work

There have been research initiatives for quite some time now to prevent various attacks in
RFID systems and facilitate the expansion of RFID technology. One key research area that
focuses on securing RFID systems is the design of secure authentication methodologies. These
authentication techniques are designed to defend against various attacks launched in RFID
systems while a reader communicates with RFID tags for identification or data retrieval purposes.
5.1. Preliminaries
A variety of authentication protocols have been proposed over the years to secure an
RFID system. Many of these protocols use cryptographic functions to protect messages
exchanged between an RFID reader and tags and also to perform authentication. Cryptographic
techniques can be divided into two main categories based on the nature of the keys used. These
two techniques are: symmetric and asymmetric. All the protocols proposed in this dissertation use
the symmetric key technique. However, next we briefly describe the two techniques:
5.1.1. Symmetric Key Cryptography
In symmetric key cryptography (or secret key cryptography), the sender and receiver
share a common secret key. The precise use of the key will depend on the nature of the protection
provided by the algorithm being used. This key can be used to protect the confidentiality and/or
the integrity of the message. One widely used symmetric encryption technique is Hash Functions.
A hash function takes an input of any length and gives as output a short, fixed-length value that is
a function of the entire input. The output of the hash function is called hash value. Hash functions
must have the one-way property; that is, they must be designed so that they are not only simple
and efficient to compute, but also, given an arbitrary output, it is computationally infeasible to
find an input that gives the chosen output. It implies that hash functions have to be irreversible.
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5.1.2. Public Key Cryptography
In asymmetric cryptography (or public key cryptography), every participating entity has
its own key pair. So, there are two keys that work in a pair. One key of the pair is called the
“public key” that is publicly available. And the other key of the pair is called the “private key,”
which is kept secret by its owner. Public key cryptography involves an encryption operation that
transforms blocks of plaintext into ciphertext blocks and a decryption operation that reverses this
process [Menezes96, Stallings99]. The main difference from symmetric encryption is the way in
which keys are used. The public key of the intended recipient of a message is used for encryption
and the recipient's private key is used for decryption. A user’s public key is made available to
anyone who wants to encrypt a message intended for that user; the recipient's private key is used
to decrypt the received encrypted messages. Implementing any algorithm involving public key
cryptography requires the computation of complex mathematical functions, e.g. involving multiprecision integer or finite field arithmetic [Mitchell03]. As a result, public key encryption
schemes tend to be more computationally intensive, and hence slower to compute, than secret key
encryption algorithms [Mitchell03]. Tiny RFID tags do not have the computational capability to
execute algorithms based on public key cryptography. Therefore, symmetric key cryptography is
used for authentication and security purposes in RFID systems.
5.2. Related Works on RFID System Security
An authentication protocol is a defined exchange of messages between two or more
parties, with the objective of providing one or both parties with an authentication service. That is,
the objective is: 1) for one or both of the parties to verify the identity of who they are interacting
with, 2) that the other party is actively involved in the protocol, and 3) that the messages send by
the other part are not old messages and maintains integrity. Usually, RFID authentication
protocols make use of cryptographic techniques to ensure confidentially and data integrity. In this

39

section, we present some classic and recently proposed approaches for ensuring the security of
RFID systems.
RFID security based research area can be divided into two categories. The first category
is protocol based. This category mainly focuses on implementing protocols using secure,
lightweight primitives on small RFID tags in order to ensure security and privacy. The second
category is hardware based. This category focuses on improving RFID tag hardware so that it can
provide additional security primitives. All of our proposed protocols in this dissertation fall in the
first category. So we will not discuss the hardware based category. However, interested readers
can refer to [Juels05b] and [Rieback07] for more details. In this section, we will mainly discuss
the research background related to the protocols based category.
Within the area of the protocol based category, many techniques have been proposed for
ensuring RFID security, and the assortment of authentication protocols is quite extensive. Thus
we shall avoid a broad review and focus on those works that are related to our contribution.
Interested readers may refer to [Juels05b, Juels06 and Avoine12]. Avoine’s collection is one of
the largest resources on RFID papers available on-line. The protocols scattered throughout the
literature of RFID security can roughly be categorized into the following classification (see figure
5.1):
Early Protocols: There are roughly two simple protocols found in early RFID papers:
Martin Feldhofer’s protocol [Feldhofer03] and Zero Authentication protocols [Engberg04].
Hash Lock Protocols: In later literature, there are many variations of the Hash Lock
Protocol ranging from simple to complex. Hash Lock Protocols are a group of protocols based on
the hash lock protocol of Weis in [Weis03]. The principle is that if you do not have the right key
to fit on the hash lock, you do not get access to the tag and its ID. The Molnar and Wagner
[Molnar04] protocol is one of the famous tree based hash lock protocol that is widely used in
RFID systems.
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Probabilistic Protocols: The cost and size limitations of a tag forces RFID protocols to
shift or reduce the workload from tag to reader. A way to do that is to use probabilistic protocols.
protocols
Probabilistic protocols provide a framework to use weaker encryption primitives. HB [[Hopper00
and Hopper01]] and HB+ [Juels05a] protocols are example of such protocols.
Other RFID Protocols: Recently RFID tags have been used in many interesting
problems like: tag estimation and object localizing. According to our categorization, these
protocols belong to “other” category.

RFID Security Protocols
Early Protocols
Hash Lock Protocols
Probablistic Protocols
Other Protocols
Figure 5.1 Category of RFID security protocols

Inn the next subsection, we briefly describe some classic hash lock protocols and
probabilistic protocols. Following this, we briefly describe some recent protocols for RFID
security.
5.2.1. Classic RFID Authentication Protocols
The Weis-Sarma-Rivest
Rivest-Engels Protocol: Weis et al. [Weis03]] proposed an
authentication protocol that used a back-end database to perform authentication. In this protocol,
an RFID tag replies with a  when it is queried by a reader. The reader forwards this

 to the back-end
end database
database, which finds out the real ID of the tag for the reader. An RFID
tag replies with the same  each time it is queried by a reader. So this protocol is not

secured against a tracking attack
attack. This vulnerability hampers the privacy of the
he tag holder. So the
authors proposed a randomized hash lock scheme to solve this problem. In this scheme, a tag
replies with

, 

  , when it is queried by a reader. Here,  is the tag’s secret,  is a
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pseudorandom function, and is a random number generated by the tag. The reader forwards this
reply to the secure database, which then searches for the ID/tag secret key pair that matches the
reply. Under this scheme, an RFID tag replies with a different value each time it is queried by a
reader, as each reply of the tag involves a random number. Weis also introduced in [Weis03] their
improved Randomized Hash Lock Protocol, which makes the output of the tag random.
The Tsudik Protocol: Tsudik proposed a protocol, YA-TRAP, in [Tsudik06] that ensures
high efficiency at the server side. It is a famous authentication protocol that places little burden
on the back-end server. The principle advantage of this protocol is that the central database avoids
any real time processing. Authors proposed that YA-TRAP is really advantageous in situations
where tag information is processed in batches rather than in real time. The fundamental idea of
this protocol is based on a monotonically increasing timestamp, which makes this protocol
secured against tracking. But the use of the timestamp makes this protocol unsecured against
DOS attack. In this protocol, an RFID tag updates its timestamp based on a value provided by the
reader. At the same time, each tag stores  , where  is the maximum value that can be
reached by the timestamp. When the timestamp reaches  a tag does not answer to the

reader’s queries. Hence an adversary can send the tag a large enough timestamp so that it goes

beyond  . Thus it becomes quite easy for a malicious reader to create DOS attack. Although
the solution to DOS was proposed in YA-TRAP+ [Avoine05], this protocol still lacks forward
secrecy.
The Ohkubo-Suzki-Kinoshita Protocol: Another lightweight protocol is OSK

[Ohkubo03]. Ohkubo, Suzuki and Kinoshita proposed that two hash functions  and  are

sufficient to provide indistinguishability and forward secrecy. Here,  is a one way hash function
and  has a random oracle. According to this protocol, a tag is initialized with a shared secret 

and the back-end server maintains a list of tag ID/secret pairs (,  ). The tag updates its secret
key after each query according to the following formula  =  . And in response to the

42

query from a reader, the tag replies  =  . The server on the other hand uses  to identify
the tag by performing a brute force search through the list of tags. OSK does not ensure
scalability. In [Avoine05], Avoine and Oechslin modified OSK, which removed the scalability
problem. They introduced a time-memory tradeoff, which reduced the computational complexity
for inverting the hash function. Another problem of OSK is that a malicious reader may easily
desynchronize a tag— eventually resulting in a DOS attack.
The Henrici-Muller Protocol: In [Henrici04], Henrici and MÄuller rely on a one-way
hash function to thwart tag tracking attacks. In this solution, a tag responds to a a reader's query
with two hash values and updates its stored values after a successful authentication. This solution
does not provide a full-degree of anti-tracking since a tag always replies with the same response
before it is successfully authenticated. In addition, it does not provide forward security as a strong
adversary could derive tag identifiers in previous sessions from the tag's current identifier and the
server's random number.
The Molnar-Wagner Protocol: Molnar and Wagner [Molnar04] pointed out that the
randomized hash lock scheme does not defend against an eavesdropper. An adversary can
eavesdrop on the communication between reader and tag to learn the tag replies. The adversary
then uses this information to impersonate the RFID tag to fool a reader. In this protocol, both the
reader and tag share a secret (!). Both the reader and tag generate random nonces   ,

"

and

share them. By refreshing the random nonces during every instantiation of the protocol, replay
attacks through eavesdropping are avoided.
The Hopper-Blum Protocols: Hopper and Blum propose a secure human authentication
protocol in [Hopper00 and Hopper01]. Here,
exclusive-or (XOR) of k-bit binary vectors

#

#·

! and

#

! represent scalar product and

and ! respectively. The HB protocol relies on the

computational difficulty of the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem. It is meant only to be
secure against passive attacks, and it is not secure against active attacks. A simple active attack,
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where an adversary pretends to be the reader and transmits a fixed

#

to the tag several times can

retrieve the value of !. While humans may get suspicious with repeated, failed login attempts if

they are actively queried by a computer, a simple tag will blindly reply to active queries. In other
words, HB would not protect against skimming attacks.
The HB+ Protocol: An alternative method for RFID authentication is based on a
“challenge and response” between a reader and a tag. Juels et. al. [Juels05a] observed that human
authentication protocols can be applied to RFID, since RFID tags, like humans, have weak
computational capabilities. They introduced the HB protocol, in which a reader issues a new
challenge to a tag each time it queries an RFID tag. The tag computes the binary inner product
based on the reader’s challenge, and returns the answer to the reader. The reader authenticates the
tag by verifying the tag response. The HB+ protocol is an improvement over the HB protocol by
using an additional binding factor from the tag to defend against an active adversary. Later work
by [Piramuthu06], [Gilbert05], [Bringer06] improve on this idea.
The Seo-Kim Protocol 1: Seo et al. [Seo06] proposed a hash function based
authentication protocol that ensures high scalability. This protocol is also untraceable. Here backend server ℬ has the following four fields associated with each tag: EPC, ℎ ,  and the

access PIN. Each tag saves the last timestamp & sent by an authorized ℛ as &()* . Based on its

own timestamp & and shared secret key , the reader compute ℎ, & and transmits it to the

tag + together witℎ &. The tag recognizes an authorized reader if & received from the reader

is greater than &()* and replies with ℎ . Reader ℛ forwards ℎ  and & to ℬ and here the

back-end server comes into play. It updates the  of the corresponding tag and asks the reader to

pass on the message to the tag for synchronization. Upon reception of the message, tag + updates
its  and &()* . The most significant contribution of this work is scalability and forward

secrecy. Updating  with a one way hash function ensures forward secrecy. Scalability is

ensured in a sense that back-end server needs time complexity ,- to find a tag in a multi tag
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environment where - is the number of tags that have same key  within the operating range of a
reader. The drawback of this protocol is that ownership transfer requires external intervention.
The Seo-Lee-Kim Protocol 2: Seo et al. proposed another authentication protocol
[Seo06b] that ensures high scalability and ownership transfer. It is a lightweight authentication
protocol that employs a proxy in addition to the back-end server. The protocol is based on
Universal Re-encryption which allows the back-end server to get the tag identifier only after a
simple decryption. This decryption requires a constant time, which makes it one of the most
scalable authentication protocols. But its application area is restricted because of the use of a
proxy. This protocol is best suited for personal use. But it suffers from the problem of traceability
and some other security issues such as DOS attack and swapping.
The Tan-Sheng-Lee Protocol: In [Tan07], Chiu et al. proposed a serverless

authentication protocol. In this protocol, the reader maintains an access list . , which is used for

the purpose of tag authentication. And each tag has a secret  that is not shared with anyone. The

reader and the tag both know  , , where is the reader identifier. Here in response to a query

from a reader, the tag replies with some of the bits of ℎ ,  ∥ 0 ∥ 01  where 0 and 01 are

two random numbers generated by the reader and the tag respectively and ℎ.  is a one way hash
function. Since only a legitimate tag can generate ℎ ,  ∥ 0 ∥ 01 , it works as the tag’s

certificate to the reader. At the same time, the tag queries the reader with a question string. Only a
legitimate reader replies with valid answer string, which introduces the reader as an authorized
reader of the tag. The tag releases its data only after confirming that the reader is legitimate. But
here again the reader has to do a lot of computation to find out the  of the required tag. But

their protocol is not purely and strongly anonymous as they return tag  by performing an XOR
operation with a hash value for authentication. Moreover, they didn’t propose any technique for
ownership transfer.
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The Chien-Chen Protocol: In [Chien07], Chien and Chen used a challenge-response
protocol to prevent replay attacks. To prevent denial of service attacks, both new key and old key
for authenticating a tag are stored in the back-end database. However, a strong adversary can still
identify a tag's fixed EPC code and thus identify the tag's past and future interactions after
compromising a tag.
5.2.2. Recent Works on RFID Security
In regard to recent RFID authentication protocols, Avoine et al. proposed a group based
private authentication scheme in [Avoine07] (later improved by Hoque el.al [Hoque11]) that
improves the tradeoff between scalability and privacy by dividing the tags into a number of
groups. One major limitation of this protocol is that the level of privacy provided by the scheme
decreases as more and more tags are compromised. Molnar et al. propose a new method
[Molnar05] that supports delegation in the tag authentication. The tag owner can transfer the
ownership to another party for authenticating valid tags. Lu et al. propose a RFID private
authentication protocol (SPA) [Lu07], which enables dynamic key-updating for tree-based
authentication approaches. A lightweight RFID private authentication protocol, RWP, has been
proposed in [Yao09], based on the random walk concept. The analysis results show that RWP
effectively enhances the security protection for RFID private authentication, and increases the
authentication efficiency from 34567 to 31. However, this technique is suitable for tags
with high computational power, as the technique requires tags to perform randomized hash
functions. Besides these types of deterministic approaches, some RFID applications use
probabilistic methods to determine some important features related to the system [Qian08].
In [Hoque09a], Hoque et al. proposed a serverless authentication protocol for RFID
systems. But their system is also more focused on defending various attacks without the help of a
central database. Moreover, in their system, the reader has to do a lot of computation to find out

the  of the required tag. In [Hoque09b], the authors proposed an RFID authentication protocol
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that supports not only security and privacy, but also recovery in RFID systems. The protocol can
return the desynchronized tags and readers to their normal state, and thus provides robustness.
The focus of this system was to defend against various attacks.
Sheng et al. [Sheng09] study a fundamental problem of continuous scanning in RFID
systems and designs algorithms based on the information gathered in the previous scanning. Yang
el al. [Yang10] proposes a probabilistic approach, SEBA, for fast and reliable batch
authentications in RFID application. However, in this protocol, when queried by a reader, tags
reply with some bits of their secret IDs. But the drawback of this protocol is that any adversary
eavesdropping in the channel may learn the complete IDs of tags over time and launch several
successful attacks.
Most of the previous works (i.e. classic protocols) on RFID systems concentrate on
collecting the IDs of a large number of tags as quickly as possible. Recently some researchers
worked on the tag-estimation problem, which is to use statistical methods to estimate the number
of tags in a large system [Kodialam06]. Tan, Sheng and Li [Tan08] designed the Trust Reader
Protocol (TRP) to detect the missing tags with probability when the number of missing tags
exceeds a certain threshold. TRP uses probabilistic methods to choose a frame size that satisfies
the system requirements and identifies missing tags.
Another recently studied area of RFID system is the reduction of radio contention during
the execution of RFID authentication protocols. Collision is a critical problem in RFID systems
when processing a batch of tags. In the literature, tag anti-collision algorithms can be categorized
into Aloha based algorithms and tree based algorithms. Aloha based algorithms makes only one
tag respond in a slot, in the response of tags, by dividing a time into slot units. On the other hand,
tree based algorithms [Lee08] make trees while performing the tag identification procedure using
a unique ID of each tag. Aloha based protocols are known for their low complexity and
computation, thus making them attractive for use in RFID networks. Examples include Pure,
Slotted and Framed Slotted Aloha (FSA) and their variants [Zhen05, and Lee05]. In Pure and
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Slotted Aloha [Zhen05], a tag responds after a random delay, and continues doing so until it is
identified. Lee et al. [Lee05] show that the FSA reader can obtain a maximum identification
throughput when the size of the detecting frame equals the number of tags. They propose a
dynamic FSA for RFID systems.
In the recent past, significant research has been conducted in developing RFID systems to
ease the everyday life of humans [Michahelles07, Munishwar09, Zecca09, and Hinske07]. Even
recently some research has been performed to devise accurate ways of determining indoor
location [Saxena07, Yunhao03]. But all of these works mainly focused on developing the system
itself, rather than considering the security and privacy vulnerabilities of installing those RFID
systems in practical environments.
5.3. Related Works on Computational RFID (CRFID) Systems
Recently WISP tags have been used in different application areas. For example, it has
been used in recognizing daily activities [Buettner09]. In [Buettner09], the authors attached
everyday objects (e.g., glass, plate, books) with WISP tags that have accelerometers. Later, daily
activities are inferred from the traces of objects that are moved. In [Chaudhri08], WISPs are used
for sensing and monitoring exercises involving free weights. The authors embedded WISPs with
free weights and body parts. Then the accelerometer sensor readings from the tags are used to
infer the exercise being done and the association between the user and the particular weight being
used. [Yeager08] presents a wireless neural interface that uses WISPs. It provides the
neuroscientists a wireless, battery-free method of monitoring neural signals.
So far, the security aspects of WISP sensor networks have not been explored in literature
extensively since the usage of these tags is still a new technology. Recently WISP has been used
for RFID and low power wireless security research [Chae07 and Czeskis08]. We are also aware
of one result that deals with the backup checkpoint status integrity of WISP [Salajegheh09]. Since
WISPs operate intermittently, one problem occurs due to energy constraints in executing
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cryptographic computations. Power derived by the sensor from a single cycle of harvested energy
might be insufficient to perform a realistic cryptographic operation. CCCP (Cryptographic
Computational Continuation Passing) [Salajegheh09] suggests that WISPs can perform
demanding computations despite limited energy and power interruptions. The main idea is for a
WISP to backup its RAM state just before it loses power (e.g., when the reader leaves). When the
reader reappears, the WISP can retrieve its backed up state and resume unfinished operations,
without having to re-start from scratch.
By using the 3D accelerometer of WISP tags, Saxena et al. developed a motion detection
system that also works as a means to ensure security [Saxena10]. According to the authors,
accessing a personal RFID device fundamentally requires moving it in some manner.
Determining whether or not the WISP tags are in motion helped the authors to provide enhanced
security and privacy. The made the WISP tags to respond only when it is in motion, instead of
doing so promiscuously.
Hoque et al. [Hoque10b] proposed a sleep monitoring system based on the WISP tags.
Their developed system does not require any additional action from the users outside their daily
routines. By attaching WISP tags to the bed mattress, accelerometer data are collocated from
WISPs and then reported back. They have shown that their system accurately infers fine-grained
body positions from accelerometer data collected from the WISPs attached to the bed mattress.
By adding a super-capacitor to the WISP, the authors of created a wirelessly rechargeable data logger that can read and log temperature data for 24 hours away from a reader
and then report back the data and recharge when it is in range of a reader [Yeager08]. However
this work again falls into the category of hardware based improvements of WISP tags.
The founders of WISP tags maintain a repository [Intel] of new research techniques that
have been conducted on WISP Network Security. It provides information on the entire WISP
related literature that has been proposed so far. But, most of these works focus on the
improvement of hardware or power aware parameters of WISP sensor network.
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5.4. Summary
In this section, we have reviewed a number of classical and recently proposed RFID
authentication protocols. We have also discussed relevant related work on CRFID systems.
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Chapter 6:

Efficient Detection of Counterfeits in Large Scale RFID Systems

The International Chamber of Commerce estimates that counterfeit goods make up seven
percent of world trade, with the counterfeit market being worth 500 billion USD in 2004
[Juels05a]. Counterfeiting has an impact on the rights holder, the country where counterfeiting
takes place, and it causes social costs. Counterfeit goods, whether of clothes, medicines or CDs,
cost hundreds of billions of US dollars globally every year. The effects of these crimes range
from loss of company revenues to threats to public health and safety. Many companies already
use anti-counterfeiting measures like holograms to reduce counterfeiting and product piracy. A
drawback of existing anti-counterfeiting measures is the low achievable degree of automation
when checking the originality of a product. Radio Frequency Identification, or RFID, helps to
address this problem, and provides the possibility to implement secure protection mechanisms
[Pollinger08].
A very good example of a large scale system that needs secure and efficient anti
counterfeiting techniques on everyday basis is the pharmaceutical industry. It is one such market
that is constantly fighting battles against counterfeiting (which make up to 7% of all
pharmaceutical products in the international supply chain). Since pharmaceutical products are
consumed by humans, any mistake during manufacturing may cause serious harm to people’s
health and even lead to death. The importance of drug authenticity is obvious. In the United
States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has been considering the use of RFID tags to
prevent counterfeit pharmaceutical products [Pollinger08]. Radio Frequency Identification, or
RFID, helps to address this problem and provides the possibility to implement extensible, secure
protection mechanisms. In fact, many RFID enabled anti-counterfeiting solutions have been
already introduced in logistics, retailing, passports, etc. Because RFID has the capability of
capturing and relaying data, it is what the pharmaceutical industry is looking towards to improve
quality, reduce costs, and improve patient safety.
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The RFID tags are typically low-cost and pervasive devices, being attached to products or
objects to enable the identification of those objects. A tag has small microchip and an antenna on
board. The reader can collect the IDs of tags via RF signals, without the need of line of sight. As
an effective automatic processing measure, RFID offers several attractive features over barcodes,
such as non-optical proximity, and rewritable ability.
A common technique of RFID enabled anti-counterfeiting is that the manufacturer stores

a serial number 9 (or termed as secret key) for each tag. The secret key is also stored in the

central authentication server. During authentication, an RFID reader challenges a tag for its
validity, and the tag replies with its encrypted or hashed serial key. This encrypted message is
passed to the server for validity checking. If the serial number is valid, the product to which the
tag is attached is declared as genuine. During this process, however, an adversary can eavesdrop
in between the channel, and the learned information can be used to create a counterfeit tag. To
address this issue, many efficient and private authentication protocols have been proposed in the
literature. Weis et al. [Weis] propose an authentication scheme based on Hash Lock. The search

complexity of Hash Lock is 37, where # is the total number of tags in the system. To improve
the search efficiency, tree-based approaches [Dimitriou06, Lu07, Hoque11] convert the
verification process to a Depth-First-Search in a key tree to reduce the search complexity to

3log 7. However, the reader still needs much more time to authenticate products in a large
supply chain.
To solve the problem of RFID based counterfeit detection, we propose to authenticate
tags in batches. However, if we apply a straightforward private authentication technique, the
protocol execution time will still be very high. If we consider this problem from a different
perspective, we see that it is not always necessary to ensure the genuineness of every single
product in a batch. In fact, even in the genuine products, there can be some products that are
shipped as defectives from the manufacture. So it is acceptable if we guarantee that the
percentage of counterfeit products is sufficiently small.
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6.1. Our Major Contributions
At this point, we summarize our contributions −
•

We propose to verify the validity of a batch of tags using statistical inference based sampling
in a protocol named GTest. However, it is not efficient since it requires high execution time
and large volume of authentication data.

•

To solve the problems of efficient batch authentication, we propose FSA based authentication
protocol (FTest) that uses a variation of Farmed Slotted Aloha [Zhen05] technique.

•

To compare the performance of GTest and FTest protocols with a per tag authentication
protocol, we measure their execution time in a simulated RFID environment.

6.2. Motivation
When detecting product counterfeiting in large systems, existing approaches can be
impractical since tags needs to be authenticated one at a time. It may seem at first that the
problem of counterfeit tag detection can be solved by using any RFID tag identification or
authentication protocol, simply by allowing the reader to interact with the tags of the batch.
However, this deterministic process will be very time consuming since reader needs to
authenticate each and every tag of the batch to determine its validity. The situation will be even
worse if there are large numbers of tags in the system. Such low authentication efficiency is
unacceptable in practice especially in large scale supply chain. Therefore, we need batch
authentication not only to increase efficiency but also to prevent counterfeiting. To address this
issue, we propose a batch authentication protocol that is scalable, efficient as well as able to
prevent product counterfeiting within a user defined tolerance level. Due to this protocol, mass
authentication along the supply chain can be possible, and the cost of maintaining integrity of
supply chains can be significantly reduced. Eventually it may increase health security, company
revenues, social awareness and global trading concerns.

53

6.3. Background
In this section, we discuss how Framed Slotted Aloha (FSA) and Tree based
authentication protocol works.
6.3.1. Tree Based Authentication Protocol
In tree based hash protocol [Nohl06, Lu09, Avoine05], the tags are organized in a secret
key tree where each tag is assigned to a leaf of the tree. Secret keys are associated with each
branch of the tree. Each tag (each leaf) receives all the secret keys along the path from the root to

itself. If the tree has . levels, each tag stores . keys. The key tree as a balanced tree and therefore,

if the branching factor is =, the 456> 7 will be equal to .. Each tag has only one key that is not
shared with any other tag of the system. Figure 6.1 shows a balanced key tree with 7 = 8 and

= = 2.

According to this protocol, the reader queries a tag with a nonce 0A . Upon the reception

of the nonce from the reader, the tag replies to the reader with
ℎB , 0A , ℎ (C , 0A , ℎ (C ,(D , 0A , … , ℎ (C ,(D ,…,(F , 0A ,

where each 4 ∈ {1, … , =}, 1 ≤  ≤ . and ℎ.  is a hash function. After receiving the
response, the reader first finds a match with the first hash value of the response by hashing with
all the keys of level 1. Whenever the reader obtains a match, the reader starts to search for the
second hash value of the response by hashing with all the keys at the next level of the sub-tree
rooted at the node where the reader has found the match. The reader repeats this step until it

reaches a leaf. Thus, the reader’s complexity is reduced to 3log > 7. In the worst case, the

reader has to search with all the = keys at each level of the tree and the complexity becomes
= log > 7.
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The major drawback of this approach each tag must transfer 4 hash values to the reader at
each authentication. As we discussed before, such a large volume of data is a major bottleneck
preventing us from accelerating the batch authentication.
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Figure 6.1 A secret key tree for the tree based hash protocol with +=8 and α=2

6.3.2. Framed Slotted Aloha
Aloha based protocols are important because they reduce the probability of occurrence of
tag collision. In case of pure slotted Aloha, tags select their response time arbitrarily. In slotted
Aloha [Zhen05], tags select the timeslot randomly and reply at the beginning of the timeslot to
avoid overlapping of transmissions. Framed Slotted Aloha (FSA) algorithm can be used to
identify a batch of tags. The protocol uses a fixed frame size and does not change the size during
the process of tag identification. In FSA, the reader offers information to the tags about the frame
size () and the random number ( ) which is used for a tag to select a slot number in the frame.

Each uses a hash function ℎ!, which is used to choose the slot number. After receiving , each

tag selects ℎ⨁  5 , as its slot number. The reader then sequentially scans every slot in

the frame. In each slot, if a tag’s slot number equals zero, it will send its  to the server

immediately. Otherwise, the tag reduces its slot number by one. Since a tag cannot sense the
signals replied from other tags, there are three types of slots from the reader’s perspective − slots
with no reply, single reply, or multiple replies. We define these slots as empty slot, single-reply
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slot, or collision slot respectively. Slots can also be characterized as multi-bit response slots and
single-bit response slots. Since the frame size of FSA is fixed, its implementation is simple but it

exhibits low efficiency of tag identification. For example, if there are too many tags, no tag may
be identified since the slots experience high collision. On the contrary, many slots wasted if the
number of tags is small. Our FTest protocol is partially dependent on the concept of FSA.
6.4. System Model and Problem Formulation
6.4.1. Problem definition

In our system, we assume that each object is attached with an RFID tag that has a unique
id (e.g. secret key). We define the set of tags as population. These tags are divided into batches or

groups of equal size. Suppose, 7 is the total number of tags in the system and L is the number of
M

groups. So, the group size is 0 = N .

The number of tags in a batch, 0, is known in advance. We define a batch of tags as valid

if no counterfeit tag is detected, otherwise this batch is considered as invalid. In our system, each
batch is associated with a unique key that we refer to as a group key. In addition to each tag’s
own secret key  , every tag shares this group key with other members of the given group.

Figure 6.2 shows the group organization of the tags where 7 = 8 and L = 4. The  ’s are the

group keys, where 1 ≤  ≤ L.
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Figure 6.2 Group organization of the tags for the batch authentication protocol, with +=8 and τ =4
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6.4.2. Architecture of the system

There are mainly four components in the system:
Issuer: The issuer initializes each tag during the deployment and also authorizes the
reader access to the tags. We can think of the issuer as a certificate authority (PQ).

RFID Tag: Each RFID tag is denoted as . The issuer assigns a unique key  and a

group key  to the th tag  of the system. The use of group key will be explained later.
Table 6.1 Database structure of the authentication server
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Reader: A reader (T) connects to the authentication server through a high speed network.
Here, we assume the communication channel between the reader and the backend server is
secured. The reader receives all the secret information by the issuer during the deployment.
Server: The authentication server maintains all the group keys and 7 secret keys

corresponding to 7 tags in the database. The server also knows which tag belongs to which group
by maintaining a database like Table 6.1. The server has powerful computing capability.
6.4.3. Preliminaries and Assumptions

We assume that the reader and all the tags in the system has the knowledge of XOR

operation and ℎ. , an irreversible one way hash function to protect the integrity of the message.
The outputs of ℎ.  cannot be linked back to its input so that an adversary cannot link back the
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tag s. There are many efficient hash functions in the literature. The hash ℎ.  does not need to
be a cryptographic hash function. In order to keep the tag’s hardware simple a cyclic redundancy
check (CRC) function which is already found in existing RFID tags can be used as ℎ. .

Communication between the reader and the tags is time-slotted. The synchronization between the
clocks of the tags and reader is done by “start” signal of the reader. The reader uses a ‘slot start’
command to start a slot. Our protocols are request-response based protocol, in which the reader
issues a request in a time slot and then zero, one or more tags respond in the subsequent time
slots. We assume that RFID reader is able to distinguish the three types of slots mentioned earlier.
All the notations related to our system are shown in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 Summary of notations

Symbol

∗
T

Meaning
Set of RFID tags
RFID Reader

7

Number of tags in a batch

τ

Number of batch in the system

∆

One way hash function

0

ℎ. 
0)

Number of tags in the population

Counterfeit threshold
Sampling size

6.4.4. Protocol goals

The goal of a server is to accurately and efficiently determine the validity of a batch of
tags. It may seem at first that the problem of counterfeit tag detection can be solved by using any
RFID tag identification or authentication protocol, simply by allowing the reader to interact with
the tags of the batch. However, this deterministic process will be very time consuming since
reader needs to authenticate each and every tag of the batch to determine its validity. The
situation will be even worse if there are large numbers of tags in the system. To solve this issue,
we design a probabilistic protocol to solve the batch authentication problem by using a variation

58

of FSA based tag detection algorithm. We call our protocol probabilistic since FSA itself is a
probabilistic protocol. It will provide a provable probabilistic guarantee for valid batches of tags
ensuring the percentage of potential counterfeit products is less than counterfeit threshold (∆). ∆

is a system parameter defined by the user in advance. We guarantee a batch is valid if there are no
more than 0 ∗ ∆ counterfeit tags in the batch. Note that it does not mean that the batch will be

declared as valid if the number of counterfeit tags is lower than 0 ∗ ∆. Even if there is only one
counterfeit tag in the batch, it will still be declared as invalid.
6.5. Group Test (GTest) Batch Authentication Protocol
In this section, we present a batch authentication process called Group Test (GTest) that
uses statistical inference to determine the validity of a batch of tags. The concept of GTest is to
reduce the cost of detecting counterfeits in large populations which is believed to contain a small
proportion of defectives by drawing sample from the large population randomly. If GTest
protocol is applied to products of batches in a large supply chain, then there may be no interest in
knowing which products are defective. The purpose may instead be to accept or reject the batch
or to estimate the number of counterfeit products it contains. Therefore, it is useful to know the
probability distribution of the number of counterfeit samples.
6.5.1. GTest Protocol Design

GTest protocol operates in two phases − 1) Group identification and 2) authentication. In

the first phase, the reader queries the tags with a nonce 0A . The tags, then, replies the following
encrypted message with probability 0.5

ℎ ∥ 0A 

Here,  is the group key in which the tag belongs. Now the reader tries all the group
keys to decrypt this message. If the reader finds the right group key that correctly decrypts the
message, then the reader can learn the identification of all the tags corresponding to that group by
online querying the database of the server. This process of tag identification is much efficient
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than per tag based identification since the reader do not need to query each individual tag of the

batch. The reader will, then, start the authentication process by randomly selecting  tags as

samples and collecting the authentication data from them. Next the reader forwards these data to
the server. GTest declares this batch of tags as invalid if the server can detect one invalid or
counterfeit tag.
6.5.2. Protocol Analysis

According to the statistical inference based on sampling, we can estimate the proportion
of individual samples that are defective when they have been taken at random from a large

population. If 0 individual samples are combined  at a time to give  pooled samples, then the

number of counterfeit pooled samples follows approximately the binomial distribution ℬ, W* ,

where

W* = 1 − 1 − W* = Y 5ZZ4[ ℎ  Y554 Y4  Y5\

Here, W is the probability that an individual sample chosen at random from the entire

population is defective. Suppose, that our complete population of tags (i.e. 7 tags) contains 0]
counterfeit tags. Therefore,

W = 0] /7

A pooled sample is assumed to be invalid if and only if it includes at least one individual

counterfeit sample. Then the probability that exactly _ of the pooled samples may be invalid is
given by
_|0]  = a
c ∑eB−1
b
b

where, max a0,  −

MfSg 
c
*

b



MfSg
M
aSfbf*
chaSfbf*
c

...(3.1)

≤ _ ≤ min , 0] 

In equation 1, when _ is zero, we derive −

_|0]  =

MfSg
h MS 
S

...

...

...

...

... (3.2)
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Equation 3.2 refers to the hypergeometric probability since the absence of counterfeit

among the 0 individual samples is equivalent to the absence of positive pooled samples.

Now that we know that the number of counterfeit tags follows the hyper-geometric
distribution, we define random variable X to refer to the number of counterfeit products in a

batch. Suppose, in a batch with 0 tags we sample 0) at a time. Then the pdf of X will be:
o|0∆ =

S∆
c
 aSf∆
p
Sq fp

aSS c
q

Here, rsot = 0) ∗ ∆. However, using GTest protocol, if we want to identify the validity

of a batch, reader needs to read a high amount of data. For example, with 0 = 100000, 0) = 1000
and ∆= 0% (meaning that every counterfeit tags need to be detected), reader needs to read

1000 ∗ 20 ∗ 456RBBBBB = 3.1 M byte of data which will take high response time. Therefore, to

decrease the protocol response time we propose a more efficient protocol in the next section.
6.6. Framed Slotted ALOHA (FTest) based Batch Authentication Protocol
In this section, we propose FTest protocol which is dependent on a variation of Frame

Slotted ALOHA technique. We consider an RFID reader T, and a population of 7 RFID tags

denoted as  ∗. Table 6.3 summarizes the notations for FTest protocol.
Table 6.3 +otations for FTest protocol

Symbol
&|

T}

T})



Meaning
Slot position within frame
Response Vector generated by the reader with the replies of tags
Response Vector generated by the server
Set of tags that are removed from the authentication initialization
phase to reduce collision slot

61

6.6.1. FTest Protocol Design

FTest has three phases − 1) Group identification, 2) Authentication initialization and 3)
Counterfeit detection. The group identification phase is similar to the one mentioned in GTEst

batch authentication protocol. The other two phases are discussed next. The entire process is
illustrated in Figure 6.3.

Figure 6.3 Authentication process of FTest protocol

Authentication initialization: After identifying a group of tags using the group
identification mechanism mentioned in GTest protocol, the authentication phase is initialized.
Reader simply starts the authentication by sending “start authentication” command to the server

and by receiving a frame size  and random number . The reader broadcasts the  and received
from the server in the first step. The frame consists of  short-response
response time slots right after the
request. Each tag uses the random number r and its key () to hash to a Slot Position, &|,

between s1, t where

&| = ℎ,  mod 

The tag transmits a short response at that slot (ex. 1 bit). Therefore, the time duration of
all slots in our approaches is very short. After the frame ends, the reader abstracts the responses in
the frame as a Response Vector ((T}). T} is a vector in which each element is related to a slot in
the frame. There are three typ
types of elements in an T}− 0, 1, and 54450,, representing empty
slot, single reply slot, and collided slot, respectively.
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We modify the slot picking behavior so that instead of having a tag pick a slot and return
its id, we let the tag reply with 1 bit of information signifying that the tag has chosen that slot. In
other words, instead of the reader receiving

{… | 1 | 0 |. . . | 54450 | 0 | 1 | … },

where, 0 indicates no tag has picked that slot to reply, and collision denotes multiple tags
trying to reply in the same slot, the reader will receive:
{… | 1 | 0 | … | 05 Z | 0 | 1 | … }
Algorithm 1: Algorithm executed by RFID tags
Receive ,  from T

for each tag  (where i = 1 to #)
end

compute &| = ℎ ,  mod 

while R broadcasts Slot Position (&|)
if (SP = = SPi)

end

return 1 in T}s&| t

Figure 6.4 Algorithm executed by tags in FTest protocol

Algorithm 2: Algorithm executed by reader T
Define T} of length 

Initialize all entries of T} to 0

for Slot Position &| = 1 5  do

Broadcast &| and listen for reply

if (05 Y4[)

continue

else if  Y4[! = 54450

T}s&|t = 1

end

else T}s&|t = 54450

return T} to the server

Figure 6.5 Algorithm executed by reader in FTest protocol
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Algorithm 3: Counterfeit Detection

assign 54_50 _6 = number of counterfeit tag

detected during per tag authentication

while (54_50 _6/0 < ∆|entire T} checked)
if (T}st == 0 & T}) st == 0) continue
else if (T}st == 1 & T}) st == 0)

assert counterfeit detected

54_50 _6 ++

else if (T}st == 54450 & T}) st == 1)

assert counterfeit detected

else continue
end
Figure 3.6 Counterfeit detection process in FTest Protocol

This is more efficient since the tag  is much longer than the bits transmitted. However,
this approach is still inefficient because the information carried in the collision slot is totally
unused. To utilize the collision slot, we turn it into a single reply slot by removing one of the two
tags from this phase.

Suppose two tags  and 1 map to the same slot position. We remove the tag (  from

this phase so that it does not transmit any short response. Hence, another tag 1  corresponding
to this slot has a singleton slot which allows it to be authenticated.

This situation can be made more efficient by turning each Y − 54450 (Y tags mapped

into one slot) slot into a singleton slot by randomly removing Y − 1 tags. All the tags that are

removed using this process are instructed to keep silent in this phase and they are authenticated in
the next phase. We refer to this set of tags as . In counterfeit detection phase, the reader
authenticates those tags after another to verify their validity.
The authentication protocol is shown in Figure 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6. Each tag in the set
executes Algorithm 1 (see Figure 6.4) independently. The reader executes Algorithm 2 (see
Figure 6.5) to generate the T} and return it to the server.
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Counterfeit detection: In this phase, first the server starts the detection process by

challenging the tags belonging to rem with a nonce 0A . The tags, replies the following encrypted

message: ℎ ∥ 0A .

The server considers those tags as valid for which it can find legitimate ids able to

generate the corresponding hash values. Tags that cannot authenticate it selves are considered as
counterfeit tags. After this per tag authentication process is over, server starts to verify the

validity of T}. Since the server knows all the keys of the tags corresponding to that batch, it can

use those keys for reconstructing the T}. The server knows the locations of the empty, singleton

and collision slots. If such reconstructed response vector exists, which we name as T}) , the server
deterministically accepts the batch of tags as valid. Otherwise, the batch is invalid. Because a
counterfeit tag has no valid key, its corresponding reply is not expected. So if a slot is supposed to
be empty but the server finds it singleton, then the server asserts the existence of counterfeit tag.
If a slot is supposed to be singleton, but the server finds a collision, then at most one tag of that
slot is valid and it is also an indication of the existence of counterfeit tag. Otherwise, the server
goes to the next slot position. After the checking ends, if there is no counterfeit tag detected, the
batch will be accepted as valid.
Since our goal is to declare a batch invalid if the percentage of counterfeit tags exceeds

counterfeit threshold ∆, we incorporate that parameter in our counterfeit detection process. This
detection process will not continue if the number of total counterfeit tags in the batch to the

number of total tags in the batch is greater than ∆. This will significantly reduce the number of

rounds in the counterfeit detection protocol since the entire T} does not need to be checked. It

will also reduce the response time of the entire protocol. For example, suppose n = 1000, number
of counterfeit tag detected during per tag authentication is 35. Number of counterfeit tags
detected during the first 70 rounds of counterfeit detection protocol is 15. Then,
B

54_50 _6 /0 = BBB = 0.05
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If ∆ = 5%, then the counterfeit detection protocol will stop after 70th round. With 0 =

100000, 0) = 1000 and ∆= 0%, FTest reads 0.03 M byte of data per batch.
6.6.2. Protocol Analysis

•

In FTest protocol, we assume that all tags in a batch, both legitimate and counterfeit, will
reply at least once in the frame. However, the counterfeit tags may reply more than once
to introduce more collision and we name this type of attack as “collision attack”.
Additionally, the counterfeit tags may not reply at all to hide their identity and we name
this attack as “concealing attack”. It is very hard to defend against concealing attack and
it is out of the scope of this work. We can identify the collision attack by comparing the
T} (response vector returned by the reader) and T}) (response vector generated by the

server for genuine tags only). There can be following types of distinguishable situations
that indicate the existence of collision attack:

•

When T}) st = 0 and T}st = 1, there should be no genuine tags replying in this slot.
But the result shows one tag has chosen this slot. So, this tag must be a counterfeit.

•

When T}) st = 0 andT}st = 54450, there should be no genuine tags replying in this

slot. But the result shows more than one tags of this batch has chosen this slot. This also
ensures that there are counterfeit tags in the system.

When T}) st = 1 andT}st = 54450, there should be only one genuine tag. But the
result shows more than one tags has chosen this slot. It implies that at most one tag replied in this
slot is genuine and the rest are counterfeit.
6.7. Security Analysis of FTest Protocol
6.7.1. Attack Model

The goal of an adversary in our system is to install counterfeit tags in the system.

Evidently, this fake tag can let a fake object to be identified as an authentic one. We assume Q is
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an adversary who can eavesdrop in between the channel and can use the learned information to
create counterfeit tags and install them in the system. Each counterfeit tag is denoted as . The

attacker may try to track genuine tags of the system. We also assume that genuine tags and reader
cannot be compromised by the attacker. In our system, the following oracle-like construction
exists:
o

 , , : The adversary eavesdrops to listen to the communication between R
and one of its tag .

o

 , , , : The adversary impersonates a reader R by sending a message

M to the tag .

o

 , , , : The counterfeit tag  impersonates a genuine tag in a

protocol session at time  and sends a message M to the reader R.
o

 , : The adversary queries a tag  to learn information during a communication

session at time .
o

  ¡, , : The adversary receives a message M from an entity U (e.g., either  or
T) at time .

6.7.2. Security Analysis

In this section, we analyze our proposed authentication protocol against different types of
attacks. For every attack, we first describe how the attack is performed by an adversary. Then

how our protocol protects against the attack is explained. T and  are referred to as a legitimate
reader and legitimate tag. Each attack and defend, as a whole, have three phases:

Phase 1. Learning phase: This phase represents pre-attack preparations. Adversary, Q

uses non-destructive oracles such as  , , ,  , ,

 , , , , and   ¡, ,  on a set of target tags and reader to learn
information related to them.
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Phase 2. Attacking phase: Q starts to attack by creating counterfeit tag () and installing
them in the system.
Phase 3. Defend Phase: Our protocol is designed in such a way so that it can defend

against majority of the attacks performed by the fake tag .

Since the defend phase is different for each attack, we discuss this phase for following
attacks:
•

Collision Attack

Learning and Attack Phase: Under this attack, Q queries a set of valid tags with

different ,  using  ,  , ,  oracle to collect replies from the genuine tags.
Using this learned information she creates fake tags and installs them in the system. From then
on, the fake tags will try to attack the system with their responses.
Defend Phase: In collision attack, a counterfeit tag emits replies in multiple slots for

disturbing the distribution of slots in the T}. In fact, our approach is very immune to such attack,
since generating more meaningless replies is equivalent to increasing the ratio of counterfeit tags,
which helps to increase the probability of detecting counterfeit tags.
•

Privacy Violation Attack

Learning Phase: Under this attack, Q repeatedly queries  with different ,  using

 ,  , ,  oracle to collect replies from the existing tags.

Attacking phase: Q execute   ¡, ,  oracle to learn replies from the tags and

create a response vector. The goal of the attacker is to learn the s of different tags.

Defend Phase: Our protocol can preserve the privacy of individual RFID tag since none

of the tags reply their . Therefore, the adversary cannot infer s from the replies of the tags.
•

Tracking Attack

Learning Phase: Here, Q tries to track  over time. Q succeeds if it can distinguish ¢

from other tags over time.
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Attacking phase: Under this attack, Q repeatedly queries  with different ,  using

oracle   ,  to learn about the slot picking behavior of the tags. Then the adversary

executes oracle   ¡, ,  to receive replies from the tags. The goal of the attacker is to
get a consistent reply that may become a signature of  .

Defend Phase: FTest protocol is resistant against tracking. Let an adversary Q

eavesdrops on the transaction between a reader T and the genuine tags. So Q knows the queries
and replies but Q cannot reverse compute the replies. The adversary can certainly be sure that a
communication has taken place. However, it cannot Figure out which tag replied in which slot

since it do not have s of the tags. Moreover, the slot picking behavior of the tags changes with

the change of  and . Therefore, the outputs of all the tags seems to be pure random to the

adversary Q.
•

Eavesdropping Attack

Learning Phase: Q executes the oracle  ,  ,  and later uses this

information to launch different attacks (ex. replay attack).

Attacking phase: Q learns every information exchanged between T and  . The goal of

Qis to use the data to impersonate a fake tag.

Defend Phase: Our protocol is powerful against this attack. In our protocol Q will not be

able to find out the expected reply of the tags. In each pass, all tags will pick a different slot based
on the random number sent by the reader. Q can only observe the communication but it cannot
link the outputs of the two parties. It cannot even launch replay attack by replaying previous
messages since the slot picking nature of the tags changes with  and .
6.7.3. Evaluation Results

We evaluate the efficiency of GTest and FTest Protocol based on the metric − execution
time. To compare the performance of both protocols we also simulate a Per Tag Authentication
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(PTA) protocol to identify the validity of batches. PTA is a deterministic approach, which

authenticates all tags to detect the validity of a batch. The accuracy of PTA is certainly 100% but
its efficiency is very low. There are plenty of Per Tag Authentication protocols in literature
[Dimitriou06, Lu07, Hoque11, Hoque09a, and Hoque09b]. We use AnonPri [Hoque11], a group
based authentication protocol as PTA. In our simulation, the authentication server is
implemented on a high performance Dell PC. We use java for protocol simulation where we use
SHA-1 as the hash function (returning 160 bits) in all three protocols. We also use MySQL to
store secret keys for the simulated tags. In our simulated RFID environment, we have considered
two systems with 7 = 2£ , L = 8, 16, 32, 64 and 7 = 2RB , L = 512, 256, 128, 64. We

deliberately introduce 1% to 4% randomly generated counterfeits into the dataset. We have run
the simulation for 100 times and reported the average.
Execution time metric determines the time required for interaction between the reader
and tags. This metric tells us the processing time of a protocol to determine the validity of tags
when we need to identify all the counterfeit tags in each batch. Since every bit almost consumes
the same transmission time which equals 25¥ [EPCGLOBAL] on average, we measure the
execution time by multiplying the size of transmitted data (in bits) with 25¥. For all protocols,
we consider the tags uses SHA-1 hash function. Therefore, in GTest protocol, the length of data
replied by tags is 160-bits [Neill08]. The total size of data used for group identification equals

160 ∗ 0/2 (since tags will reply with probably 0.5). Now to verify a batch with 0 tags, suppose
that 0) tags are sampled and the length of random numbers equals 160 bits. The size of

authentication phase will equal 160 + 160 ∗ 0) Z, since reader will challenge with a random
number (160 bits) and tags will reply with their hashed response (160 bits). So, the total data size
of GTest protocol will be:
_§¨©ª)* = a160 ∗

0
+ 160 + 160 ∗ 0) c Z
2
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For PTA protocol, the reader needs to check all the group keys and this has to be done for
all the tags of the batch. Therefore, the data size will be

_§«©# = 160 ∗ 0 + 160 + 160 ∗ 0 Z

On the contrary, the data transferred in FTest one random number and  replies. Since
each echo is in the same size (1bits), the total size:

_§¬©ª)* = 160 ∗ 0h2 + 160 + 1 ∗ 0 − 0Aª  + 160 + 160 ∗ 0Aª  Z

(a) Execution time of FTest, GTest, and PTA when N =2£

(b) Execution time of FTest, GTest, and PTA when N =2RB
Figure 6.7 Comparison of execution time of FTest, GTest and PTA protocol
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Figure 6.7(a) and 6.7(b) shows the execution time of our two protocols. The figure shows
that GTest performs better than PTA and FTest performs the best. We can see that FTest protocol
significantly reduces the execution time. For system with N = 216, FTest reduces almost 800 sec
than PTA for the largest batch. And for system with N = 220, FTest reduces almost 1700 sec than
PTA for the largest batch. . And for system with N = 220, FTest reduces almost 1700 sec than PTA
for the largest batch (see Table 6.4).
Table 6.4 Performance comparison table

+

Ftest savings over PTA [6]

216

≈ 800sec

220

≈ 1700sec

Figure 6.8(a) and 6.8(b) shows the execution time of our two protocols when ∆ ≈ 3%. By
∆ ≈ 3%, we mean that the protocol will consider a batch invalid if it can identify at least 3% of
the tags as counterfeit. At that point, the protocol will declare the entire batch as invalid and will
stop executing further. The figure clearly shows that, with ∆ ≈ 3% , FTest is the most efficient
protocol. We can see that out approaches, especially FTEst protocol significantly reduces the
execution time. FTest with ∆ ≈ 3% saves almost 85 sec for largest batch size.

(a) Execution time of FTest, GTest, and PTA when N =2£ and ∆ = 3%
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(b)
(b) Execution time of FTest, GTest, and PTA when N =2RB and ∆ = 3%

Figure 6.8 Comparison of execution time for FTest, GTest and PTA protocol with ∆ = %

6.8. Goals Satisfied by FTest Protocol
The motivating example of RFID application for this chapter is to identify counterfeit
tags in large scale RFID systems efficiently. The goal of such a system is to identify counterfeit
tags, ensure low system response time as well as provide basic security like confidentiality and
authentication. FTest protocol is able to achieve all these goals with very low response time
compared to the existing work.
6.9. Summary
Detecting counterfeit tags in large scale RFID systems is a very significant but underrated
research issue. Most of the existing RFID authentication methods used for counterfeit detection
require a pre-identification process, and suffer from high scanning cost and communication cost.
We believe that an efficient, secure and fast counterfeit detection protocol may have good impact
on the deployment of many large scale RFID systems. In this chapter, we present an efficient
batch authentication protocol (FTest) to detect product counterfeiting in RFID enabled systems.
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Our simulation results show that our FTest can perform significantly better than per tag
authentication protocols.
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Chapter 7:

Privacy Preservation in RFID based Healthcare Systems

RFID technology can provide a number of benefits to the healthcare industry. This
technology can improve overall safety and operational efficiency because it operates without lineof-sight while providing immense capabilities. In fact, RFID can contribute to create the hospital
of the future by improving patient care and safety, optimizing the workflows, reducing the
operating costs, and reducing costly thefts. There are a number of ongoing trials and studies at
hospitals and healthcare centers around the world utilizing and integrating RFID into their
hospital information systems. One study estimates that the market for RFID tags and systems in
healthcare will rise rapidly from $90 million in 2006 to $2.1 billion in 2016 [Harrop08].
Primarily, this will be because of Item Level Tagging of drugs and Real Time Locating Systems
for staff, patients and assets to improve efficiency, safety and availability and to reduce losses
[Harrop08].
By attaching RFID tags to different entities in healthcare industry (people and objects),
RFID technology can provide tremendous automation in identification, tracking, monitoring and
security control measures. These capabilities directly affect the major issues currently
experienced by healthcare organizations while helping to drive down costs [BlueBean]. Some of
the most promising RFID based systems that are already being successfully tested (or deployed)
are: patient identification and monitoring, patient’s drug usage monitoring, surgical instrument
tracking and locating, newborn identification, hospital personnel identification and tracking,
blood bag tracking, detecting pharmaceutical counterfeit, avoiding theft of medical equipment,
tagging of meal plateaux to ensure patients get the appropriate diet, ensuring proper identification
of laboratory specimens, and restrict access to high threat areas of the hospital to authorized staff,
etc.
In a patient identification system of an RFID based hospital, every patient is identified
using an RFID tag installed wristband [Wessel05]. A reader is used to identify the ID of the tag
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which allows the system to identify the patient uniquely. It also allows doctors, nurses and other
hospital personnel to access the medical information of the legitimate patient from the server,
using the tag ID. The ID can also be used to access various healthcare services, for example,
identifying and dispatching prescribed medicine for a particular patient.
In spite of several ongoing researches on RFID based healthcare systems [Chen10,
Turcu09], there are still some significant research challenges regarding privacy that need to be
addresses. First, RFID tags can be read at a small distance, through materials, even without the
knowledge of its owner. Second, if the communication between tags and readers is performed in
wireless environment, any unauthorized reader may try to track the tag to access the user’s private
information. Third, data collected from RFID tags can potentially be used by multiple users
(doctors, nurses, pharmacists and etc) and multiple organizations to provide various healthcare
services. Fourth, the ID of the RFID tags along with its Electronic Medical Record (EMR),
collected over a period of time, may expose significant private information of user such as: trace
of personal health information, clinical history and financial information. In conclusion, RFID
technology has not really seen its true potential in healthcare since above mentioned four privacy
concerns are not properly addressed by the existing techniques.
7.1. Our Major Contributions
In this chapter, we make an effort to address the above mentioned challenges with
following contributions:
•

From the four privacy concerns mentioned in the introduction, we point out two major
privacy concerns in RFID based healthcare systems: privacy concerns in RFID sensing and
privacy concerns in RFID based healthcare service access.

•

We propose a framework (PriSens-HSAC), consisting of two major components, each
component respectively addresses one of the above mentioned two privacy issues.
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•

The PriSens component proposes a group based anonymous authentication protocol to
solve the tradeoff between the scalability and privacy problem of RFID sensing. Our idea is
to preserve privacy in RFID sensing based on the premise that adversary cannot break
unlinkability with probability better than random guessing.

•

The HSAC component proposes a privacy preserving healthcare service access mechanism
to maintain user’s privacy while accessing various healthcare services.

•

We also present the evaluation of the framework by measuring the level of the achieved
privacy.
Though our major motivation in this chapter is to enhance the privacy of users in an

RFID based healthcare system, our proposed PriSens-HSAC framework addresses all the security
and privacy requirements mentioned in Chapter 3. This framework has scope not only in the
healthcare industry, but also in other applications where the privacy of the tag bearers is an
important issue.
Organization of the chapter: The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2
presents the motivation of our work. In section 7.3, we present relevant related work. In section
7.4, we discuss the privacy issues of RFID tag sensing in healthcare setting. In this section, we
also discuss the privacy issues in RFID based healthcare service access. In section 7.5, we present
the details of our framework. Then we present the group based anonymous authentication
protocol (PriSens) in section 7.6. The architecture of HSAC is presented in the same section. In
section 7.7, we present the evaluation of our framework.
7.2. Motivation
7.2.1. RFID in Healthcare

With the deployment and use of RFID technology in the healthcare domain, there are
increasing privacy concerns regarding the technical designs of RFID systems. The potential
benefits of RFID technology have been accompanied by threats of privacy violations [Juban04].
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These threats pertain to the potential risks of unauthorized data access, misuse of patient data, and
the capabilities of permanently saving and linking information about individuals through
temporal and spatial extension of data collection activities. While RFID technology can improve
the overall quality of healthcare delivery, the benefits must be balanced with the privacy and
security concerns. The use of RFID introduces a new set of risks: Security risks are associated
with the possible failure of the RFID system under various security attacks, i.e. tracking,
eavesdropping, and denial of service, while the threat to privacy reside in the capabilities to
permanently save and link information about individuals through temporal and spatial extension
of data collection activities. Although concerns about information privacy are not unique to the
healthcare domain, health related information can be perceived as more personal and more
sensitive. Due to the highly personal and sensitive nature of healthcare data, both healthcare
providers and patients can be expected to resist further digitalization though the usage of RFID
technology until security and privacy protections is in place.
There are different kinds of RFID applications that allows healthcare professionals to
avoid errors or risks that could endanger the patient safety. Usually, RFID based sensing activities
related to healthcare can be divided in two types:
Direct sensing activity: These activities refer to various identification and monitoring
systems. Some of the most promising RFID based direct sensing activity that are already being
successfully tested (or deployed) in a number of hospitals are: hospital personnel [Wessel05],
patient and newborn identification and monitoring [Wessel05], patient’s drug usage monitoring
[Yao10], surgical instrument tracking and locating [Rivera08], and blood bag tracking [Yao10].
Indirect inferred activity: These activities basically refer to those systems that use direct
sensing activity data to infer important information. For example, detecting pharmaceutical
counterfeit, avoiding theft of medical equipment, the tagging of meal plateaux to ensure that
patients get proper diet according to their treatment, allergies and tastes and etc.
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Figure 7.1 An RFID based ubiquitous healthcare system

Figure 7.11 illustrates a simple architecture of an RFID system in healthcare. It has two
individual modules:
1) RFID Sensing Module - consisting of all thee RFID identification and monitoring
systems.
2) Service Provider Module - consisting of all the systems that uses legitimate RFID
identification data to provide various healthcare services (ex. physician’s diagnosis, prescription,
medicine usage chart, specialist’s
pecialist’s opinion, insurance verification, appropriate medicine dispatch,
and etc).
Some simple example scenario of RFID tag usage in healthcare area can be as follows:
Medicines’ authenticity tracking: Ensuring the origin of medicines is essential to
guarantee their quality. RFID tag based identification and authentication methods can guarantee
the origin of medicines, especially in pharmaceutical supply chains. Electronic Product Codes
(EPC) (e.g. a serial number) in RFID tags are used to track each iindividual
ndividual medicine along the
supply chain. Each EPC/RFID tag is attached to a drug unit. Thus, it is possible to track every
individual drug unit and to verify its authenticity.
Patients’ drug dispatch: Usually, in case RFID based hospitals, a patient is identified
i
using RFID installed wristband [[Wessel05].
]. The medical information of the legitimate patient is
then pulled up from the central database and passed onto the physician’s PDA which is a part of
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the service provider module. The physician’s system may suggest medicine based on diagnosis
and the pharmacy system may use the prescription to dispatch proper medicine for the patient.
Financial Transactions: Depending on the health care system, patients must pay for the
service that they receive. In addition, health care providers must be able to verify that a given
patient is covered under a particular plan, what specific procedures, lab tests, and whether
dependants are covered. In this case, RFID can be used to identify patients using wristbands
[Wessel05] which can pull up all those information in seconds for hospital bill calculation.
Patients’ disease monitoring: Wide varieties of methods have been used to identify
patients when they are in hospitals. One of the most popular methods is based on using a
wristband in which a bar code is printed. However, recently the barcode based bracelets has been
replaces by RFID tag based bracelets [Wessel05]. In some chronic diseases, continuous
monitoring of patients is very important. RFID technology could be used to send information
from patients to a control system. The control system could activate an alarm based on the
received data.
7.2.2. Two Fold Privacy Preservation

It is evident that in RFID based healthcare systems, the privacy concerns are twofold:
privacy concerns in RFID sensing and privacy concerns in RFID based healthcare service
access. Therefore, to address this problem we need to have twofold privacy management

mechanism in place:
1) A privacy preserving authentication protocol is required while sensing RFID tags.
This protocol will preserve privacy when different identification and monitoring process are
executed in “RFID sensing module” of Figure 7.1.

2) A privacy preserving access control technique is required while receiving services
from “service provider module” of Figure 7.1 to ensure that user preferred privacy level is
achieved.
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To address the two above mentioned privacy problems in RFID system, we propose a
privacy preserving framework (PriSens-HSAC) in this chapter. With this privacy mechanism in
place, the true potential of an RFID based healthcare system can finally be exploited. The
widespread adoption of such privacy preserving RFID based healthcare system will open doors
for various assisted care, remote health monitoring, and elderly care systems. Eventually, it may
help to ensure quality healthcare facilities, longer life expectancy, reduced death rate, and
preserve patient’s privacy.
7.3. Background Study
The HSAC component of the framework uses P-RBAC [Dafa-Alla05]. There are plenty
of role based access control (RBAC) techniques in the literature. In [He05], the authors propose
an enhanced role based access control mechanism for hospital information systems but they did
not consider any privacy issues. Purpose based access control (PBAC) models also have been
proposed to protect sensitive data [Byun05, Yang07], but the purpose is difficult to define. Jin et
al propose a framework for e-Health systems [Jin09], which supports patient-centric selective
sharing of virtual composite e-Health data using different levels of granularity. However, it
focuses on the framework only and does not discuss a detailed approach for policy definition and
management. Attribute based access control (ABAC) adopts XACML [Godik03] to define
policies, and transform them into access control lists (ACLs). However, commercial DBMS
kernel cannot support XACML and thus existing ABAC module in databases are implemented in
an on the fly basis. This brings high performance degradation for the database.
The major component of PriSesn-HSAC framework is PriSens which is an RFID
authentication protocol. Several authentication protocols have been proposed to secure RFID
systems against major attacks and details of such related works are presented in Chapter 5.
Our proposed PriSens-HSAC framework provides higher level of privacy and security in
terms of RFID sensing. The framework provides more privacy in RFID based healthcare system
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by proposing a better privacy preserving authentication protocol and by using P-RBAC while
accessing healthcare services. To the best of our knowledge, PriSens-HSAC is the first
framework to provide increased privacy in RFID based healthcare systems through the usage of
RFID authentication along with access control technique.
7.4. Privacy Concerns in RFID Systems
7.4.1. Privacy Issues in RFID Sensing

Ensuring strong privacy in RFID sensing imposes a higher complexity on the reader.
Conversely, improving efficiency may hamper some privacy. Here, our main focus is on the
tradeoff between privacy and scalability of RFID systems. Public key cryptography would be a
better candidate to solve the problem between privacy and scalability. In this approach, the tag
would encrypt its message using the public key of the reader so that only the real reader would be
able to decrypt the message and identify the tag. But public key encryption is too expensive for
low cost tags. In this chapter, we consider the low cost tags which are capable of doing symmetric
key encryption, in which keys are shared between the tag and the legitimate readers. First, we
outline how the tree based hash protocol provides scalability but sacrifice some privacy. Then, we
describe how the group based protocol provides improved scalability as well as a higher level of
privacy. Finally, we point out the privacy problem of this group based protocol. Our main focus,
here, is on this major problem of tradeoff between privacy and scalability of RFID systems.
Molnar and Wagner [Molnar04] first proposed a tree based hash protocol for RFID

systems to reduce the search complexity of the reader from 37 to 3log > 7, where = is the
branching factor at each level of the tree. But this approach achieves better scalability at the cost
of some privacy loss of the tags [Nohl06]. Figure 6.2(a) shows a balanced key tree with 7 =
8 and = = 2. Suppose the tag ® in Figure 6.2(a) becomes compromised. All the tags of the

system are partitioned into three disjoint sets. The adversary can now uniquely distinguish the tag

¯ and identify the tags  and R as a unique partition. All the remaining tags ( , £ , ° , ± ) form
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a single partition because the tag ® shares no key with them. Therefore each tag of this partition
( , £ , ° , ± ) is anonymous among these four tags. The privacy provided by this scheme

diminishes as more and more tags are compromised.
Avoine et al. [Avoine07] proposed a group based authentication protocol to address the
privacy problem of the tree based hash protocol. According to this protocol, tags are divided into
² disjoint groups of equal size. Figure 6.2(b) shows the group organization of the tags where

7 = 8 and ² = 4. This protocol reduces the complexity of both the reader and the tag. The tag

always has to perform two encryptions. In the worst case, the reader has to perform ² + 1

encryptions. In addition, each tag needs to store only two keys for the authentication. The group
organization of this protocol improves the level of privacy. For instance, if the tag ® is

compromised, the adversary can uniquely identify only the tag ¯ (see Figure 6.2(b)). The

adversary cannot uniquely distinguish the other tags  , R ,  , £ , ° , ± . Each of these tags
remains anonymous among these six tags. Like other protocols, this protocol also has some
limitations. There is a tradeoff between the number of groups and the group size. To address this

problem, we propose an efficient anonymous private authentication (PriSens) scheme that
improves the privacy protection by keeping the reader’s complexity moderate. This protocol is
specifically suitable for healthcare since its goal is to achieve automation and preserve privacy.
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Figure 7.2 Two privacy preserving RFID authentication protocols

There are several authentication protocols that have been proposed [Hoque11, Hoque
09a, Hoque09b, Avoine05, Avoine07, and Dimitriou06] for RFID systems to secure them against
major attacks. However, all those protocols can preserve minimal user privacy at the cost of large
reader complexity. The reader complexity increases with large number of tags is the system.
Moreover, the level of privacy provided by the scheme decreases as more and more tags are
compromised. Therefore, we identify that there is a tradeoff between privacy preservation and
scalability in RFID authentication. To address this problem, we propose an anonymous private
authentication (PriSens) protocol that improves the privacy protection in RFID sensing by
keeping the reader’s complexity moderate. This protocol is specifically suitable for healthcare
industry since RFID based healthcare systems since its main goal is to preserve privacy while
achieving automation. In our approach, each tag is assigned a couple of identifiers. A single tag
shares some of its identifiers with some members of its group. Thus this protocol prevents
tracking by increasing the uncertainty of the adversary.
7.4.2. Privacy Issues in RFID based Healthcare Service Access

The ID of the RFID tag identified by PriSens, may need to be shared with physicians,
pharmacy, insurance company and emergency care providers to access various healthcare

84

services. This information, collected over a period of time, may expose significant private
information such as trace of personal location, personal health information and etc. To address
this, we propose a privacy preserving access control technique to restrict unauthorized access of
patient’s private information.
7.5. Architecture of PriSens
PriSens-HSAC Framework
To solve the two major privacy issues in RFID based healthcare systems, we propose
PriSens-HSAC,
HSAC, a framework consisting of two major components. One component is PriSens
that proposes a group based anonymous authentication protocol to solve the tradeoff between the
scalability and privacy of RFID sensing in healthcare. PriSens pprovides
rovides more privacy and
achieves better efficiency than existing RFID authentication protocols. The second component is
HSAC that proposes a privacy preserving healthcare service access mechanism to maintain user’s
privacy while accessing various healthca
healthcare
re services. HSAC follows the concept of role based
access control mechanism to restrict unauthor
unauthorized access to private data. The architecture
architectur of the
framework is shown in Figure
igure 7.3.

Figure 7.3 Architecture of PriSens-HSAC framework
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When any RFID based identification or monitoring operation takes place in a healthcare
system, the reader as well as tags in concern executes PriSens protocol to preserve user privacy. It
is important to notice that PriSens can preserve privacy and defend against attacks launched by
the outsider adversary. For example, if any unauthorized reader tries to launch any attack in the
RFID information system of the hospital or tries to violate user privacy (by tracking the user),
PriSens can defend against the launched attacks and provide better privacy compared to the other
existing protocols [Molnar04, Avoine07]. If any unauthorized user wants to access any healthcare
service (ex. access patient’s medical history using the ID of the tag), HSAC will not allow the
user to access that service using a privacy aware role based access control mechanism [DafaAlla05]. Therefore, it is evident that PriSens component will run in tags and reader. But HSAC
component can be executed in user’s mobile devices, central server or any other machines that
uses ID if the RFID tag to access healthcare related services.
7.6. Overview of PriSens-HSAC Framework
In this section we describe the two components of Prisens-HSAC framework in detail.
7.6.1. Details of PriSens (Group based Anonymous Authentication Protocol for RFID Sensing)

In this section, we will describe the details of PriSens Protocol.
1) Privacy Characterization in PriSens
In literature several different notions of privacy have been proposed so far. Some authors
mention information privacy as the privacy of RFID systems. This privacy notion is the act of
preventing a tag from disclosing its product information [Ohkubo03, Weis03]. But protecting
information privacy keeps tags traceable. Therefore, it is a weak notion of RFID privacy. Some
define unlinkability as the strong notion of RFID privacy [Nohl06, Chatmon06]. Unlinkability
means the inability to distinguish between the responses from the same tag and the responses
from different tags of the system. Providing unlinkability ensures strong privacy when the
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adversary cannot distinguish between two tags with a probability better than random guessing
[Juels07]. In our protocol, we protect privacy of the tags by providing unlinkability between two
tags of the system.
The level of privacy obtained by any protocol can be measured using the anonymity set.
Anonymity has been proposed in the context of mix-nets in [Diaz02]. Mix-nets are used to make

the sender (and the recipient) of a message anonymous. The anonymity set is defined as the set of
all potential senders (recipients) of the message. Anonymity is defined as being not identifiable
among a group of entities, i.e., the members of the anonymity set. A higher degree of anonymity
is achieved with an anonymity set of larger size. Perfect anonymity is achieved if anonymity set
contains all the members capable of sending (receiving) messages in system.
2) System Model of PriSens

In our protocol, tags are divided into groups of equal size. Suppose, 7 is the total number
M

of tags in the system and L is the number of groups. So, the group size is 0 = N . Next, we define
the components and parameters of our system.
Issuer. The issuer initializes each tag during the deployment by writing the tag’s
information into its memory. The issuer also authorizes the reader access to the tags. Even each
group receives its unique group key and a pool of identifiers from the issuer.

Group. Each group has a 0 number of tags. The issuer assigns a unique group key ¨³ to

the th group  of the system. This key is shared between the members (tags) of this group. Each
group also receives the following pool of identifiers from the issuer ´ = µ, , ,R , … , ,¶ ·,
where, 1 ≤  ≤ L and ¸ is a system parameter. The pools of any two groups do not share any

identifier, i.e., ´ ∩ ´1 = ∅, ∀ ≠ ½. Each tag of the group  is assigned a couple of identifiers

from ´ by the issuer.

Tag. All the tags of the system are divided into L groups. Each tag receives the shared

group key of the group that the tag belongs to, a unique secret key that is known only to the
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reader and the tag itself, and a set of identifiers from the pool of identifiers of the group. Suppose,
the tag 1 belongs to the group  . This tag possesses the group key ¨³ , the unique secret key
 ©¾ , and a set of identifiers Ω1 . Each key is of À bits, where À is the security parameter of

symmetric key encryption. We define the Ω1 as follows
Ω1 = µ,1C , ,1D , … , ,1Á ·, where,

each ,1Â is chosen randomly following uniform distribution from the pool ´ and

½ ∈ {1,2, … , ¸}, where 1 ≤ ! ≤ 

,1Â ≠ ,1Ã , for all ! ≠ [

 is also a system parameter and ¸ > .
The identifiers are assigned to the tags in such a way that at least one identifier of a tag is

shared with at least two other members of the same group. So, we can say for the tag 1 ,
∃Y, ÆÇ,1Â ∈ ÈÉ ∩ ÈÊ Ë,

where Y,Æ are any two members of  and Y ≠ Æ.

Reader. The reader is connected to the backend server. We assume the communication
channel between the reader and the backend server is secured. From now on, we denote the
backend server as the reader. In our system, the tag is the prover and the reader is the verifier. The
reader receives all the secret information by the issuer during the deployment. The issuer issues
the reader a set of secret information for each group in the system Ì = µÍ¨³ , Î ÏÐ1 ≤  ≤ L·,

where ¨³ is the secret group key and Î is the mapping of the identifiers of the pool ´ with the
secret keys of tags. Formally,
Î = µÍ, , Ñ ÏÐ1 ≤ ! ≤ ¸ and , ∈ ´ ·,
where Ñ is the set of secret keys of tags associated with the , . Ñ can be defined as

an empty set if no tag is associated with the , or it can be a set of size at least one. Formally,
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µ ,  , … ·, where Ö∗ ∈ { , R , … , M }Ø
Ñ = Ò ÓC ÓD
.
∅,
otherwise

System parameters. Since each tag receives  identifiers randomly chosen from the

pool of ¸ identifiers, according to the  distribution strategy, we can say that each tag has at
least one identifier common with at least two group members. The probability that each tag shares
at least one identifier with at least two group members is
|)ÙAª = 1 − Ú

¶f
¶fR




×
Ü
¶
¶





®

¸ − !
=1−
¸!R ¸ − 3!

where ¸ ≥ 0. For example, we consider an RFID system of 1000 tags divided in 10

groups. 100 tags are in each group. For simplicity, we assume ¸ = 100 and  = 10. Then the

probability that each tag shares at least one identifier with at least two group members is |)ÙAª =
96.87%.
Reader 

Generate nonce, 0A

0A

Tag Þ

1. Generate nonce 0*

2. Pick a ,1Â from Ω1

3. ← rà 0A ∥ 0* ∥ ,1Â ,
³

\ ← rá 0A ∥ 0* , and
¾

1. T tries all the group keys

-

- ← , \

until it decrypts  to retrieve

the ,1Â

2. T lookups the key set Ñ
associated with the ,1Â

3. T tries all the keys  ∈ Ñ
until it decrypts \.

4. If such a key exists, T

accepts 1 ,otherwise rejects 1

Figure 7.4 The PriSens protocol
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3) Brief Overview of PriSens
We describe our protocol briefly in this section. The reader starts to query the tag with a

nonce 0A . Upon the reception of the query, the tag generates another nonce 0* . Suppose the

reader interrogates the tag 1 . In the second step, the tag picks an identifier, say ,1Â , from Ω1 .

Then the tag computes - as shown in Figure 7.4. Here, r .  denotes symmetric key encryption

with key . The tag replies with the -. Now the reader searches all the group keys until it finds

the correct one that properly decrypts the first part () of the response. If the reader retrieves the

identifier ,1Â that the tag used in its response, then the reader tries to decrypt the second part
(\) of - with the potential set of secret keys (Ñ ) associated with ,1Â . After finding the right

secret key, the reader can uniquely identify the tag 1 . Sharing some identifiers of a tag with other
members of the group provide unlinkability even if any tag is compromised by the adversary.
7.6.2. Details of HSAC (Privacy Preserving Healthcare Service Access Mechanism)

Unauthorized disclosure of health related information can have serious consequences
like: refusal of employment, seclusion from family or community groups and personal
embarrassment. Once information has been disclosed, the damage cannot be undone so to earn
user trust it is important that unauthorized disclosure is prevented. Also to prevent any kind of
insider attack in the RFID based hospital information system, unauthorized access of sensitive
data should be prevented. A major concern in RFID based healthcare system is how to protect
user privacy when the RFID identification data, i.e. patient’s private information are increasingly
passed around and accessed by a large number of people such as doctors, nurses, technicians, and
researchers. This information, collected over a period of time, may expose significant private
information such as: trace of personal location, medical history, treatment history, and even
financial information. One measure is to use access control technique which requires that only
authorized entities or users with a legitimate request satisfying related policies or laws can access
sensitive information.
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1) Access Policy Requirements for Healthcare Privacy
In modern day healthcare systems, most of the organizations are internetworking their
systems, increasing the potential for unauthorized access. Since there are countless individual
scenarios, circumstances and relationships, the access control framework must be flexible and
highly expressive. The framework needs to ensure that a user’s access policy can be recorded and
enforced in a manner that reflects their understanding of who they want to have access and who
they don’t want to have access. This will typically involve allowing or disallowing consent to
groups or roles. In order to restrict access of certain information to only certain people, allowing
or disallowing access to certain roles needs to be included too. To employ allowance and
disallowance of consent or access rights explicit denial of access to particular role is necessary.
2) Brief Overview of of HSAC
Role based access control (RBAC) [Ferraiolo92] is a popular security model. Due to its
flexibility, RBAC model has been widely applied to healthcare information systems [Becker04,
Bhatti06]. In this research work, we propose HSAC, a privacy preserving healthcare service
access mechanism. The architecture of HSAC is shown in Figure 7.5. HSAC propose to preserve
user preferred privacy while accessing healthcare services using Privacy-aware Role Based
Access Control (P-RBAC) [Dafa-Alla05]. The adoption of a model like P-RBAC in a RFID
based healthcare seems justifiable since healthcare is a complex environment which deals with
various user roles in multiple organizations. Classical RBAC, does not support role roaming
among different organizations. Furthermore, in order to protect privacy in healthcare sector, not
only the content of EMR but also some meta information about EMRs, e.g., the creators, owners
are required for privacy protection. However, the main feature of P-RBAC lies in the complex
structure of privacy permissions that reflects a structured ways of expressing privacy rules.
Moreover, aside from the data and the action to be performed on the data, in P-RBAC, privacy
permission explicitly states the intended purpose of the action along with the conditions under
which the permission can be granted and the obligations that are to be finally performed. It helps
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in verifying that the access control policies of the healthcare organization are compliant with
privacy regulations. Moreover, in HSAC, we allow users to have preferred privacy configuration
by including
luding user defined privacy policies along with the organizational privacy policies.

Figure 7.5 The architecture of HSAC

In HSAC, the administrator can define and manage traditional privacy policies related to
the access of various data as well as user preferred privacy policies. For example, some doctor
may not want anyone else to view her patient’s medical diagnosis withou
withoutt her permission. All
these policies are broken down into unit privacy policy and unit user role by the Privacy Policy
Manager (PPM). The unit policy and unit role are stored in Privacy Policy DB (Database) and
User Role DB (Database). The User Role DB mod
module
ule also contains a role hierarchy. For example
any information that can be viewed by the nurse must be accessible by the doctor too. But only a
part of information visible to nurse may be accessible by the pharmacist, who only needs to know
which drug to dispatch for which patient. Moreover, the pathologist only needs to know the lab
test name, and the accounts section of the hospital needs to know the breakdown of costs for

various services provided to the patient. It is hard to develop a generalized role hierarchy since it
may differ for different institutions. However, such a role hierarchy can be defined by the
administrator based on the preference and organization requirements. Whenever, a user requests
for some healthcare service using the ID of the tag, the Access Control Manager (ACM) locates
policies defined by the PPM. The PPM then brings up the requested information by querying
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stored unit policies and merging them for the particular user role. If ACM detects any violation of
any unit privacy rule for a particular role, the service request is denied.
7.7. Evaluation
Though our framework consists of two major components, the main privacy preservation
is done by the PriSens component while identifying a tag via radio frequency channel. HSAC is
able to preserve privacy by restricting unauthorized access given that HSAC follows a proper
implementation of P-RBAC technique and privacy policies are properly defined. Therefore, it is
more significant to evaluate the privacy achieved by the PriSens component. In this section, first
we evaluate PriSens protocol using formal security analysis. Then, we measure the level of
privacy achieved by PriSens as a function of the total number of compromised tags. We also
evaluate PriSens by assessing the memory and search complexity of the protocol and by
comparing it other classic protocols.
7.7.1. Security and Privacy Analysis of Prisens

In this section, we formally prove that our protocol preserves data privacy and provides
unlinkability. In addition, we analyze the preservation of privacy in some attack scenarios where
some of the tags of the system are compromised by the adversary Q.

Attack Model: One of the major goals of an adversary in any RFID system is to infringe

the tags’ privacy by means of tracking. In this work, an adversary is denoted as Q. We assume Q
as an active adversary who has full control over all the communications between the tag and the
reader. She can not only eavesdrop, but also intercept, modify and even initiate authentication
session. The adversary can, for example, impersonate a tag and communicate with the valid
reader. Even the adversary can query a valid tag and learn the tag’s response. Our assumptions
also include that the adversary can control a number of readers and tags. Each reader and tag

controlled by the adversary are denoted as T and , respectively. T is unauthorized to have access
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to any real tags since T has no secret information like the real reader T. Similarly,  is not valid
as it does not have the secret and identifying information of a valid tag. However, the adversarial
reader T can communicate with a valid tag. Even the fake tag  can communicate with a

legitimate reader. In both cases, the ultimate goal of the adversary is to track any tag of the RFID
system. We assume that the adversary, the adversarial reader, and the adversarial tag have
polynomially bounded resources. In addition, the adversary can launch physical attacks.
However, the hardware based defenses against physical attacks are beyond the scope of this work.
We also assume that the reader cannot be compromised.
1) Information Privacy:

Theorem 1. PriSens preserves information privacy with respect to the adversary Q.

Proof. Let us assume âÉ] provides the adversary Q with a tag . Q transmits this tag to

the oracle âªS]AãÉ* with a nonce 0 . Then âªS]AãÉ* provides Q with the response -.

Now, Q selects a . To break data privacy, Q should tell if -is produced using the .

This implies that Q has to identify the input of the encryption by just learning the cipher text. Q
can succeed in two cases. First, if she can retrieve the inputs from the output of the random
oracle. But this contradicts with our assumption that the inputs of a random oracle are

computationally intractable from the output of the oracle. Second, if Q knows the secret keys of

the tag . Without tampering the tag , if Q can determine the keys by learning the cipher texts,

this again breaks the semantic security of the symmetric key cryptography. Therefore Q can break
data privacy with probability no better than random guessing. Thus it proves data privacy

property of Definition 1. ∎
2) Unlinkability:

Theorem 2. PriSens provides unlinkability with respect to the adversary Q.
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Proof. Let us assume âÉ] provides the adversary Q with two tags B ,  from the same

group. These two tags go into the learning phase. Q transmits B ,  to âå(É which outputs the
response -" .

Now, to break unlinkability, the adversary Q has to tell the value of Z. We assume that the

adversary’s guess is right. In other words, the adversary can determine whether the response -" is

produced by B or  , given the learned responses from both the tags. The responses of a tag

cannot be a signature of the tag because according to our protocol, a nonce on the tag side makes
each response different from all the previous responses originated from the same tag. Therefore,
we can say that the guess is right because the adversary knows the keys (the group key and the
secret key) stored on these two tags. Without tampering the tags B ,  , the adversary has to

determine the keys stored on these tags by just observing the cipher texts. But this contradicts
with the semantic security of symmetric key cryptography. Therefore, the adversary can break
unlinkability with no better approach than random guessing. Thus it proves the unlinkability

property of Definition 2. ∎
3) Physical Attack:

Under this attack, we consider that the adversary Q can compromise any tag with a


probability of M. Whenever a tag 1 becomes compromised, the adversary learns all private

information stored on the tag 1 . Therefore, the adversary can now decrypt  of each response originated from the other members of the group  . Thus, Q can learn the identifier that a tag is

using to produce its response by decrypting the . We discuss the aftereffect of this attack with an
example and demonstrate how PriSens provides unlinkability even if the adversary realizes the
identifiers used in the responses.

We consider a group  of four tags  , R , ® , and ¯ . Suppose the adversary

compromised the tag ® as shown in Fig. 4. Now the adversary learns the group key ¨³ , the tag

secret key  ©æ and a set of identifiers Ω® = {1,2,3,4}. From now on, the adversary can decrypt 
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part of all the responses originated from  , R , and ¯ with the group key ¨³ . But, the adversary
still cannot decrypt \ part of these responses since she does not possess the secret keys of these

tags. With this learned information (¨³ and Ω® ), the adversary tries to track the other tags of this
group. Since the adversary can decrypt  of each responses, she can learn the identifier

underlying the cipher text . In other words, she can discover which identifier has been used to
produce a response. The arrow in the Figure 7.6 represents that the responses of the

authentication sessions (after ® is compromised) are transmitted from the tags ( , R , ¯ ) to the
reader. The identifiers used in these responses are shown on above the arrow. Each identifier is

shown in plaintext since the adversary can retrieve the identifier by decrypting  of - using ¨³ .
According to our protocol, even if the adversary comes to know about the identifier used
in a response, she cannot conclude which of the potential tags is the sender of this response. In
our example, the adversary discovers the identifier 2 is used two times, but she cannot be certain
which of these tags ( , R , ¯ ) is the originator(s) of these responses. Though ® shares the

identifier 2 with only  and ¯ , however, the adversary has no knowledge about the parties with

whom ® is sharing which of its identifiers. Even the adversary does not know how many of the
identifiers of Ω® are being shared. So, under this scenario, the anonymity set of the potential

senders of a given response seems to be 3 to the adversary. Therefore, when the adversary

compromises one tag from the group of 0 uncorrupted tags, PriSens forms an anonymity set
of size 1 and another anonymity set of size (0 − 1) from the group instead of 0 anonymity

sets of size 1 like the group based authentication [Avoine07]. This is the noticeable partition that
improves the level of privacy provided by PriSens. Because, the remaining 7 − 0 tags of the
system forms the other anonymity set which is same under both the protocols. Thus PriSens
prevents adversary benefit from tracking by compromising a tag.
We now consider the case of compromising multiple tags of the same group. In the above

scenario, even if Q compromises either  or ¯ after compromising ® , the adversary cannot be
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certain whether R has identifier 2 in ΩR or not. Therefore, the size of anonymity set is still 2, i.e.,

0 − , where  is the number of compromised tags of the group. If Q compromises R instead of
 or ¯ , the size of anonymity set is still 2 (i.e., 0 − ). Therefore, we conclude that the

anonymity set, formed from a group that is under physical attack, is of size (0 − ), where 0 is

the group size and  is the number of compromised tags of the given group.

PriSens provides protocol-level privacy only. In real world, there are many possible side
channels. If tags emit distinct “radio-fingerprint”, then no protocol-level privacy countermeasures
can prevent privacy infringement [Avoine05].

3,5,9,10

2,3,5,6

T2

T1
2,5,8,12

T4
Anonymity set 3

1,2,3,4

T3

Figure 7. 6 Aftereffect of a physical attack on PriSens, where  is compromised by the adversary

7.7.2. Evaluation of PriSens by Measuring Privacy

We consider two privacy metrics for the measurement of privacy. First, our privacy
measurement technique is based on anonymity set like the privacy metric used by Avoine et al.
[Avoine08]. Second, we identify the amount of information disclosed by a scheme as another
metric presented in [Nohl06]. This metric is based on Shannon’s information theorem
[Shannon48].
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7.7.3. Measurement of Privacy Based on Anonymity Set

The level of privacy of an RFID system, achieved by a scheme, at a given time, is a
function of the total number of compromised tags at that time. When some tags are compromised,
the set of all tags are partitioned such that the adversary cannot distinguish the tags belong to the
same partition, but she can distinguish the tags that belong to different partitions. So, these
partitions become the anonymity sets of their members. The level of privacy based on anonymity
set, ℘, can be measured as the average anonymity set size [Avoine08].
℘=

|| |
1
1
è|| |
= R è|| |R
7
7
7


where || | denotes the size of partition | and

chosen tag belongs to partition | .

|«³ |
|M|



is the probability that a randomly

According to PriSens, a similar kind of partitions is formed when tags become

compromised. If  is the number of compromised tags within group  , then the set of the tags

within this group is partitioned into  anonymity sets of size 1 and another anonymity set of size

0 −  . If ℂ = { | is the total compromised tags within  } is the set of compromised groups,
|ℂ| is the total number of compromised groups, and P = ∑ª]Ù ]³ ∈ℂ  is the total number of

compromised tags, the level of privacy ℘ achieved by PriSens can be expressed as
℘=

1
R
ê 0L − |ℂ| +
R
7

è  + 0 −  R ë

each ]³ ∈ℂ

where 7 = total number of tags in the system

0 = total number of tags within a group

L = total number of groups in the system.
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7.7.4. Measurement of Privacy Based on Information Leakage

We measure the information leakage in bits based on Shannon’s information theorem

[Shannon48]. If we have a group of tags of size & and the adversary divides this group into two

disjoint subgroups of size &/2, then 1 bit of information is disclosed out of log R & bits. Extending
ì


this concept from two subgroups of equal size to two subgroups of different sizes, where tags



are in one subgroup and the remaining tags a1 − c & are in another subgroup, we can measure
the average amount of information disclosed in bits as follows
=

1
−1

log R  +
log R a
c.
−1



In general, if the adversary splits 7 tags of the system into  disjoint partitions, then


=è
e

|| |
7
∙ log R î ï
||
7
|

where || | denotes the size of partition | . According to our protocol, if ℂ =

{ | is the total compromised tags within  } is the set of compromised groups, |ℂ| is the total

number of compromised groups, and P = ∑ª]Ù ]³ ∈ℂ  is the total number of compromised tags,

the amount of information leakage in bits  can be expressed as
=a

SNf|ℂ|
M
log R aSNf|ℂ|cc +
M

∑ðñòó ]³ ∈ℂ a a log R 7c +
M


Sf]³ 

where, 7, 0 , and L bears the same meaning mentioned before.

M

M

log R aSf] cc
³

7.7.5. Experimental Results

We have compared both the protocols, PriSens and the group based authentication, using
a Matlab simulation. The experiment results establish that the level of privacy provided by
PriSens is higher than that of the group based authentication. Our comparison is based on the two
metrics presented above, the level of privacy (based on anonymity set) and information leakage.
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We have come up with a conclusion same as [Nohl06] that the information leakage describes the
privacy threats better than the anonymity set.

In our simulation, we have considered two systems with 7 = 2£ , L = 64 and 7 =

2RB , L = 64. Tags are selected to be compromised with a uniform random distribution. The

number of compromised tags ranges from 0 to 160. We have run the simulation for 100 times and
computed the average ℘ achieved by PriSens and the group based authentication as a function of
the total number of compromised tags P (Figure 7.6(a)-(b)).
PriSens

(a) Level of privacy based on anonymity set, with 7 = 2£ and
L = 64
PriSens

(c) The amount of information leakage, with 7 = 2£ and
L = 64

PriSens

(b) Level of privacy based on anonymity set, with 7 = 2RB
and L = 64
PriSens

(d) The amount of information leakage, with 7 = 2RB and
L = 64

Figure 7.7 Experimental results of PriSens against the group based authentication
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The small increase in the level of privacy achieved by PriSens is visible when the total
number of compromised tags becomes more than 30. During the simulation, we have also

computed the average amount of information leakage , for both the protocols, as a function of

the total number of compromised tags P (Figure 7.7(c)-(d)). The plots depict that a significant
amount of improvement in privacy protection is achieved by PriSens. With the increase in the

total number of compromised tags P, the average amount of information disclosed by the group
based authentication is quite higher than the information disclosed by PriSens.

In Figure 7.7(c) (7 = 2£ , when P becomes 160, the group based authentication

discloses about 15 bits out of 16 bits of information, while PriSens discloses about 6 bits of
information. The group based authentication discloses 56.25% more information than PriSens in a
similar setup.

Figure 7.7(d) (7 = 2RB) shows that the group based authentication reveals almost 19 bits

out of 20 bits of information and PriSens reveals around 6 bits of information. This time the
group based authentication discloses 65% more information than PriSens. Based on the
simulation results, we can conclude that the information disclosed by the group based
authentication increases with the size of the system; however, PriSens shows consistency in the
information leakage in both the cases. Information leakage is a better metric to demonstrate the

privacy threats in RFID systems than anonymity set. Though the improvement in ℘ provided by
PriSens against the group based authentication is not significant, however, we can say that
PriSens provides better privacy protection than the group based authentication, based on the
results of the amount of information disclosed by these two protocols.
7.7.6. Memory and Search Complexity Analysis of PriSens

Search Complexity: According to PriSens, the reader’s complexity is slightly increased

than the group based scheme [Avoine07]. After receiving the response - = , \ from a tag 1 ,

the reader searches for the correct group key to decrypt . In the worst case, the reader has to
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perform this operation L times. If such a group key exists, the reader can retrieve the identifier

,1Â from . Now, the reader has to search for the tag’s secret key to identify 1 by decrypting \

properly. The reader searches a key space of size |Ñ |. Therefore, in the worst case, the reader’s

total complexity is L + |Ñ |. In the best case, the size of Ñ is 3 and in the worst case, it can be 0,

size of the group. But in the group based scheme, the reader’s complexity in worst case is L + 1.
Nevertheless, PriSens is much better than the other schemes where the worst case reader’s

complexity is 7, the number of total tags in the system. To provide improvement in privacy

protection, we have to sacrifice this small increase in the complexity of the reader. Since readers
are more powerful than tags, they can handle this increase in search complexity.

Memory Complexity: According to PriSens, tags need to store  number of identifiers

along with the group key and the unique secret key. Though tags have limited resources,
however, the increase in memory requirement is acceptable than the increase in computation and
communication complexity. A smart RFID tags have memory capacity of 32kBytes or more
[Laurie07]. Even RFID tags with extended memory capacity are available at the market
[Fujitsu08]. All these tags can store the information required for PriSens.
7.7.7. Comparison of Security Requirements with existing Work

Table 7.1 presents the summary of security and privacy goals satisfied by PriSens
protocol. This table also summarizes the comparison of PriSens with other relevant existing work.
Here, N is the number of tags in the system.
Table 7.1 comparison of existing techniques

Complexity

Cloning

Tracking

Privacy

Resistance Resistance Protection

[Ohkubo03]

O(N)

Yes

Yes

Yes

[Weis03]

O(1)

No

No

No

[Molnar04]

O(logN)

Yes

No

Yes
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[Avoine07]

1

O(γ)

Yes

Yes

Yes

[Avoine05]

O(N2/3)

Yes

No

Yes

[Dimitriou05]

O(logN)

Yes

No

Yes

[Henrici08]

O(1)

No

No

Yes

[Molnar05]

O(logN)

No

No

Yes

[Tan07]

O(N)

Yes

Yes

Yes

PriSens

2

Yes

Yes

O(L + |Ñ |) Yes

1. γ is the number of groups in the system.

2. In the best case, the size of Ñ is 3 and in the worst case, it can be 0, size of the group.

7.8. Goals Satisfied by PriSens Protocol
The motivating example of RFID application for this chapter is to preserve privacy in
RFID based healthcare or such systems where user’s privacy is the most important issue. The
goal of such a system is to preserve privacy efficiently as well as provide basic security like
confidentiality, unlinkability, and authentication. PriSens protocol is able to achieve all these
goals since it discloses much less information than the existing works.
7.9. Summary
In this chapter, we propose a “two component” based framework PriSens-HSAC that
provides increased privacy for RFID based healthcare systems. The PriSens component provides
better privacy compared to the existing RFID authentication protocols while identifying an RFID
tag in healthcare setting. The HSAC component restricts unauthorized access of patient’s private
information by using P-RBAC mechanism. Our evaluation clearly illustrates that the adoption of
this framework will allows RFID based healthcare systems to preserve user privacy.
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Chapter 8:

Ensuring Survivability in Computational RFID based Systems

In the past decade there has been a substantial effort to realize the vision of original
ubiquitous computing applications. Particularly wireless sensor networks (WSNs) based on mote
sensing have been applied to many real-world problems. Despite many successes, WSNs have not
led to sensing devices embedded in the fabric of everyday life, where everything is equipped with
networked sensors. For this type of deployment, truly unobtrusive sensing devices are necessary.
For the last few years, it is argued that Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology has a
number of key attributes that make it attractive for such applications. RFID is mainly used for
automated identification of objects and people. However, this technology is limited to only
identifying and inventorying items in a given space [Ma10]. Future RFID applications will
require tags that can also perform minimal sensing, computation, and storage. One recent
innovation of powerful RFID is Computational RFID (CRFID) [Buettner08b, Sample07] that
presents exciting possibilities for future ubiquitous computing applications [Holleman08,
Jiang05, and Segawa09]. In this chapter, we explore the survivability issue of CRFID systems.
One example of CRFID tags is Wireless Identification and Sensing Platforms (WISP). WISP tags
present the combination of capabilities of WSNs and RFID networks.
Authentication is a key technique that can be used to defend against typical attacks on
CRFID systems. However, as WISP tags have sensor data along with its ID, the chosen
authentication technique needs to be different from the ones currently used in RFID systems.
Usually CRFID systems are used in sophisticated applications like: enemy move
detection in military battlefield, volcanic activity measure, etc [Buettner08a]. In these types of
applications, the main goal of the system is to provide service constantly. However, in CRFID
systems an adversary may de-synchronize tags and readers to create DoS attack and to threaten
system’s survivability [Buettner08a]. Survivability refers to a system’s ability to withstand
malicious attacks and support the system’s mission even when parts of the system have been
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damaged. With effective fault tolerance and damage recovery mechanisms in place, a system may
still be trustworthy in fulfilling its functions and supporting the system mission. In this chapter,
we address the problem of ensuring survivability in CRFID based sophisticated applications
without sacrificing system’s performance.
8.1. Our Major Contributions
The main contributions of this chapter are:
•

To address the survivability issue of CRFID systems, here we propose DoS attack
resistant Robust Authentication Protocol (DRAP) for WISP networks.

•

This protocol detects DoS attack and recovers from the attack so that the tag and the
reader can get back to their synchronous state.

•

To prevent DoS at the link layer, we also propose to use the Enhanced Dynamic Framed
Slotted ALOHA (EDFSA) [Lee05] technique at the link layer during communication.
Here, our concept is to reduce the collision rate so that optimum system efficiency can be
achieved.

•

We measure the performance of the DRAP protocol and present the evaluation results.
Organization of the chapter: The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: in section

8.2 describes our major motivation to address survivability issue of CRFID based systems. We
propose the DRAP protocol in Section 8.3. This section also includes the system architecture,
DoS attack technique in CRFID systems, existing defend mechanisms, attack models, adversary
goals and details of DRAP protocol. In section 8.3, we perform the security analysis of DRAP
protocol. Section 8.4 describes our simulation technique and analysis of simulation results.
8.2. Motivation
For simple RFID systems, the data of interest is simply each tag’s identity. However, for
WISP networks, it is difficult to develop efficient protocols for gathering sensor data that changes
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over time. WISP tags with new sensor data must wait until they are interrogated by a reader. This
increases the likelihood of many devices wanting to use the bandwidth limited channel at the
same time. However, the standard RFID strategy of identifying and then communicating with
each device is wasteful as only some devices would have relevant data. Moreover, most of the
RFID authentication protocols are challenge response based and they need multiple rounds of
message exchange in order to verify the legitimacy of both parties (verifier and prover, i.e. reader
and tags). As WISP tags have sensor data associated them, communication can be reduced by not
authenticating the tags that do not have new sensor data. One technique to reduce communication
is to reduce the number of message exchanges by identifying and authenticating those tags only
that have new sensor data. Because of all these differences, the trivial RFID protocols securing
RFID network cannot be applied to WISP sensor network.
As a motivating example, let us consider a CRFID system where WISP tags are deployed
in a battlefield. Quick response time along with survivability is very important in such systems. A
reader might have hundreds of WISPs in its field of view. Because all the WISPs share a single
reader channel, the update rate per tag would be very low if every tag were simply queried for
sensor data sequentially. However, at any given moment, only a few objects would typically be in
motion and therefore producing non-trivial sensor values. For this type of situation, protocols
have been designed which gives highest priority to sensors with new data [Saxena10]. But an
adversary can send a bulk of dummy messages with dynamic new sensor values which would
appear as a legitimate packet to the reader. This scenario may lead to Denial of Service (DoS)
attack. DoS attack can also be launched in these types of systems by de-synchronizing the tags
and readers. DoS attacks are not addressed by most of the authentication protocols because it is
not possible to cope with all kinds of DoS attacks. DoS attacks may also occur because of some
communication failure. For example, due to the radio jamming of the channel between the tag
and the reader, a communication failure may happen and the tag and reader may become
desynchronized which may eventually result in DoS attack. However, defending against DoS due
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to radio jamming is out of the scope of this research work. In the application layer, the underlying
problem of DoS attack is tag collision. These collisions occur when more than one WISP tag
reflects their data at the same time. As a result the reader searches all the tags in interrogation
(shown in Figure 8.1)) zone.

Figure 8.1 Collision by the tags in interrogation zone

Therefore, our focus is to investigate a feasible solution to detect the DoS attack and
recover the system to maintain system survivability without sacrificing system’s survivability.
We also minimize the tag reply collision at the link layer by using EDFSA based communication
technique.
8.3. DoS Attack Resistant Authentication Protocol (DRAP)
8.3.1. Our Approach to Ensure Security and Survivability

In order to be secure against the major attacks of WISP networks, we design a mutual
authentication protocol. However, in order to prevent the DoS attack in the link layer, we need to
reduce the number of tag collisions at the link layer. Tag anti
anti-collision
collision algorithms can be
categorized into ALOHA based algorithms and tree based algorithms. Tree based algorithms
[Myung06] make trees while performing the tag identification procedure using a unique ID of
each tag.. On the other hand, ALOHA based protocols are known for their low complexity and
computation, thus making them attractive to be used in WISP networks. Examples include Pure,
Slotted and Framed Slotted ALOHA (FSA), and their variants [Zhen05]. In Pure and Slotted
ALOHA,, a tag responds after a random delay, and continues doing so until it is identified. Lee, et
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al. [Lee05] proposed enhanced dynamic framed slotted ALOHA for efficient RFID tag
identification. The MAC protocol for WISP systems is based on Framed Slotted ALOHA. To
increase the system efficiency and also to reduce collision rate, we propose a technique based on
Efficient Dynamic Framed Slotted ALOHA (EDFSA) [Lee05] as the underlying layer’s
communication technique.
8.3.2. Goals of Different Actors

Adversary goals. In WISP based systems, an adversary may perform several attacks like
tracking, cloning, eavesdropping, replay attack and DoS attack. DoS attacks cover not only the
adversary’s attempt to subvert, disrupt, or destroy a network, but also any event that diminishes a
network’s capability to provide a service. This attack may also include de-synchronization of tags
and readers of the system. In WISP networks, several types of DoS attacks in different layers
might be performed. At the physical layer the DoS attacks could be jamming and tampering. At
the link layer, the attack could involve collision. At the application layer this attack could be
performed by malicious flooding and de-synchronization.
Our Goals. Our goal is to design an authentication protocol to ensure systems’
survivability in the event of de-synchronization between tags and readers. Our authentication
protocol prevents the DoS attack from application layer perspective and makes the system
survivable. The EDFSA based communication technique allows us to minimize the effect of DoS
attack by reducing the collision rate.
8.3.3. System Architecture of WISP #etworks

The architecture of a WISP tag based system is shown in Figure 8.4. There are three main
components in WISP network.
Issuer: The issuer initializes each tag during the deployment and authorizes the reader
access to the tags. We can think of the issuer as a certificate authority (PQ).
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WISP Tag: Each WISP tag in the system is denoted as ¢. The issuer assigns a unique

key  to the th WISP tag ¢ of the system. Each tag contains a 3-tuple
tuple consisting of a secret
9 , an identifier  , and new activity threshold ∆.. In our protocol, we consider a sensor data as

new if the difference between the data at current timestamp and at previous time stamp is greater
than ∆.

Figure
igure 8.2 System architecture of WISP based systems

Reader: The reader is assumed to be connected to the backend server. We assume the
communication channel between the reader and the backend server is secured. From now on, we
denote the backend server as the reader. The reader receives all secret information by the
t issuer

during the deployment. For
or each tag, the reader has a 44-tuple,
tuple, composed of the secret number 9 ,
the secret number of the last successful session 9÷øùú , the tag identifier  and the previous

sensor value ôÉAªõ . Initially, all ôÉAªõ are assigned to zero. The reader contains a list of all valid
tags that take the following form,
Tû*")ª

Í9÷øùú , 9 , ôÉAªõ :  Ï

∙∙∙ þ ∙∙∙
=ü
ቑ
Í9M÷øùú , 9M , ôÉAªõ : M Ï
M

where there are # number of WISP tags in the systems. We assume that the reader and all

the WISP tags in the system has the knowledge of ö. ,, an irreversible one way hash function to

protect the integrity of the message. In our protocol, we use SHA
SHA-2 as ö. ,, and its output
outp is 256
bits. The outputs of ö.  cannot be linked back to its input, and as a result an adversary cannot
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link back the tag ID. All the entities of the system can generate pseudorandom number using a

generator |.  based on its seed. Initially, the data of tag and reader are in sync, and 9÷øùú ,

equals 9 . We also assume that each tag (¢ ) can perform encryption of their sensor value with

their key 9 by using an encryption function r³ . . Similarly, the reader can perform decryption
the same key (9 ) but by using a decryption function ³ . .
8.3.4. Threat Model

We assume that an active adversary has full control over all the communications between
the tag and the reader. Our assumptions also include that the adversary can control a number of
tags but cannot corrupt a reader. The adversary can install a fake reader in the environment which
we call an adversarial reader. We denote the adversary as Å. Each reader and tag controlled by the
 , respectively. T is unauthorized to have access to any real
adversary are denoted as T and ¢

 is not valid as it does
tags since T has no secret information like the real reader T. Similarly, ¢

not have the secret and identifying information of a valid tag. However, the adversarial reader T
 can communicate with a legitimate
can communicate with a valid tag. Even the fake tag ¢

reader. We assume that by programming a WISP tag appropriately, such that the sensor value >

 that can impersonate as legitimate tag in the
threshold (∆), an adversary can create a fake tag ¢
system. Here, the adversary’s goal is to create as many collisions as possible so that the valid tags
do not get a chance to reply. We also assume that the adversary, the adversarial reader, and the
adversarial tags have polynomially bounded resources. In our system, the following oracles
represent the adversary’s actions to attack tags.

 , , : The adversary eavesdrops within a channel at session  between R

and one of its communicating tags ¢.

 , , , : The adversary impersonates a reader R in a protocol session

t and sends a message M to the tag ¢.
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 , , , : The adversary impersonates a tag ¢ in a protocol
session t and sends a message M to the reader R.

 , : The adversary queries a tag , to learn information, during the

communication protocol session t.

  ¡, , : The adversary receives a message M from an entity U (e.g., either WT

or R) during the execution of session t.
8.3.5. Our Protocol (DRAP)

The protocol operates as shown in Figure 8.2. At first, the reader sends a request

accompanied by a random number 0A . If the tag has a new sensor value, it computes = with

another random number 0 , generated by itself, and 9 . Next ¢ executes encryption function
r³ on (ö  ⨁ ôSª௪  to generate - . Here, to enhance security, ¢ encrypts the XOR of

ö  and new sensor value (ôSª௪ ) rather than encrypting only the sensor value. Finally, the
tag replies with = for authenticating itself, 0 to help the reader to produce the same

pseudorandom number and - to retrieve the new sensor value. Now, the reader checks the

validity of = by computing |9 ⨁0A ∥ 0  for each tag in the database. If the reader finds a
match, it can be sure of the validity of the tag.

Then the reader checks if the sensor value sent by the tag is old. ¢ does this by

checking if the difference of new and old sensor value is greater than ∆. If it is old, it might be an
indication of an adversary trying to launch DoS attack by using previous sensor values (Since a
valid tag replies only when it has a new sensor value).

If the sensor value is new, the reader updates 9÷øùú and ôÉAªõ . And then =1 is generated

by using the next seed that is the hashed secret number ℎ9 . If the reader fails to find any match
in the first search strategy, it changes the scheme of search by replacing the 9 with the 9÷øùú of

all the tags in the database. Upon realizing any match, the reader only generates =1 .
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Reader 
Í9÷øùú , 9 , ôÉAªõ :  Ï

∙∙∙ þ ∙∙∙
ü
ቑ
Í9M÷øùú , 9M , ôÉAªõ : M Ï
M

Tag 
Í9 ,  , ∆Ï

Generate nonce 0A

0 0A

if ( ∆ ≤ |ôSª௪ − ô(û | ) then
1. Generate nonce 0
2. = = |9 ⨁0A ∥ 0 
3. - = rೈá ö  ⨁ ôSª௪ 
³

Use database to generate |9 ⨁0A ∥ 0  for
all tags and check the validity of =
if correct:
W = ³ - 
ôSª௪ = W ⨁ ö 
if ôSª௪³ not equal ôÉAªõ³ then
9÷øùú ⟵ 9 , X⟵ ℎ9 ,
=1 ⟵ |X⨁0A ∥ 0  , 9 ⟵ öo
ôÉAªõ³ ⟵ ôSª௪³
else
ignore the message, =1 ⟵ 0
if not correct:

else
0 = , - , 0  5 05 Y4[

generate | a9÷øùú ⨁0A ∥ 0 c for all tags
and check validity of =
if correct:
W = ³ - 
ôSª௪ = W ⨁ ö 
if ôSª௪³ not equal ô(û³ then
=1 ⟵ | aℎ9÷øùú ⨁0A ∥ 0 c

ôÉAªõ³ ⟵ ôSª௪³
else ignore the message, =1 ⟵ 0
Otherwise: ignore the message, =1 ⟵ 0

=1

ܻ ⟵ ℎ9  generate |ܻ⨁0A ∥
0 and check validity of =½
if correct: 9 ⟵ ℎܻ

Figure 8.2 DRAP protocol

In fact, this step is to provide the robustness to the protocol by recovering any tag from

out of order to be in synchronization with the reader. In both the cases, the reader replies with =1 .
If = is not valid, the reader simply ignores the message and replies with a random number rand.

However, this rand keeps the protocol consistent by preventing an eavesdropper to acquire any
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knowledge about this session. Finally, it is the tag’s turn to authenticate the reader by verifying
=1 . If =1 is valid, the tag updates its secret number. Otherwise the tag discards the message.
8.3.6. Communication Protocol

Figure 8.3 Collision ratio for tag identification with different frame size

In DRAP, we propose to use Efficient Dynamic Slotted ALOHA (EDFSA) based
communication technique to reduce collisions at the link layer. Generally, in the framed slotted
ALOHA anti-collision method, the system efficiency decreases as the number of responding tags
becomes larger. However, EDFSA facilitates us to have optimum system efficiency by

maintaining dynamic frame size ℱ in each round. The derivation of ℱ for each round can be
found in [Lee05]. In a WISP network, the number of tag collisions increases with the increase of
tags in the system. The relationship between the collision ratio and the number of tags is shown in
Figure 8.3, where the ℱ ∈ {32, 64, 128, 256, 312}. We can keep the system in maximum

efficiency (35.5%) to decide the next round frame size. This also ensures a reduced collision rate,
which allows the DRAP protocol to defend against the DoS attack. So, we lessen the
susceptibility to DoS attack by reducing the number of collisions with the use of EDFSA.
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8.4. Security Analysis of DRAP
In this section, we analyze DRAP against different types of attacks. For every attack, we

first describe how the attack is performed and then how DRAP defends against the attack. T and

¢ are referred to as a legitimate reader and legitimate tag. DRAP is secure against most of the

attacks; next we discuss the following two types of attacks and their defenses. Each attack and
corresponding defense has three phases:
Phase 1. Learning phase: Adversary, Å uses non-destructive oracles such as

 , , ,  , , , ,  , ,

 , , , , and   ¡, ,  on a set of target tags and reader. The goal

of the adversary is to learn important information related to the tags and reader.
Phase 2. Attacking phase: Depending on the security level of the readers, Å may
impersonate as a legitimate tag or reader.
Phase 3. Defend Phase: DRAP protocol is designed in such a way so that it can defend
against the majority of the attacks.
•

Eavesdropping:
Learning phase: Å executes the oracle  , ,  in the communication

between T and ¢ and later uses this information to launch any of the attacks mentioned above.
Attacking phase: Å can learn every piece of information exchanged between T and ¢

such as 0A , 0 , = and - .

Defend Phase: According to our protocol, Å cannot launch a privacy attack as the

protocol does not reveal any sort of private information of the tag or the reader. Even Å fails to

track ¢ because each time ¢ is queried, it replies with a new random value. Thus Å cannot

figure out any signature to follow ¢ . Even eavesdropping the communication cannot help Å to
ప by executing the oracle
launch a cloning attack. Å cannot create a fake tag ¢
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 , , , . Even Å cannot act as a legitimate reader to the legitimate tags by

executing the oracle  , , , .
•

Denial of Service (DoS)
Learning phase: In this case, Å does not want to derive any information or try to

impersonate. The main target of Å is to ensure that a reader cannot access its authorized tags. By
executing the oracle  , , , Å tries to learn information and crate fake tags to
install them in the network.
Attacking phase: To launch a DoS attack, Å places many programmed nodes with

random sensor data within the network. The task of these malicious nodes is to reply whenever
the reader executes an authentication query on the legitimate tags so that the there is a maximum
number of collisions in the channel. As a result, the reader/back-end server is not able to
authenticate tags easily and with efficient response time.
Defend Phase: As part of our authentication protocol, we propose an EDFSA based

communication technique that minimizes the collision rate within a channel. This technique also
reduces the collision rate as well as maintains reasonable system efficiency. Moreover, our DRAP
protocol is designed in such a way so that it can detect DoS attack and recover from desynchronization between tags and reader.
In the final dissertation, we plan to include the formal proof mechanism of DRAP against
all major attacks, like: tracking, cloning, replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack.
8.5. Performance Evaluation
In our simulation, the authentication server is implemented on a high performance Dell
PC. We use Java for the protocol simulation where we use SHA-2 as the hash function (returning
256 bits). The simulated environment consists of 1000 nodes in the network and one legitimate
reader. Among the1000 WISP nodes we made 1% ~ 3% nodes to be malicious. The system
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efficiency and collision rate is determined in terms of the legitimate nodes. We ran the simulation
300 times and reported the average.

ℱ = 64

ℱ = 128

ℱ = 256

Figure 8.4 Average collision ratio with three different frame sizes

ℱ = 128

ℱ = 256

ℱ = 64

Figure 8.5 Total number of rounds required to authenticate one tag

Our comparison is based on two performance metrics. The first metric is collision rate,
which is defined as the ratio of the number of slots with a collision to the frame size. And the
second metric is the rounds/iterations required by the reader to authenticate one tag. Now,
considering the current state of the network (i.e. number of malicious nodes and number of
legitimate nodes are fixed), we executed the DRAP protocol to perform authentication of all valid
tags. As the underlying communication mechanism between the tag and the reader, we used our
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proposed technique based on EDFSA. Finally, we took the average of 300 collision rates. We also
took the average of 300 runs performed to collect rounds required to authenticate one tag.

We performed the above mentioned simulation for three different frame sizes (ℱ =

64, 128, 256). Figure 8.4 shows the collision rate for different numbers of tags in the networks.
We can clearly see from the Figure 8.4, that when the number of tags increases the collision rate
increases. However, with a larger frame size (ex. 256), the collision rate reduces with the increase
of total tags in the system. Figure 8.5 shows the number of iterations required to identify one tag
with respect to the number of tags in the system. From this figure, we can see that, with smaller
frame size, and with increased number of tags, the collision rate increases. Therefore, more
iteration is required to authenticate a single tag. However, when the frame size is increased, even

with increased tags in the system, the iterations required to authenticate one tag is ∼ 5. Therefore,
the system response time is low, since the reader requires less time to authenticate.
8.6. Summary
To address the survivability issue of WISP networks, in this chapter, we propose DRAP
(DoS attack Resistant Authentication Protocol). DRAP allows both tag and reader to
communicate successfully with each other even if the adversary launches De-synchronization or
DoS attack.
8.7. Goals Satisfied by DRAP Protocol
The motivating example of CRFID application for this chapter is sophisticated RFID
applications especially designed for enemy move detection in military battlefield. In such
applications the main goal of the system is to receive service from the system consistently.
Therefore, the system needs to provide service even if the system is under attack. Because of this,
ensuring survivability as well as reducing response time are two major goals in these type
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applications. DRAP protocol is able to achieve these goals since it is robust and it allows an RFID
system to re-synchronize the state of tags and reader if there is de-synchronization of DoS attack.
8.8. Publication
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Chapter 9:

Ensuring Reliability in Computational RFID based Critical Systems

Recently, WISP tags, one example of CRFID tags, have been used in indoor activity
recognition, vital signs identification, sleep quality, and other health status monitoring systems
[Buettner08a]. In [Chaudhri08], WISPs are used for sensing and monitoring exercises involving
free weights. Hoque et al. [Hoque10b] proposed a sleep monitoring system based on the WISP
tags. Recently WISP has been used for low power wireless security research [Chae07, Czeskis08,
and Salajegheh09]. By using the 3D accelerometer of WISP, Saxena et al. developed a motion
detection system that also works as a means to ensure security [Saxena10]. These systems are
considered as critical RFID applications where the decision accuracy or reliability of the system
is very important. These types of systems can be very popular in the healthcare and wellness
application domain if the protocols designed for such systems can provide necessary security
features and can assure reliability of system’s decision. With the appropriate protocols in place,
these technologies can be applied to home healthcare [Haigh06], elderly care [Haigh06], smart
hospitals [Bardram07], medication adherence [Lundell07], smart kindergartens, smart homes
[Srivastava01], etc.
Within the above mentioned CRFID based critical applications, one area of research is
the problem of monitoring a large set of WISP tags and then identifying the missing ones. The
missing WISP tag data may introduce errors in the resolved decision of the system which reduces
the reliability of the system’s decision. Therefore, in order to maintain system reliability a
monitoring protocol needs to be executed frequently to find the missing tags of the environment
and so it should be made efficient in terms of execution time.
Aside from home healthcare systems, detecting missing tags is an important problem in
other settings too, such as warehouses, hospitals, pharmacy, and prisons. In a warehouse, it is
sometimes necessary to know if a product is missing due to theft, administrative error or vendor
fraud. Similar situations may exist in a large hospital where tens of thousands of pieces of
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equipment and other objects need to be tracked. Highly related to this is a recent paper by Tan,
Sheng and Li [Tan08], who designed novel protocols to detect missing tags within a certain
probability. However, the protocols cannot detect missing tags with certainty (i.e. 100%) and
more importantly, they cannot tell which tags are missing. Identification of missing tags has also
been investigated by Li et al. in [Li10]. They proposed a series of missing tag detection protocols
but they are not suitable for WISP tags since they do not have any mechanisms for handling
sensor data of the WISP tags. To address the problems mentioned above, we propose a missing
tag detection protocol that follows the following two guidelines to achieve efficiency and ensure
low response time 1) Reduce collision rate and
2) Let the tags report their presence by transmitting sensor data so that another round of
data collection is not needed.
The aim of this protocol is to ensure that the resolved decision of the system based on the
tag data of the environment is reliable
9.1. Our Major Contributions
•

We consider the problem of how to accurately and efficiently monitor a set of WISP tags for
identifying the missing tags.

•

We propose two tag monitoring protocols, MTD (Missing Tag Detection) that does not
require the reader to collect IDs from each WISP tag, but is still able to accurately detect
missing ones.

•

Our first monitoring protocol, Simple MTD, eliminates the transmission contention among
tags but it is not defensive against two attacks.

•

Our second protocol, Reliable MTD, increases reliability and is secure against major attacks.
To ensure low response time, this protocol reduces information volume that needs to be
transmitted from the tag.
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•

Reliable MTD is efficient as it allows the WISP tags to send their sensor data in the same
round of messaging in which the tag identification data is received.
Organization of the chapter: The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 9.2

describes our major motivation to address the problem of missing WISP tag detection. In this
section we also characterize reliability from our protocol’s perspective. In section 9.3, we present
the system model of a WISP based home healthcare system. Section 9.4 describes the MTD
protocols. This section is followed by section 9.5, presenting the security analysis of reliable
MTD protocol. Section 9.6 describes the performance comparison of the two protocols.
9.2. Motivation
As a motivating example of CRFID based critical system, let’s consider a scenario where
CRFID tags are used to determine the physiological status in a home healthcare system. This
system depends on collecting raw sensor data from the environment and inferring important
health status. In these types of systems, even subtle changes in the behavior of the patient can
give important signs of the onset and progression of certain diseases. Typically, this type of
system is composed of three subsystems (Figure 9.1) - the body area network (BAN), the home
network, and the central processing node, which also acts as a gateway to the Internet. Usually
the implementation of BAN depends on deploying different sensors for collecting different
environmental and human behavioral parameters (for example: room temperature, humidity, heart
rate, pulse, etc.). Moreover, the physical condition of the patient has to be sensed in an
unobtrusive manner by using as few sensors as possible. Recently WISP tags have been used in
the implementation of BAN in such systems. Since WISP tags alone have the capability to sense
various parameters, they allow the inference of important health status and activities by intelligent
analysis. Since these systems depend on every tag data for collective information analysis, the
absence of any tag data may eventually introduce error in the resolved health status.

122

For example, Table 9.1 shows a computational RFID tag based health status monitoring
environment consisting of three WISP tags that are used to monitor the health status of a person
who recently had a heart attack. At time  , the pulse rate and body temperature measuring tags

show high readings. Since the heart rate measuring tag shows normal reading, the system can

make an accurate decision that the person has a fever. But, at time R , the heart rate monitoring
tag is missing and due to high pulse rate and high temperature, the system makes an incorrect
decision. The system decides that the person has a fever. But in reality the person has high blood
pressure which is very dangerous for a patient who recently had a heart attack.
Therefore, in such systems, before making a decision based on the collective information
analysis, it is very important to detect the tags that are missing in the system. Otherwise, the
absence of any tag data may result in reduced reliability of the system’s decision. In this chapter,
by “missing tag”, we refer to an event when the sensor data is not reported back to the reader.
This event may occur due to the physical absence of the tag, some programming error in the tag,
some hardware error inside the tag or maybe the tag needs to be replaced in order to function
properly. In all these cases, the missing tag event needs to be fixed either by replacing a new tag
or by re-programming the tag accurately. But in order to fix the “missing tag event”, the system
needs to detect it first.
Table 9.1 Example of system error due to missing WISP Tags

Time  (Heart
rate)


R


(pulse)

 (Body
Temp)

Real Health
status

Inferred Health
status

System
Accuracy

Normal

High

High

Fever

Fever

Correct

Missing

High

High

High Blood
pressure

Fever

Incorrect
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Figure 9.1 Architecture of WISP based home healthcare system

To address the above mentioned problem, we propose a protocol in this chapter to
identify the missing tags and collect sensor information from the existing tags only. Since any
missing raw data from the tags may incorporate errors in the system’s decision making process, it
is important to ensure that all tags are present in the environment to maintain the reliability of the
system’s decision
Characterization. In literature several different notions of reliability have
Reliability Characterizatio
been proposed so far. In general, the definition of reliability is
is− the probability that a system will
perform its intended function for a given interval of time under specified operating conditions
condi
. In

our system, we consider our protocol to be successful if it can identify the tags that are missing in
the system. For example, let’s assume that

tags’ data is missing out of 7 tags in the system at

time .. We say that our protocol is reliabl
reliable if the probability of detecting missing tags is close to
1. We define reliability as follows:
Definition 1. Reliability, R(ts), is the probability of a system performing successfully
during the time period [0, ts].

T = |o =  ൎ 1
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ℎ , o = 7Z 5 06 6′  ݓℎ0   5 7 6
Identifying missing tags is a very important problem that has practical significance and
existing tag collection protocols can be adapted to solve this problem. In a typical tag collection
protocol, the reader collects the IDs from every RFID tag in the set, and returns all the IDs back
to the server. The server uses the collected data to determine whether there are any missing tags.
Since a collision yields no useful information to a reader, this protocol uses a slotted ALOHAlike scheme to minimize collisions. Tree based protocols [Myung06] can also be used for this
purpose. However, slotted ALOHA [Lee05, Zhen05] based algorithms reduce the probability of
collisions as tags are scheduled to transmit at separate times. So, here we propose slotted ALOHA
based protocol to solve the problem.
9.3. System Model
9.3.1. Problem definition

In our system, we assume that the server has a group of objects, and a WISP tag with a
unique ID is attached to each object. We refer to this group of objects as a set of tags. We
consider this set of tags to be “intact’’ if all the tags in the set are physically present together at
the same time. The problem is to design time efficient reliable protocols for the reader to
exchange information with the tags in order to identify the missing ones.
9.3.2. Protocol goal

The goal of the protocol is to accurately determine whether a set of WISP tags is intact
and collect the sensor data from the existing tags only.
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9.3.3. Architecture of the system

The architecture of a WISP based system is shown in Figure 9.2. There are four main
components in the system:
Issuer: The issuer initializes each tag during the deployment by writing the tag’s
information into its memory. The issuer also authorizes the reader to the tags. We can think of the
issuer as a certificate authority ((PQ).

WISP Tag: Each WISP tag in the system is denoted as ¢. The issuer assigns a unique

identification  to the th
th WISP tag ¢ of the system.

Reader: The reader is connected to the backend server. In our system, the WISP tag is the
prover and the reader is the verifier. The reader receives all the secret information by the issuer
during the deployment.
Server: The server contains the database of all tags. We assume that the communication
channel between the reader and the backend server is secure.

Figure 9.2 System architecture of WISP based network

We assume that the reader and all the tags in the system has the knowledge of XOR

operation and ℎ. ,, an irreversible one way hash function, to protect the integrity of the message.

The outputs of ℎ.  cannot be linked back to its input so that an adversary cannot link back the
tag s. There are many efficient has
hash
h functions in the literature. In this work, we use SHA-1
SHA

hash function that outputs 160 bits. Communication between the reader and the tags is timetime
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slotted. Reader uses a “synch” command to synchronize the clocks of the tags and reader. The
reader uses a ‘slot start’ command to start a slot.
9.3.4. Preliminaries and Assumptions

A home healthcare infrastructure may have multiple synchronized readers covering the
entire home but we logically treat them as one. We assume that the reader has access to a

database that stores the s of all tags. This assumption is necessary for any missing-tag detection

protocol. If we do not have the s of the tags, even after the reader collects the s directly from

all the tags, we still do not know if any of the tags are missing. If the database is lost due to a
database failure, we can recover the information by reading the s from the tags one at a time. In

this case, we will not be able to detect the tags that have already been lost because we have no
way to know of their existence in the first place. However, after collecting the s of the existing
tags, we may use our proposed protocol to monitor the intactness of this set of tags.
Communication between the reader and the tags is time-slotted. Our protocols are
request-response based protocol, in which the reader issues a request in a time slot and then zero.
One or more tags respond in the subsequent time slots. We assume that an RFID reader is able to
distinguish the slots with no reply, single reply, or multiple replies. We define these slots as
empty slot (E), single-reply slot (S), or collision slot (C) respectively. In each types of slot, there
can be three possible responses − 1) A bit string of 0 - meaning that no tags have replied, 2) A bit
string of sensor values- meaning that one tag has replied sensor data in that slot, and 3) Collision
- meaning multiple tags have replied in that slot.
If a slot is supposed to be single and it has a bit string of sensor values, it means that the
tag is present and the event corresponding to that slot is correct (OK). If a slot is supposed to be
empty but it has a bit string of sensor values, it might be an indication of an attack (A). On the
other hand, if a slot is supposed to be single-reply slot but it has a bit string of 0, it is indication
that the tag is missing (M). Based on the three types of slots and three different outcomes in each
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slot, there can be nine situations in our system (see Figure 9.3). The focus of this work is limited
to the six situations corresponding to the lower triangular (along with the diagonal) part of the
table shown in Figure 9.3. Therefore, we assume that the attacker is benign who will not
introduce any error in the system by replying in any slot or by launching replay attack. However,
the attacker is able to eavesdrop and track. The capabilities of the attacker and the security
analysis of MTD are discussed in a later section. Slots can also be characterized as multi-bit
response slots and single-bit response slots. The length of a multi-bit response slot is denoted as

( , which allows the transmission of a long response carrying multi-bits (ex. 4 bit) information.
The length of a single-bit response slot is denoted as ) , which allows the transmission of a short
response carrying only single bit information.
slot type
outcome E
E
S
C

OK
M
M

S

C

A
OK
M

A
A
OK

Figure 9.3 Table of possible situations in the system

9.4. Monitor and Collect (MTD) Protocols
In this section we describe our protocols. We consider an RFID reader, T and a set of 7

WISP tags, ¢ ∗. We denote the frame size as f and the random number generated by reader/tag
as r. The server contains a table of tag entries. Each entry of the table contains the corresponding
tag id. Table 9.2 summarizes the notations.
All of our protocols have two phases− Learning Phase and Execution Phase. The
learning phase is similar for the two protocols and it is executed only once; at the beginning of a
protocol when the tag monitoring system is launched for the first time. After that point, only the
execution phase will be executed by the MTD protocol to detect missing tags and to collect
existing sensor information. The execution phase is different for each protocol and this phase has
two steps− Monitor Step and Collect Step. The goal of the monitor step is to detect missing tags
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and the goal of the collect step is to collect sensor data from the tags. We will discuss these two
steps for each of the protocols later.
Table 9.2 +otations for MTD protocol

Symbol
¢ ∗
T


ℎ. 
&|

ܤT

ܤT)ªAõªA
_
_

Meaning
Set of RFID tags
RFID Reader
Random number
Frame size
One way hash function
Slot position within frame
Bit Record generated by the reader with the
replies of tags
Bit Record generated by the server ahead of
time
Encrypted sensor data
Raw sensor data

Learning Phase: Since the reader is connected to the database using a secure connection,

it can collect s of all the tags directly from the database. The reader can then use these s to

authenticate one tag at a time. Reader can use any standard authentication protocol [Hoque09a]. If
the reader can successfully authenticate all the tags, the set of tags is intact. Otherwise, tags that
cannot be authenticated are considered as not existing. Using this process, the reader can learn
about the tags that currently exist within the system. From then on, the reader can perform the
Execution phase of the MTD protocol to detect missing tags within this set of tags. Instead of

authentication, the reader can also broadcast the s of the tags one at a time and wait for a fixed
time period for receiving the response from the tag. However, this process of tag presence

learning is not secure since an adversary may learn tag s by eavesdropping. If the time required

for reader’s authentication query and a tag’s response is denoted as ( (as query and response are
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supposed to be multi-bit), then the estimated time for learning phase is 7 ∗ 2 ∗ ( , for a system
with 7 tags.

9.4.1. Simple MTD Protocol

Monitor Step: In monitor step of simple MTD protocol, the reader will issue a request
such that only an authenticated tag can understand, and the tag will reply only if the query is

intended for itself. All other tags will keep silent. Since we assume that each tag has a unique ,
only one tag will reply resulting in no collisions. At the end of the list, the reader will inform the
server if there are any missing tags. The Simple MTD protocol works as follows:
Æ = ℎ ⨁  

T

þ 

¢ ∗

þ  _ Æ = ℎ ⨁  

T → W ∗

T

þ 

Æ ∥



 _ Æ == Æ 



þ 

Y4[

0 40

\ Y4[
6 50

 6 06

The verification of each tag’s existence takes (( + )  time and the total execution time

is 7 ∗ ( + ) . Where, ( = reader’s query time (multi-bit data) and ) = tag’s response (singlebit reply, can be 0 or 1).
Collect Step: In this step, the reader signals each of the tags to reply with their sensor
values one at a time. To maintain security, the sensor data has to be encrypted using some

standard encryption technique. If the time required to transmit encrypted sensor data is û* , the

collection step will take 7É û* + ) . Where,
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7É = 0Z 5 6 Y 0 0 ℎ [

therefore, 7É = 7 − 7

7 = 0Z 5 06 6 0 ℎ [
) =  ᇱ  60406  5 ℎ 6

Total time for the entire simple MTD protocol is:
 = 7( + )  + 7É  ) +û* 
9.4.2. Reliable MTD Protocol

The simple MTD protocol is not completely secure and time efficient. In this protocol, an
adversary can observe all the transactions. Since the adversary does not know the content of the
query, observing the existence of an answer may not be very useful, but it will allow the
adversary to track the tag. This protocol is also vulnerable to an eavesdropping attack. To
overcome the shortcomings of simple MTD, we propose Reliable and Secure MTD protocol in
which the reader is assumed to be honest.

Given a set of 7 WISP tags, Reliable MTD returns a Bit Record (BR) to the server to

check if the set of tags is intact and lets the server collect the sensor values. We will discuss the
data structure of a Bit Record soon.
In this protocol, we assume that WISP tags resolve collisions using a slotted ALOHA
[Lee05, Zhen05] like scheme. The reader first broadcasts a frame size and a random number,
, , to all the tags. Here, is a random number and  is the frame size. The frame consists of 

short-response time slots right after the request. Each tag uses the random number r and its id to
hash to a Slot Position, &|, between s1, t where &| = ℎ⨁  mod . Each tag creates an

encrypted version of the sensor data, _ , using the following method:
_ = ℎ⨁ _

Finally the tag sends the encrypted data, _, to the slot position SP. Tags that
successfully transmit their data are instructed to keep silent in the following rounds. Tags that
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pick the same slot for replying will face a collision and they will be given chance to retransmit in
subsequent rounds. For each round, the reader forms a Bit Record (BR) by maintaining an array
of slot positions. Whenever the reader receives any sensor data, it is stored in that slot position.
Upon receiving 0 or collision, respective values are stored in corresponding slot positions.
We modify the slot picking behavior used in typical tag collection protocol so that instead
of having a tag pick a slot and return its id, we let the tags reply with the encrypted sensor data
value _, signifying that the tag has chosen the slot. In other words, instead of the reader
receiving

{· · · | 1 | 0 | 6 | 54450 | 54450 | · · ·},

where, 0 indicates no tag has picked that slot to reply, and collision denotes multiple tags
trying to reply in the same slot, the reader will receive −

{· · · | _ | 0 | _ | 54450 | 54450 | · · ·}.

After receiving the replies, the reader can insert a random number, r, in the collision slot.
The final BR created by the reader from existing tag’s reply has the following structure:
ܤT = {· · · | _ | 0 | _ | | | · · ·}.

This is more secure since the tag is not returning its id, and the sensor data is sent in
encrypted form which seems purely random to the adversary. Our protocol exploits the fact that
tags pick reply slots in a deterministic fashion. Thus, given a particular random number

and

frame size , a tag will always pick the same slot to reply. Because the server knows the s of all

tags, it knows in which slot each tag is supposed to respond with their sensor data. The server
knows that it is supposed to get random numbers in the collision slots and it will discard those
random numbers. The server knows the locations of the empty, singleton and collision slots. In

fact the server can create its own bit record (ܤT)ªAõªA  ahead of time, with 0 for the empty slots,
1 for the singleton slots, and random bits for the collision slot. The server can use this bit record
ܤT)ªAõªA to compare with the BR transmitted by the reader to identify the missing tags.
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Algorithm 1: Interaction between server and reader( T)
1. Server sends ,  to the reader T
2. R executes Algorithm 4

3. All nearby tags executes Algorithm 3

4. Pre-compute ܤT)ªAõªA for all tags ¢ ∗

5. Receive ܤT from T

6. for  = 1 þ  do
7.

8.

if ܤT)ªAõªA  == 1 

if (ܤT  )

 ℎ 6  Y 0

9.

else  ℎ 6  05 Y 0

10.
11. end

Figure 9.4 Algorithm for interaction between server and reader

Algorithm 2:Interaction between WISP tags and reader T
1. Reader broadcasts ,  to all tags ¢ ∗
2. Each tag ¢ executes Alg. 3

3. Reader executes Alg. 4

4. Reader returns ܤT to the server
Figure 9.5 Algorithm for interaction between tags and reader

Algorithm 3: Algorithm executed by WISP tags
1. Receive ,  from T

2. for Each tag ¢ (where i = 1 to #)
3.

4.

compute &| = ℎ ⨁  mod 

compute _ = ℎ ⨁ _

5. end

6. while R broadcasts Slot Position (&|) do
7.
8.
9. end

if (SP = = SPi) then

return _ to R

Figure 9.6 Algorithm executed by WISP tags in MTD protocol
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Algorithm 4: Algorithm executed by reader T
1. Define ܤT of length 

2. Initialize all entries of ܤT to 0

3. for Slot Position &| = 1 5  do

4.

Broadcast &| and listen for reply

6.

if  Y4[_ 06 ! = 54450

7.

else

5.

8.
9. end

ܤTs&|t = Y4[
ܤTs&|t =

10. return ܤT to the server
Figure 9.7 Algorithm executed by the reader in MTD protocol

If a slot is supposed to be singleton but the server finds it to be empty, then the tag that is
mapped to that slot must be missing. This process can verify the existence of all tags that are
mapped to the singleton slots. But it cannot verify existence of the tags that are mapped to the
collision slots.
In order to verify the existence of the tags that faced collisions during the first round, the
reader executes the simple MTD protocol to learn of their presence. In the first round of reliable
MTD, the reader detects missing tags and collects sensor values in the same time slot. But in
following rounds, each existing tag’s detection and sensor data collection takes at most ( + ( 

time. For tags that are mapped to a collision slot as well as missing, the reader only needs ( time

to detect its absence since there is no response time for them. Therefore, the execution time of
complete reliable MTD is.

 =  ∗ ( + ( ∗ 7] + 2 ∗ ( ∗ 7]

where 7] is the number of tags mapped to the collision slots and present. 7] is the
number of tags mapped to collision slots but missing. Alg. 1 (see Figure 9.4) shows the overall
interaction between the reader and the server. Each tag in the set executes Alg. 3 (see Figure 9.6)
independently.
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The reader executes Alg. 4 (see Figure 9.7) to generate the ܤT and return it to the server.
Notice MTD algorithm only requires a single round for missing tag detection and data collection.
Furthermore, in Alg. 4, the tag does not need to return the tag id to the reader. Rather the tag
sends the encrypted sensor value (that seems random to the attacker) to inform the reader of its
presence. This reduces the communication cost since a second round of messages is not required
to send the sensor data to the reader.
9.4.3. Protocol description

Monitor Step: In this step, the reader first broadcasts a frame size and a random number,

, , to all the tags. Each WISP tag ¢ uses its own tag  and r to generate &| =

ℎ ⨁  mod  . At the same time, each tag calculates its own sensor data, _ =
ℎ⨁ _. When the slot position broadcasted by the reader matches with &| , tag ¢

replies _ in that slot position to the reader. Upon receiving replies from different tags, the
reader forms the Bit Record (BR) of length f (frame size) to transmit to the server. Initially the
reader assigns 0 to all the slot positions. However, the reader stores Y4[_ 06 in those slot

positions where it receives a reply. The reader stores a random number in the slot position where
it receives a collision. This technique of bit assignment allows our search protocol to be secure

against some major attacks which we will discuss in next section. The ܤT is then transmitted to

the server. The server calculates Bit Record, ܤT)ªAõªA , for all the tags ahead of time. We assume

that the frame size (f) is large enough to accommodate enough tags in the first round without
collision.

Next, the server compares between received ܤT and ܤT)ªAõªA . If any slot position of

ܤT)ªAõªA contain 1 and that slot position of ܤT does not contain any data, the server become

aware of that the tag data is missing. For the tags that faced collision in the first round, the reader

broadcasts those s one after another. If the reader does not receive sensor data for any particular
tag, it is detected as missing.
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Collect Step: The collect step is executed by the server after the monitor phase is over. In

this phase, the server computes the raw sensor data from the Y4[_ 06 corresponding to each

tag. The Y4[_ 06 is an encrypted form of the raw sensor data. However, only the server can
determine the correct sensor value since s for different tags are only known by the server. The

server can compute the hash of the , i.e. ℎ. The server can XOR the hash, ℎ, with

_ to determine _ using following steps:
for Each tag ¢ (where i = 1 to N)

compute _ = ℎ ⨁ _

end
9.5. Protocol Analysis
In this section, we analyze our second protocol, Reliable MTD protocol, against different
types of attacks.
9.5.1. Attack Model

The goal of an adversary in a WISP based home healthcare system is to counterfeit a real
tag with its real data such that it can only be distinguished from the real one with small
probability. Evidently, this fake tag can let a fake object be identified as an authentic one. In this
system, an adversary is denoted as Q. We assume Q is an active adversary who can listen to all

the communications between the tag and the reader. The adversary can, for example, impersonate
a tag and communicate with the valid reader. The adversary can even query a valid tag and learn
,
the tag’s response. Each reader and tag controlled by the adversary are denoted as T and ¢

respectively. T is unauthorized to have access to any real tags since T has no secret information
(i.e. ) like the real reader T. However, the adversarial reader T can communicate with a valid

 can communicate with a legitimate reader. In both cases, the ultimate
tag. Even the fake tag ¢
goal of the adversary is to perform various attacks in the system.
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We assume that the adversary, the adversarial reader, and the adversarial tag have
polynomially bounded resources. In addition, the adversary can launch physical attacks.
However, the hardware based defenses against physical attacks are beyond the scope of this work.
Our assumptions also include that the reader cannot be compromised. In our system, we consider
following oracle construction:

 , , : The adversary eavesdrops within a channel to listen to the

communication at time  between reader R and one of its communicating tag ¢.

 , , , : The adversary impersonates a reader R in a protocol session

at time  and sends a message M to the tag ¢.

 , , , : The adversary impersonates a tag ¢ in a protocol

session at time  and sends a message M to the reader R.

 , : The adversary queries a tag , to learn information during protocol

session at time .

  ¡, , : The adversary receives a message M from an entity U (e.g., either WT

or R) during the execution of protocol session at time .
9.5.2. Security Analysis

For every attack, we first describe how the attack is performed by an adversary. Then

how our protocol protects against the attack is explained. T and ¢ are referred to as a
legitimate reader and legitimate tag. Each attack and defense, as a whole, has three phases:

Phase 1. Learning phase: This phase represents pre-attack preparations. Adversary, Q

uses non-destructive oracles such as  , , ,  , , , ,

 , ,  , , , , and   ¡, ,  on a set of target tags and
reader. The goal of the adversary is to learn information related to tags and reader.
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Phase 2. Attacking phase: Q starts to attack. Q may impersonate as a legitimate tag or
reader.
Phase 3. Defend Phase: Reliable MTD protocol is designed in such a way so that it can

defend against the majority of the attacks performed by the adversary Q. Due to space limitation,
here we only discuss three attacks.
•

Privacy Preservation

Learning Phase: Here, Q repeatedly queries ¢ with different ,  using

 ,  , ,  to collect replies from the tags.

Attacking phase: Q executes   ¡, ,  oracle to learn replies from the tags and

create a bit record. The goal of the attacker is to learn the s of different tags and also the raw
sensor values so that it can infer human activity or environmental situation. This is known as
privacy violation.
Defend Phase: Our protocol can preserve the privacy of individual WISP tags since none

of the tags reply their . Therefore, the adversary cannot infer the s from the replies of the
tags. Q cannot even find out the original sensor data. Each tag replies with an encrypted sensor

data, ℎ⨁ _ which can be decrypted only by the server. Since the server only knows the

 of different tags, only it can compute the hash value. So, none but the server can decrypt the

encrypted sensor data to collect the raw data.
•

Tracking

Learning Phase: Here, Q tries to track ¢ over time. Q succeeds if it can distinguish

¢ from other tags.

Attacking phase: Under this attack, Q repeatedly queries ¢ with different ,  using

oracle   ,  to learn about the slot picking behavior of the tags. Then the adversary
executes oracle   ¡, ,  to receive replies from the tags. The goal of the attacker is to

get a consistent reply that may become a signature of ¢ .
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Defend Phase: MTD is resistant against tracking. Let an adversary Q eavesdrop on the

transaction between a reader T and the existing tags. So Q knows the queries and replies but Q

cannot reverse compute the replies. The adversary can certainly be sure that monitoring has taken
place. However, it will not be able to figure out which tag replied in which slot since it does not

have the s of the tags. Moreover, the slot picking behavior of the tags changes with the change
of  and . As a result, the outputs of all the tags seems to be purely random to the adversary Q.

•

Eavesdropping

Learning Phase: Q executes the oracle  ,  ,  and later uses this

information to launch different attacks (ex. replay attack)

Attacking phase: Q can learn every piece of information exchanged between T and ¢ .

The goal of Q is to use the data to impersonate a fake reader or a fake tag.

Defend Phase: Our protocol is powerful against this attack. In our protocol Q will not be

able to find out the expected reply of the tags. Q will not be able to find out any relation between
the slot positions and tag replies. In each monitoring pass, all tags will pick a different slot based
on the random number sent by the reader. Q can only observe the data sent by the reader and the
tags. But Q will not be able to link the outputs of two parties and it will not be able to decrypt

sensor data. It cannot even replay the messages since it cannot compute the correct slot position
(given  and ) without the knowledge of . Therefore, Q cannot impersonate T or ¢ and it
cannot launch replay attack by using previous values.
9.6. Evaluation Results
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of our two protocols by simulation. We use two
metrics to compare the performance of the protocols − 1) protocol execution time and 2) time to
determine the first missing tag. The protocol execution time metric tells us how long it takes for
a protocol to identify exactly how many tags are missing and which tags are missing. The second

139

metric tells us how long it takes a protocol to identify the missing-tag event, i.e. at least one tag is
missing.

(a) Number of missing tags follows an
exponential distribution with mean
20000

(b) Number of missing tags follows an
exponential distribution with mean
35000

(c) Number of missing tags follows an
exponential distribution with mean 45000

Figure 9.8 Comparison of Simple and Reliable MTD protocol based on protocol execution time

(a) Number of missing tags follows an
exponential distribution with mean
20000

(b) Number of missing tags follows an
exponential distribution with mean
35000

(c) Number of missing tags follows an
exponential distribution with mean 45000

Figure 9.9 Comparison of Simple and Reliable MTD protocol based on the time to detect the first
missing tag

According to the technical specification of Philips I-Code system [Buettner08], a reader

needs 0.4 to detect an empty slot, 0.8 to detect a collision or a singleton slot, and 2.4 to

transmit a 96-bit piece of data. In our simple MTD protocol, we need to consider only the time to
transmit short responses () = 0.4 ), long responses (( = 0.8 ) and time to transmit sensor
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data (û* = 2.4 ). However, in the Reliable MTD protocol, we only need to identify single

reply slots and collision slots. The efficiency of reliable MTD is also dependent on frame size .

A smaller  has fewer slots, which results in faster performance. We assume the duration of each
slot is equally long.

In our simulated WISP environment, we considered 7 = 50,000 to 100,000 WISP tags

and one legitimate reader. Figure 5.8 shows the execution time of our two protocols. We assume
that the number of missing tags in the system follows an exponential distribution with mean =
10000 in Figure 9.8(a), mean = 35000 in Figure 9.8(b) and mean = 45000 in Figure 9.8(c). We
ran each simulation 100 times with different random seeds and took the average of these values to
produce a point on the graph. The first set of simulation results (Figure 9.8 (a) (b) (c)) shows that
the reliable MTD protocol performs increasingly better than the simple MTD protocol, especially
when there is a large number of missing tags in the system. For example, when N = 100000, the
time of the reliable MTD is 65.3% of the time taken by simple MTD.
The second set of simulations studies the relation between the number of missing tags
and the time to detect the first missing tag. From the experimental results shown in figure (Figure
9.9 (a) (b) (c)) it is evident that it takes less time to find out whether some tags are missing than to
actually identify all of them. This is also an important feature for systems that require a quick
check on the tags on whether the set of tags is intact. All the results of Figure 9.9 also illustrate
that the simple MTD takes more time to detect missing tag than the Reliable MTD protocol.
9.7. Discussion
The overall goal of this research work was to investigate the solution of missing WISP
tag detection that can be very significant in any WISP based monitoring systems. Since the
decision making of such a system depends on each individual WISP tag, the absence of any tag
data may raise questions about reliability of the system’s decision. If the missing tag event goes
undetected and any wrong decision is taken by the system, it can be even more critical from the

141

point of view of the system’s user. Therefore, from the point of view of system’s functionality
accuracy, missing WISP tag detection is an important problem.
In this chapter, we propose a simple and reliable missing tag detection protocol that can
be useful in the above mentioned application areas where reliability and security is the primary
focus. However, our protocol has a minor limitation. In secure and reliable MTD, there can be
situations where existing tags in the systems are compromised by an adversary and are instructed
to keep silent during the execution of the protocol. We call this type of attack a “concealing
attack”. It is very hard to defend against a concealing attack and it is out of the scope of this work.
However, investigation of defense mechanism for concealing attack can be a good future work.
9.8. Goals Satisfied by MTD Protocol
The motivating example of CRFID application for this chapter is critical CRFID
applications where the reliability of the system’s decision is really very important. In such
applications the main goal of the system is ensure that the decision taken by the system is reliable
or accurate enough since the overall collective decision of the system may have an impact on
human lives. Therefore, ensuring decision making reliability (by indentifying missing data in the
system) as well as reducing response time are two major goals in these types of applications.
MTD protocol is able to achieve these goals since it allows identifying the missing tags as well as
ensures system security and decision reliability.
9.9. Summary
In this chapter, we considered the problem of identifying the missing tags in CRFID
based critical systems. To address this problem, we propose a secure protocol to monitor for
missing tags, identified the missing ones without sacrificing the performance of the system.
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October, 2012.
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Chapter 10:

Conclusions and Future Work

In this chapter, we summarize the contributions of the dissertation and present some
future research directions.
10.1. Research Achievements
RFID technology is increasingly being deployed in diverse applications ranging from
inventory management to counterfeiting prevention. With the emergence and deployment of
computational RFID tags, the application of this technology will become even more extensive.
Nonetheless, RFID tags have yet to replace the ubiquitous barcode found on almost every grocery
product. This slow adoption is partly due to the security and privacy concerns over the pervasive
deployment of RFID tags. With commodities as varied as bank notes, airport luggage, and
clothing items, the security and privacy aspects of each system need to be individually addressed.
Usually general RFID authentication protocols are used for ensuring security and preserving
privacy in all applications. However, each RFID application has its own specific requirements.
For example, RFID systems for healthcare, supply chain and military battlefield have different
security, privacy and performance requirements. Therefore, our focus in this dissertation is to
ensure that RFID system specific goals are met without sacrificing performance.
To address the above mentioned goals, the methodologies that we have presented in this
dissertation represent a complete solution to the security and privacy issues of couple of major
real life RFID applications. We can use encryption and digital signatures in our scheme despite
the use of passive read/write tags, which are resource constrained. This scheme can be deployed
without any changes to the existing EPC Class 1 architecture. Further, it can be integrated with
the EPC Network.
The main achievements of the research presented in this dissertation can be summarized
as follows:
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•

Detecting Counterfeits in Large Scale RFID Systems Using Batch Authentication

Protocol: In Chapter 6, we propose to detect counterfeit tags in large scale system using efficient
batch authentication. In large scale RFID applications (such as supply chain, retail industry, and
pharmaceutical industry) tag authentication is used to detect counterfeit products. However, RFID
authentication protocols are mainly per-tag based where a reader needs to authenticate tags
sequentially. This increases the overall protocol execution time. To address this, we propose
Frames Slotted ALOHA (FSA) based protocol, FTest, to meet the requirements of prompt and
reliable batch authentication in large-scale RFID applications. FTest can determine the validity of
a batch of tags with minimal execution time which is a major goal of large-scale RFID systems.
FTest can reduce protocol execution time by ensuring that the percentage of potential counterfeit
products is less than a user-defined threshold. Our experimental result demonstrates that FTest
performs significantly better than the existing counterfeit detection approaches, e.g.
authentication techniques.
•

Preserving Privacy in RFID based Healthcare Systems: In Chapter 7 we address the

tradeoff between privacy and reliability in RFID based healthcare systems. RFID has received
considerable attention within the healthcare community since early 2000. However, the prospect
of wide spread use of RFID in the healthcare area has also triggered discussions regarding
privacy. There are basically two types of privacy preservation issues in RFID based healthcare: 1)
A privacy preserving authentication protocol is required while sensing RFID tag for different
identification and monitoring purposes; 2) A privacy preserving access control framework is
required to maintain user preferred privacy while accessing various healthcare services based on
RFID identification data. To address the above mentioned research issues, we propose two
component based framework (PriSens-HSAC). The PriSens component proposes a group based
anonymous authentication protocol to solve the tradeoff between the scalability and privacy
problems of RFID sensing in healthcare. The HSAC component proposes a privacy preserving
healthcare service access mechanism to maintain the users’ privacy while accessing various
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healthcare services. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first framework to provide increased
privacy in RFID based healthcare using authentication along with access control technique.
Ensuring Survivability of RFID Systems using a Robust Authentication Protocol: In

•

Chapter 8 we introduce computational RFID tags and their possible application areas. WISP tags
are an example of Computational RFID (CRFID) which is used in many sophisticated
applications like: enemy move detection in military battlefields, and activity inference in elderly
care systems. In these types of systems, an adversary may create more collisions to initiate a desynchronization attack. This, in turn, may result in Denial of Service (DoS) attack, increase the
system response time, and jeopardize the survivability of the system. In an effort to address the
survivability issues in CRFID based sophisticated applications, we propose DRAP protocol. This
protocol can return desynchronized tags and readers to their synchronous state. Therefore, it
provides robustness and ensures survivability. Our simulation results show that DRAP reduces
the collision rate significantly to increase the system performance.
•

Detecting Missing WISP Tags for Improved Decision Reliability of CRFID based

Systems: In Chapter 9, we present missing tags detection protocols for CRFID based critical
systems. Recently, WISP tags, one type of CRFID tags, have been used to monitor indoor
activity, vital signs, sleep quality, and health status remotely. However, these critical CRFID
based systems are very sensitive in terms of decision reliability. Any missing tag data in these
systems may introduce error in the final decision of the system and this may reduce system’s
decision reliability. To address this problem and to maintain system’s decision reliability, we
propose two tag monitoring protocols for CRFID based critical systems based on probabilistic
methods. We also report the performance comparison of our protocols. The goal of these
protocols is to improve the security and decision reliability of CRFID based critical systems.

146

10.2. Future Research Directions
There are many possible research topics for further study within the area of RFID
security and privacy. We mention some possible research directions related to the work described
in this dissertation:
•

In FTest Protocol, we assumed that all tags (both legitimate and counterfeit) will be

honest, i.e., all tags will reply when queried by a reader. In our attack model, we did not consider
counterfeit tags that may not reply to hide their identity during the query phase. However, in an
active adversarial environment the counterfeit tags may not reply at all to hide their identity and
we name this attack as “concealing attack”. It is very hard to defend against concealing attack and
it is out of the scope of this dissertation. Therefore, one future research direction would be to
investigate defense mechanisms against concealing attack in FTest Protocol.
•

One other future research direction in case of FTest protocol is to investigate the protocol

performance for different batch sizes and for varying ∆ values. In this regards, one could also

investigate the design of a lightweight batch authentication protocol based on key transportation
and authentication using threshold secret sharing scheme which provides strong security on lowcost RFID tags.
•

In PriSens-HSAC framework, one research investigation could be to investigate the

performance and accuracy of the entire framework by utilizing it in various real scenarios for
different user roles like: Physician, Emergency care provider, and Pharmacist. To better
investigate the privacy preservation issue one could also test the accuracy of the framework by
simulating the system scenario under various attacks.
•

One other research direction in case of PriSens-HSAC framework can be to investigate

the privacy levels achieved for different types of service requests and different attacks.
•

Another future research direction in the context of privacy preservation in RFID systems

could be to study the privacy threats in RFID data publishing phase and show that traditional
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anonymization techniques are not applicable for RFID data due to its challenging properties:
high-dimensional, sparse, and sequential. Future research can also be focused to adopt a newer
privacy model like LKC-privacy that can overcome these challenges in the data publishing phase.
•

In DRAP Protocol, we use EDFSA based communication technique while the tag and

reader communicates with each other to reduce the collision rate so that optimum system
efficiency can be achieved. However, one future research could be to investigate how the protocol
performs when the underlying communication technique is varied. The underlying
communication technique can be varied by varying the frame sizes for the following protocols:
pure slotted ALOHA, framed slotted ALOHA, dynamic framed slotted ALOHA.
•

One major future research work could be to develop an emulator for secure RFID

protocol testing so that the real performance of all the protocols proposed in this dissertation can
be tested. The aim of this future work could be to better understand the nature of various attacks
launched in different RFID system and how our protocols can address them. This work can be
further extended by investigating the performance of our protocol under collaborative attack.
•

This dissertation only considers RFID protocols using symmetric cryptography, primarily

those using hash functions. There are a number of other general RFID protocols that needs further
study, including RFID protocols using asymmetric cryptography. There could also be many
attacks on RFID systems that we have not identified. Thus, further study of such protocols and
possible attacks would be really significant.
•

In this dissertation, we have also assumed that the channel between the back-end server

and the reader is secure. Therefore, we have not dealt with security threats arising on that
channel. However, in some applications, this communication channel may be unsecure, for
example, the channel me be an unsecure wireless channel. Thus, development of secure
authentication protocols over this channel should be studied further.
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Chapter 12:

Appendix

Glossary of Terms
Term

Anonymity

Definition

Anonymity is the state of not being identifiable within a set
Authentication means the act of confirming someone (or something)

Authentication
as authentic.
Backend server/

A backend server is a trusted server that contains all the information

central server/

of all tags in RFID system and it can access these information from

backend database

its database by using the tag’s response as a key
Eavesdropping is the act of secretly listening to the private

Eavesdropping
conversation between two parties
The second generation air interface for communication between an
RFID reader and tag, administered by EPC global Inc. It deals with
Gen 2
the modulation scheme, packet structure, command language and
methods for dealing with collision.
Lightweight

Cryptographic operations that require low computational and

Cryptography

processing power to be performed

Nonce

A random number that never repeats its value
Pervasive computing provides an environment where information

Pervasive computing and services can be accessed remotely from the environment
specially through wireless technologies
The notion of controlling where, when, to whom and what amount
Privacy
of information is provided to the external entities
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A class of algorithms for cryptography that use a pair cryptographic
Public key
key: public key (known to public) and private key (known only to
cryptography
the owner).
RFID is an abbreviation of Radio Frequency IDentification. It is a
RFID systems
data collection technology that uses electronic tags for storing data.
A microchip attached to an antenna that is packaged in a way that it
RFID tags

can be applied to an object. The tag picks up signals from and sends
signals to a reader. The tag contains a unique serial number.
A device used to communicate with RFID tags. The reader has one

Reader

or more antennas, which emit radio waves and receive signals back
from the tag.
Process of creating a computing platform that ensures only allowed

Security
actions are performed.
Symmetric key

A class of algorithms for cryptography that use shared secret

cryptography

cryptographic keys
WISP stands for Wireless Identification and Sensing Platform.

WISP

WISPs have the capabilities of RFID tags, but also support sensing
and computing.

